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ABSTRACT AND KEY TERMS 
 
 
This study focuses on a critique of the nature of church-state relations that exists 
between the Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN) and the Plateau State, Nigeria, with 
a view of assessing the extent to which the nature of this relationship influenced the 
experience of violent conflict within Jos, Nigeria, especially from 2001 to 2010.  
This study argues that when there is a confusion of roles and lack of clarity in their 
relations, whereby it facilitates violence and inhibits the development of the people, 
thereby denying them fullness of life (John 10:10 NIV). Only when Church and State 
understand and use power, “as being everywhere, diffused and embodied in discourse, 
knowledge, and ‘regimes of truth,’ making us what we are, and not concentrated, not 
possessed, not coercive or an instrument of coercion, not concentrated in structures, 
not episodic, not sovereign, and not an act of domination” (Foucault, 1998:63-68), 
will their relations be constructive and foster the well-being of all the citizens of Jos, 
Plateau State. Power ought not to be construed as a negative force that is utilized to 
discriminate and exploit the powerless, but should be a positive and constructive force 
that promotes the well-being of all within society (Foucault, 1991:194). If the exercise 
of power fails to promote life through peaceful and common participation of all its 
citizens in the decisions that affect their well-being, it inevitably becomes destructive. 
Based on the research question that undergirds the study, I utilize a systematic 
literature reviews method to assess the existing literature on church-state relations 
with special emphasis on relevant literature from the Nigerian context, covering the 
colonial and post-colonial contexts, as well as the wider sub-Saharan African context. 
The study explores the historical models of church-state relations that have emerged 
from the history of Western Christianity as a background to explain how they 
promoted or inhibited peace-building in their contexts. This served as a sign-post to 
the evolution of the nature of church-state relations that existed between the COCIN 




The study is a critique of the prevailing model of church-state relationship in the 
socio-political and economic context of the Nigerian State. The aim was to assess the 
extent to which it promoted or inhibited peace-building in Jos, and how it influences 
their current relations and peace-building process in the State. In search of an 
improved peace-building process in Jos, the study suggests a Suum-Ngi model of 
religions-state relations as an alternative African model for relations between religions 
and Plateau State as a replacement of the extant Church and State model that has 
served only to foster violence. 
 
 
Key Terms: Africa; Church of Christ in Nations; Church-State Relations; Colonial; 
Critical Solidarity and Distance; Jos; Kadung; Missio-Political; Missio-Dei; Nigeria; 
Peace-Building; Plateau State; Pluralistic Society; Post-Colonial; Suum-Ngi; Social 
Reconstruction; Violent Conflict.  
x 




In order to be consistent with the use of key terms throughout this study, each concept 
needs to be defined and analysed to ensure that they communicate with clarity the 
deep meaning that is intended by each term used. 
Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN): This is a regional Evangelical Mission-
founded church denomination in Plateau State, Nigeria, founded in 1904 (Gutip, 
1998:2-3). It was founded by the British Branch of the Sudan United Mission (SUM) 
(The Light Bearer, 1907:2-4, Gutip, 1998:3-6; Goshit, 2013:2-3). Its original Hausa 
(Nigerian local language) name was Ekklisiyar Kristi A Sudan (EKAS) (Church of 
Christ in the Sudan). It was later changed to Ekklisiyar Kristi A Najeriya (EKAN) 
(Church of Christ in Nigeria) (Gutip, 1998:3-4). In 2013, its name was changed again 
to Ekklisiyar Kristi A Kasashe (EKAK) (Church of Christ in Nations) because it had 
spread beyond the borders of Nigeria to other African countries and Europe, including 
the United Kingdom (Goshit, 2013:2-6). This study critiques this church in the 
context of its institutional expression based mainly in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria. 
 
Colonial: This term is used in this study in the context of the foreign rulership over a 
people by an imperial power (2012, Lesmore, 2015; Lenshie, et a.l.,), which, in this 
case, refers to British colonial rule over Nigeria from 1900 to late 1960.  
 
Post-colonial: The prefix “post-” in ‘post-colonial’ refers to a historical relation, to a 
period after colonialism as a chronological progression. Post-colonial opposed to the 
philosophical concept of hermeneutic interpretation, is used in this study to refer to 
Nigeria’s Independent era after the close of colonial rule (Lenshie, et al., 2012:43). In 
this case, it refers to the period of Nigerian Independence from Great Britain from 01 
October 1960 to 2015.  
 
Jos: Jos is the capital city and the administrative headquarters of constituent Plateau 
State, Nigeria, known for its tin mining activities as early as the eighteen-century 
(Plateau State Gazette, hereafter PLSG, 1976). The discovery of tin and columbite on 
the Jos plateau informed the colonial economic interest and the migration of 
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Hausa/Fulani Muslims from Kano, Sokoto, and Katsina to Jos, whom the colonialists 
brought to work on the tin mines (PLSG, 1976). Jos is a pluralist city with 84.5% 
Christians, 12% Muslims, and 3.5% Traditionalists (Danfulani, 2006:6-8). Its native 
name was “Gwash” but when the colonial administrators brought in the Hausa/Fulani 
from the core north to work on the tin mines of Gwash, they mispronounced “Gwash” 
for “Jos” (Plateau State Indigenous and Development Association Network hereafter 
PIDAN, 2012:3-7, PLSG, 1967), which constitutes part of the intractable violence 
between Christians and Muslims in the city (PIDAN, 2012:7-8). It is used in this 
study as the immediate context and centre of violence from 2001-2010. 
 
State: The term is used in this study in the context of Max Weber’s understanding, 
which sees it as “a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (1968:54). John Bennett also 
offers a similar definition: “an institutional political system in which ultimate power 
and authority are located, which are necessary for maintaining law and order to give 
conscious direction to the life of a society” (Bennett cited in Wogaman, 1988:12). 
However, when used in this study it refers specifically to Plateau State as a constituent 
political unit of the sovereign State Nigeria. 
 
Church: Ecclesiologically, the church has been defined by Huns Küng (1967:xi, 80, 
81) as “the pilgrim community of believers…a new community of called-out-ones” 
(1967), and “an eschatological community of salvation.” The term is used in this 
study as a physical and institutional expression of what David Bosch (1977:15-17) 
refers to as “church organized,” or “alternative community” called to promote social 
justice by holding the State accountable to all that give life to society. The Church in 
this context is ordained to live and preach peace especially in a pluralist society such 
as Jos by engaging in critical solidarity and distance from oppressive structures. 
 
Missio-political Critique: This is being used in this study as the main framework or 
lens of evaluating and critiquing the relationship that exists between the Church of 
Christ in Nations (COCIN) and the Plateau State within the context of violent conflict 
in Jos. Missio-political in this context refers to the wholesome and life-giving agenda 
of God which is all-embracing, and in which the church is called to participate 
(Bosch, 1982:179). Missio-political is holistic because it constitutes the entire on-
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going liberating package of God for the world politically, economically, socially, 
culturally, and religiously so that the church is equally called to participate in all these 
to the extent that social justice is maintained (Bosch, 1982:179). Allan Boesak 
(2005:135-154) has defined what constitutes the missio-political mandate of the 
church as the “critical involvement in all the affairs of the state as a responsibility to 
witness and to promote God’s justice, peace, and meaningful life for all the people in 
the society.” Missio-political participation not only calls for church’s involvement, but 
it also calls for the church’s critical distance from all dysfunctional policies that may 
tend to promote life-denying policies (Boesak, 2005:154). One could equally add that 
Missio-political constitutes the entire intention of God for creation, which the Church 
is called to promote by participating actively in all affairs that are life-giving to all 
people without discrimination. 
 
Critical Analysis: This is being used as a strategy of carefully examining, judging, 
and scrutinizing the large pool of existing literature on Church-State relations and the 
historical models of Church-State relations while expressing approval or disapproval 
as to whether they work or fail to work as expected in accordance with the mission of 
God in the world (Turnbull, 2010:46, 348). This strategy is aimed at arriving at a 
more constructive model of church-state relations that is more life-giving for the 
COCIN and the Plateau State. 
 
Violent Conflict: This refers to violence which can be interpersonal, inter-group, or 
structural in nature. It is used in this study to refer to any conflict that involves the 
infliction of injury to persons or property, or structural violence expressed in the 
denial of human rights by unlawful means that result in exploitation and oppression of 
the weak by the strong (Phelps, 1992:21). Conflict itself can be expressed as 
disagreement, strife, struggle, controversy, antagonism, opposition, and resentment 
between two or more interests (1992:22). In this case, the decade of violent conflict in 
Jos, Nigeria was both interpersonal and inter-group because of competing interests 
over economic domination by the majority, identity, and religious sentiments (Imo, 
2011:246). Colletta Kurunziza (2003:v) also argues that “violent conflict results from 
the experience of poverty, lack of vision, unmotivated staff, limited resources, lack of 
transparency and accountability, inequality, ethnic, and political discrimination.” In 
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this way, Nkurunziza agrees with M. K. Gandhi, who describes poverty as the worst 
violence (cited in Wallis (2002:61). 
  
Pluralist Society: A pluralistic society embodies the phenomenon of diversity in all 
of the different spheres of life: religious, cultural, political, and ethnic in nature, or all 
of these put together (Newbigin, 1989:14). Therefore, a pluralist society is a situation 
where, as understood by Leslie Newbigin (1989:14), “peoples of many ethnic origins 
and many different religious commitments and cultural orientations live together in 
our cities sharing public life”. One important insight contained in Newbigin’s 
definition of religious pluralism is that “religious pluralism is the belief that the 
differences between the religions are not a matter of truth and false, but of different 
perceptions of the same truth…” (1989:14). When people of different religious and 
political affiliations recognize that their religion or political party is one of the many 
and not the absolute, it helps to curtail unhealthy competition and religio-political 
violence among the citizens in a given society. Therefore, pluralism may contribute to 
violence in society not because there are many religions but because religious people 
become intolerant of others and claim superiority over them. 
 
Peace-building: This term is used within this study to describe a deliberate effort by 
Church and State to strengthen the prospects of internal peace by decreasing the 
likelihood of violent conflict (Tobias and Kleing, 2002:35-36). Peace-building is 
geared towards enhancing indigenous capacities of a society to manage conflict 
without violence. It focuses on a wide range of activities which have bearing on the 
social, psychological, and economic environment at the grassroots (Raiser, 2013:439). 
Without intensive involvement of ordinary people at the base of their society to build 
strong foundation for civil society, even if negotiation between conflicting parties 
takes place at the official level it may not result in positive peace-building at the base 
(Galtung, 2006:446). 
 
Religion: A normative definition of religion is difficult because there are many 
religions with varying codes and dogmas, but also because of its deeply experiential 
nature. Michael Haralambos (1980:453) defines religion as “the belief in the 
supernatural” but Roland Robertson and Melford Spiro (cited in Haralambos, 
1980:453), have critiqued this definition by arguing that the definition has failed to 
xiv 
incorporate the idea that the supernatural forces have some influence or control upon 
the world. Accordingly, they have added to the definition, whereby religion can refer 
to the existence of supernatural beings or beings which have a governing effect on 
human life, as well as the possibility of bringing harm or assistance to bear.  Since 
religion focuses on absolutes, Jeff Haynes (1999:197) rightly notes that “it can 
generate potent danger.”  Karl Marx, being critical of what religion does to society, 
offers the well-known definition of religion as “an illusion which eases the pain 
produced by exploitation and oppression…a sigh of the oppressed creature, the 
sentiment of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions…an opiate to dull 
the pain produced by oppression (Marx cited in Haralambos, 1980:460). 
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INTRODUCING THE STUDY: SETTING THE STAGE 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The central focus of this study focuses on examining the understanding and practice of 
Church-State relationship within a particular regional State of Nigeria that has been affected 
by violent conflicts from 2001-2010. The second objective is to engage a missional critique 
of the ways in which the Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN) faith community has 
identified, harnessed and utilized peacebuilding resources within the pluralist community of 
Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria, to facilitate fullness of life. 
  
This opening chapter will develop by tracing the history of the evolution of Church-State 
relations with particular reference to how the Western worldview through colonization 
informed the separation of the two entities. The motivation and context of this present study 
is also discussed in the chapter. As far as the context, this study will review the birth of the 
Nigerian State, its ethnic Constitution, its constituent political units, as well as provide a brief 
overview of the inter-religious violence that has beset the country. This context will be 
narrowed down to Plateau State and its Local Government Areas showing the ethnic 
Constitution of each Local Government Area. The peaceful nature of Plateau State before the 
violence and its religious diversity will be highlighted including a brief overview of how the 
violence erupted from 2001. The chapter will also highlight the COCIN and its strategic 
position within Plateau State. Included also will be the research problem, hypothesis, research 
question and research objectives. Finally, the scope and limitation of the study, as well as a 
summary of the literature reviews will be provided. 
 
1.2. The Evolution of Church-State Relations 
With regard to the evolution of Church-State relations, it is pertinent to briefly present an 





1.2.1. The Concepts of ‘Church’ and ‘State’ 
Unless I state otherwise, when I use the concept of ‘Church’ in this study, I refer primarily to 
its usage as an institutional expression of governance within the socio-political environment 
of a society in which it is located and not necessarily to the ecclesial body of believers who 
meet for Divine worship in a particular space or locality, or the global organic body of 
believers in Christ who claim eschatological identity (Küng, 1967:81; Bosch, 1977:12-13). In 
the same way, when I utilize the concept of ‘State’ in this study, denotes a territorial political 
community for which there is an independent government, but is not sovereign in and of itself 
(as in the case of Plateau State); but rather is a constituent political entity, accountable to the 
sovereign State of which it is part (Pick, 2011:3). 
  
 
1.2.2. The Phenomenon of Church-State Dynamics 
Tarnas (1991:171) has argued that “Church-State dynamic evolved from the complex 
evolutions of the Western Mind which took over the Medieval Christian world view.” Here, 
Tarnas seems to imply that the classical societies of ancient Greece up to and including the 
Greco-Roman world did not experience Church-State dynamics or religion and politics as 
separate entities until the era of persecution (Marriott, 1927:54; Baker, 1959:1; Boer, 
1976:12-13; Kraut, 2002:208). This was because they were more like Nation-States, 
operating as theocratic societies (Marriott, 1927:55) where the religious and political spheres 
were united in the governance of public affairs. The phenomenon of Church-State dynamics 
emerged when the European powers began their process of colonization of other regions of 
the world. For example, when the Romans conquered the Greeks in 63 BCE and replaced 
their classical culture with Christian and Roman Religious culture; this process set the stage 
for the emergence of the modern world view. It can be argued that the different religions that 
existed within the Roman Empire were quasi-State departments that offered an underpinning 
spiritual support for the socio-economic and political development of the Roman Empire 
(Boer, 1976:13-14). As Tarnas (1991:159) confirms, “when the Romans colonized the 
Greeks, Christianity replaced classical culture…as the Roman culture became Christian, 
Christianity became Roman.” Accordingly, this period became the cradle of Church-State 
dynamics, facilitated later by three important historical epochs: (i) Colonization, (ii) the 




corresponding rise of secularist humanism across Europe (Tarnas, 1991:123-131). These 
were not Church-friendly movements, forcing instead the Church to withdraw and create a 
space for itself distinct from the Empire. 
 
Within the African context, the Church-State dynamic prevailed in the previously Western 
colonized Nation States, especially countries within the Sub-Saharan African region such as 
Nigeria. The British-religio-political influences upon Nigerian society ensured the dominance 
of a Euro-centric missio-cultural brand of Christianity on the southern regions of the nation 
State. The other dominant religions within Nigeria are Islam which dominates the northern 
States as well as the wide-spread prevalence of African Traditional Religion (ATR).  
 
 
1.2.3.  The Missio-political Identity of Church and State 
The principal focus of this study is the Christian religion and to a lesser extent, Islam both 
being monotheistic faiths with a zeal to enforce allegiance to one God according to their 
different understandings. This dynamic has created an environment of intolerance of other 
groups who have different religious beliefs (Raiser, 2013:11-23). Since this study seeks to 
examine the quality of the relationship between the COCIN and Plateau State relationship 
within Jos, from 2001-2010, it will employ a missio-political lens through which to 
interrogate the ways in which the nature of this relationship influenced the process of peace-
building within the context of violent conflict. This framework is informed by an 
understanding of the Church along with the State, each existing to serve different roles as life 
affirming instruments that fulfil God’s purpose (missio-Dei) as expressed in the mission of 
Jesus who came to offer fullness of life for all creation (John 10:10) (Keum, 2013). 
 
The missio-political identity and vocation of the Church and State refer to the quality of their 
relationship as they work together for the common good of the community and how that 
flows together with the missio-Dei for the world (Hewitt, 2012:34). The desire for the total 
well-being of all creation, inclusive of the human community, is central to the understanding 
of the missio-Dei (Bosch 1982:178). Jesus in his ministry and mission declared that the 
coming kingdom of God calls for restoring the dignity of all creation (Luke 4:18-19; John 




not a sphere of creation that falls outside the concern of the Lordship of Christ” (1988:20-25). 
Boesak’s position is that the participation of the Church in the mission of God is all-
embracing, a result of which should be Church’s involvement in the sphere of politics. These 
submissions imply that the Creator is continuously sustaining his entire creation towards a 
life-giving purpose. The desire of the Creator is that all of creation enjoys a constructive and 
peaceful social order in a world where justice and peace reign eternally.  
 
In this present study, I employ theories of Church-State relations to interrogate the COCIN’s 
relationship with the Plateau State in Nigeria in the context of violent conflict in the city of 
Jos, and its environs. Within the context of Jos, Church and the State are strategic institutions 
that shape how society is structured and managed to facilitate good governance. According to 
Hunsinger (2006:352), the Church and State are in symbiotic relationship because:  
The Church needs the State to create the orderly preconditions for the Church’s 
proclamation and witness, and the State needs the Church to remind the State of its 
divinely appointed origin, limits and goals, therefore the State best serves the Church 
by remaining the State and the Church serves the State best by remaining the Church.  
However, this symbiotic relationship is not an end in itself but instead are a means to an end, 
otherwise their symbiotic relations becomes selfish and destructive to the needs and welfare 
of the entire society. Hunsinger (2006) only addresses the constructive roles that both 
institutions play in society without mentioning any of the negative aspects of such a 
relationship that can be detrimental to peace building within the different societies. However, 
as Raiser (2013:103) has pointed out, both institutions engage in a cut-throat competition for 
power and influence with the intention of transforming the context in which they operate, a 
process that often can be destructive to the common good of society. Raiser’s critique of 
Church-State relations identifies therefore that they constitute complementary and 
contradictory realities. Pilgrim (1999:187) thus postulates:  
The Church and State live in uneasy tension. On the one hand, they can be mutually 
supportive of one another as long as the State fulfils its beneficent role as 
administrator for the common welfare. On the other hand, the Church is obligated to 
discern the temptations to idolatry from the State and its lack of concern for the good 
of human communities it serves. The Church rejects all idolatrous claims of the State 
as demonic. 
However, Pilgrim’s argument implies that as long as the State fulfils its role, the Church will 
naturally fulfil its own role. Within the context of Jos this perspective does not work because 




and inclined to accumulate and utilize power in a way that does not work towards the 
common good of all its citizens.   
Because religion and politics are practically ideologies of social order, they are potential 
rivals. Either can claim to be the guarantor of orderliness within a given society and therefore 
the ultimate authority for people’s allegiance. Such claims may embody an extraordinary 
degree of power that gives each institution the right to offer moral sanctions for life-and-
death decisions. When political or religious systems of governance seek to rule by themselves 
without accountability, it reduces the role of the other to the periphery of the society. Since 
religion tends to claim the fundamental source of power and authority that goes beyond 
human authority, it has claimed at different periods in history to be the measure of the 
legitimacy of all forms and structures of governance (Haynes, 1996:6-7). On the other hand, 
political ideologies such as secular nationalism also make absolute claims to power, including 
the control of religion. However, even in settings where there is a complete integration or 
absorption of religions into the State system (Caesaropapism)1 it does not necessarily 
guarantee social order and good governance.  
 
This study thus argues that the nature of Church-State relations which exists between the 
COCIN and the Plateau State does not adequately engender peace building and this 
constitutes a contributing factor to the violent conflict that engulfed Jos from 2001-2010. To 
counter this, an alternative model of Church-State relations is necessary in the context of Jos, 
Plateau State that works for the common good of all.   
 
 
1.3. Motivation/Rationale for the Study 
 
1.3.1. Identifiable Research Gaps  
The motivation for this study emerged from identifiable gaps in my (2003) MTh. Dissertation 
entitled: Saint Ambrose’s Theory and Practice of the Ministry of Clergy: Its Relevance and 
Lessons for the Church in the Twenty-first Century, (Unpublished M.Th., Dissertation, and 
                                                 
1 Simeon Eboh, in his (1984) book, Church and State Relations in Nigeria: A Juridical Survey of the Church-
State Relationship from 1960-1983, utilizes the term “caesaropapism” which he understands to mean a system 
of government in which the supreme royal and sacerdotal powers are combined in one lay ruler. This means that 
a lay person combines royal power and priesthood in and of her/himself like that used by the emperor to rule 




Jos: Theological College of Northern Nigeria (TCNN) / University of Jos, 2003). Here, I 
presented the missio-political identity and vocation of the Church as it sought to meet its 
inner ecclesial needs and yet deliberately disregarded the socio-economic and political 
responsibilities of the Church in the society. Ambrose ministered during the period when the 
Church sought its freedom from the State (Boer, 1976:130). This led him to challenge State 
officials on many issues of justice; however in so-doing, he was not always fair to the State 
because he portrayed the Church as being better than the State in its approach to matters of 
justice, which was not necessarily true (Boer, 1976:130). When his perspectives are applied 
to the context of Jos, one can also identify the need for the Church to be more critical of how 
the State dispenses justice and the need for the Church to be held accountable in its 
stewardship within the nation. Accordingly, this study argues for a broader understanding of 
the missio-political identity of the Church’s vocation which incorporates witnessing to both 
the socio-economic and political spheres of life.    
 
 
1.3.2. The Prevalence of Violence in Jos  
A second motivation for undertaking this study is linked to the socio-political and religious 
context of Plateau State, Nigeria. Being an indigene, I have seen many lives destroyed as a 
result of intractable violent conflicts between communities comprising of Christians and 
Muslims in the city of Jos. My initial naïve perception was that the Plateau State, being a 
majority ‘Christian State’ would not experience such religious conflicts because of my 
assumption that the State was predominantly Christian. However, even within Christian-
dominated nations of Africa such as Rwanda and South Sudan, Christians take-up arms and 
slaughter one another (Gifford, 2012:48-49). The concept of a ‘Christian State’ usually refers 
to a political State where leaders pass laws based on a Constitution that affirms Christianity 
as the preferred religion of the State, giving it a privileged status over other religions because 
the majority of its residents are Christians (Wogaman, 1988:167-8). In such a political 
environment, the Church and the Bible occupy positions of great influence in setting 
standards for national values.   However, within the context of Jos this understanding of a 
‘Christian State’ is called into question because it was incompatible with the reality of 
perennial violence that enveloped the society that claimed over 5,000 lives and destroyed 




neighbouring States (Danfulani 2006:5; Higazi, 20011:14-15; Ambe-Uva 2010: 6-8; Igboin 
2012:18-20).  
 
Regarding the statistics of how many people lost their lives in the violence during the 
successive years, scholars have given varying breakdown of the statistics of destruction to 
human lives in Jos on a yearly basis: In 2001, 1,000 people were killed (Higazi, 2011:15); 
over 1,600 people lost their lives in 2004 (AmbeUva, 2010:6-9); more than 500 people were 
killed in 2008 (Human Rights Watch, 2005), and in 2010, 992 people lost their lives in the 
violence.2  Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002:243) argue that in 2001 alone, more than 3,000 
people died in the violence in Jos, while another unidentified source3 agrees with Higazi that 
from 7-13 September 2001, 1,000 lives were lost in the violence in Jos. When these figures 
are put together, they virtually add up to the general figures given above. This alarming death 
rate specifically informed my choice of 2001-2010 as the time-frame for this study.  Indeed, 
2001-2010 as a decade of religious violence called into question the role of religion within 
the society, especially when the Church seemed to remain silent during this entire period of 
bloody violence.  
 
According to Dalat (2008:2), people were killed or burned to death as if they were victims of 
a natural disaster, but the tragedy was caused by Nigerians themselves. Human Rights Watch 
(2004) reported that women and men of the Red Cross that responded to the human-created 
disaster could not cope with all the dead bodies because the stench of death was so 
overwhelming that eventually vultures descended upon the city of Jos and stayed for months 
devouring the human corpses. The city that was known nationally for its peaceful status was 
quickly transformed into a war zone that had lost all respect for human dignity and life itself. 
This wanton destruction of life was carried out by people who used God’s Name and claimed 
to be religious, raising serious questions about the role of religion in nurturing the deadly 
violence.4 
 
                                                 
2 Available at: <http://creepingsharia.wordpress.com/03/08/nigeria-muslims-slaughter400-500christians-in-
latest-jos-crisis/>, [Accessed 13 October 2015]. 
3 Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/nigeria1201.pdf/>, [Accessed 13 October 2015]. 
4 Plates 1 and 2 in the Appendix present gruesome photographs of the human tragedy in Jos that has resulted in 





Although religious and political institutions in general claim to promote peace and harmony 
in societies where they serve, their toxic and corrupting mixture within the Nigerian context 
has empowered those that wish to use religion and politics to achieve a specific self-seeking 
political agenda even if ii requires the use of violence. Describing the cause of this negative 
role of religion, Raiser (2013:138-141) argues that:  
Religions are responsible for endangering social peace because of their competition 
on who has the power to shape the social order…religions encourage domination of 
human beings by human beings…Where the symbolically based power of religions is 
transformed into antagonistic political power, it loses its authority rooted in 
transcendence and becomes the ideological legitimization of sectional interests. It 
thus becomes subordinate to the friend-enemy opposition and violates the basic 
precept of the Golden Rule. All religions face the temptation of using their symbolic 
power as an instrument to exercise political domination up to and including 
legitimizing violence. 
Politics and religion need therefore to renegotiate their relationship for the sake of the 
legitimacy of the social order (Raiser 2013:142). Raiser further pleads for the culture of 
dialogue for peaceful co-existence to be deliberately intensified by religious leaders through 
proximity to the people at the grass roots (2013:143). In the researcher’s experience as a 
Church leader he has observed the impact of violence on the lives of many people and the 
need for his leadership in burying many innocent citizens. In addition, the loss of so many 
lives and the resultant upheaval in their communities brought additional financial pressures 
on the Church budget to provide relief materials for the internally displaced persons. 
 
 
1.3.3. Wider Exposure to Literature on Church-State Relations 
The third and final motivation for this study is to be found in my wider academic exposure to 
fresh thinking from contemporary scholars on different theories of Church-State relations. In 
John C. Nwafor’s (2002) Relationship between Church and State: The Nigerian Experience, 
a justice model is introduced in which it is argued that the Church and State are responsible 
for social justice and the promotion of peaceful co-existence in the Nigerian pluralist context. 
It was Rose Uzoma’s perspective in her (2004) Religious Pluralism and the Stability of the 
Nigerian State that triggered and informed the choice of this study. It was Benson Igboin’s 
(2012) work: The Re-awakening of the Prophetic Vocation, which explored what Church and 
State can contribute for the wholesome development of society. Finally, Allan Aubrey 
Boesak’s (2005), The Tenderness of Conscience (2005) offered the theoretical framework of 




context where religion and politics played both positive and negative role within the 
environment plagued by social inequality and violence also influenced my critique of the 
Nigerian context. This was specifically relevant because Boesak uses the violence unleashed 
by the apartheid system to address the plight of the suffering people which similar socio-
political situation in Jos, Nigeria. 
 
 
1.4. The Context of the Study 
The specific focus of this study examines the missio-political character of the Church-State 
relationships in Jos as expressed in the relations between the COCIN and Plateau State, and 
how it facilitates peace-building or otherwise in times of violent conflicts. However, a brief 
overview of the general religio-political context of the sovereign Nigerian State will first 




1.4.1. The Birth of the Nigerian State 
The Nigerian State is a West African country that was constituted in1914 when the former 
northern and southern Protectorates were amalgamated by the British colonial representative 
Frederick Lord Lugard (Gutip 1998:19, Oyediran and Agbaje 1999:11, Imo 2011:239-240). 
The country was colonized by the British colonial power from 1900 to 30 September 1960. 
Nigeria gained its political Independent from Great Britain, 01 October, 1960 and established  
a Federal Republic in 1963 with Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and Abukar Tafawaf Balewa as the 
first Governor General and Prime Minister respectively (History of Nigeria 2013:28).  
 
The post-colonial administration has since split the four initial regions into “the thirty-six 
constituent States of Nigeria” (History of Nigeria, 2013:28). These thirty-six constituent 
States have been further divided into 774 local government areas in an attempt to facilitate 
good governance of the State at the local level. However, the intention to provide good 
governance by sub-dividing the political structures of the country seems not to have yielded 
sufficient positive changes because the restructuring seems to have created more demands on 




a situation where religion is being used by the elite of the society to achieve their political 
goals. The political map of the country that is presented below identifies the constituent 
States that make up the country as well as its boundaries with other African countries. 
 
Figure 1.1. Political map of Nigeria showing its thirty-six constituent States5   
 
1.4.2. The Ethnic Constitution of Nigeria 
Nigeria is described by Fatokun (2013:315) as “the giant of Africa” because its inhabitants 
are estimated at 170 million according to the 2010 National Census (Fatokun 2013:315). The 
population is made up of numerous ethnic groups. Nigeria has between 250 and 450 ethnic 
groups, the major groups that dominate the country being Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani 
(Fatokun, 2013:316). Nigeria’s multi-ethnicity implies competition and conflict as natural 
concomitants of population growth. It was the ethnic complexity of Nigeria that was a 
                                                 





contributing factor for the splitting of the original regions into States with the aim of 
recognizing important minority groups in the country (History of Nigeria, 2013:36). 
 
1.4.3. The Nigerian State and its Constituent States 
The diagram below in Figure 1.2 below illustrates the Nigerian State in the context of a unity 
of territorial political community that makes it a sovereign State (Pick 2011:3; Epelle, 
2010:7). The language of State is also used in relation to the political institution in which 
ultimate power and authority are located to maintain order and to give legal and good 
governance to the life of a society (Bennett cited in Wogaman, 1988:12). A constituent State 
indicates the smaller political units that make up the “Nigerian Sovereign State” (Pick, 
2011:2-3). The constituent States are regional political units that are part of the Nigerian State 
without enjoying full sovereignty on their own. The outer circle of the diagram in black 
represents the Nigerian State; the constituent States are represented by the smaller circles. 










1.4.4. A Brief Background of the Inter-Religious and Political Violence in Nigeria 
Nigeria has witnessed a series of inter-religious and ethnic violent crises since independence 
in 1960 (Ibikwe, 2012:18; Imo 2011:241). During its years of being an Independent State, 
Nigeria was ruled by a military regime for twenty-seven years, (Oyediran and Agbaje, 
1999:11-14). The multi-ethnic identity of the population within the context of an environment 
shaped by violence has resulted in Nigeria being described as the most deeply divided 
country in Africa (Uzoma, 2004:651; Lenshie and Abel, 2012; Ibrahim, 1994:11-12; 
Danfulani, 2006; Ambe-Uva 2010; Ostien 2009; Higazi 2011:6-8). It can be argued that this 
description of Nigeria is legitimate because socio-political, religious and economic divisions 
surface at every level in society. The root cause of these divisions is linked to the legacy of 
colonialism bequeathed by political and Christian missionary’s attitudes before Independence 
that encouraged divisive politics among the traditional rulers (Adetunji 2013:351-354). 
Adetunji (2013:353) laments that Nigeria has lost every hope of unity because of instability 
within the country. The divisions within the nation are manifested in three major areas: 
politics, religion and ethnicity (Ambe-Uva, 2010:24-26). 
 
The fragmentation and disunity within the country is visible within different ethnic and 
affiliations. As a result, the interplay of religion, politics and ethnicity complicates issues and 
has a negative influence on the process of peace-building (Ambe-Uva, 2010:2-6). This 
scenario may have been exacerbated by the post-colonial sectional and discriminatory 
political elite, who failed to embrace diversity and promote co-existence among the different 
sectors of society in their political leadership.  
 
It was the administration of General Yakubu Gowon that divided the regions into States in 
order to acknowledge minority ethnic groups and promote unity (Adesina, 1973:487-496; 
Danbazau, 1991:16-19). However, it failed in its intention and the minority ethnic groups in 
question abused their economic and political power by oppressing other groups that were 
without political clout (Dalat, 2009:256). The division of Nigeria into constituent States 
therefore heightened the unhealthy competition between the diverse ethnic groups in the 
country. These ethnic divisions also exposed religious differences that exasperated tensions 





Against this background, Ishaku (2009:153) predicted that Nigeria may face disintegration as 
a sovereign State. His prediction was based on the religio-political events ranging from the 
activities of Boko Haram6 to the blatant disregard for the Nigerian Constitution by competing 
political actors. Twelve out of the thirty-six States have so far instituted Sharia Law7 as the 
‘State religion’ in a country that claims to have a secular Constitution. Consequently, the 
unity of the Nigerian State is at high risk if this process of disintegration is left unchecked 
(Ishaku, 2009:155). The apparent inability of the Nigerian government to tackle the Sharia 
Law issue and Boko Haram activities reveal fundamental weaknesses in the capacity of the 
State.   
 
The lack of unity within the government embodies the wider division within the nation 
because the instigators of divisions are also part of the decision-making bodies of the country 
as argued by Igboin (2012:18). Unless these instigators become peace-builders and promoters 
of national unity then the problems will persist.8 The former Nigerian President, 
Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe Jonathan has admitted to the presence of instigators of violence in 
his cabinet but he did not name them nor were they ever punished (Igboin, 2012:6-7). His 
weakened authority exposed the incapacity of the Nigerian government to find the political 
will to overcome violence (Dalat, 2008:10; Igboin, 2012:3). The deteriorating religio-political 
environment seems to suggest that it is important for the Church and State to sow seeds of 
peace-building that will germinate and mature to facilitate a culture of peace across the 
country. The Latin American Archbishop, Oscar Romero argued for a “Vision for Peace and 
Justice” within a world context that was plagued with violence: 
A vision of a world which reflects the reign of God, and where justice, peace, truth, 
freedom and solidarity prevail. A world where the dignity of the human person, made 
in the image of God, is paramount. A world that does not know what exclusion, 
discrimination, violence, intolerance or dehumanizing poverty are, but rather a place 
where the goods of the earth are shared by all and creation is cherished for future 
generations. It is a place where all people, especially the poorest, marginalized, and 
                                                 
6According to Adelani et al., (2012:493-495), Boko Haram, from the local Hausa/Fulani language commonly 
spoken in northern Nigeria, means Western education is forbidden. 
7 Sharia Law, as described by Ibrahim Suleiman in his book: The Islamic State, cited in Matthew Hassan Kukah 
(1993:115) refers to the system of religious laws enshrined in the Qur’an and followed by Muslims. Sharia Law 
is adopted by Muslims in order to make the Word of Allah supreme, to bring unbelief and tyranny to naught, to 
bring dignity and honour to Muslims and save them from having to live under the influence of an un-Islamic 
power. Küng (1986:41-42) also posits that the interpretation of the Sharia Law was the right of the Ulama, the 
experts in religious law among the Sunnis, and the Ayatollahs among the Shi’a. 
8 Drawing on Igboin’s perspectives there are entrepreneurs in Nigeria, who seek to benefit politically and 





oppressed, find hope and are empowered to come to the fullness of their humanity as 
part of the global community (Romero cited in Neufeldt, et al., 2002:4).  
However, Romero’s dream may never materialize because some forms of religious 
expression have embraced extreme political and religious agenda in Nigeria. Accordingly, 
Nigeria is in dire need of what the late Martin Luther King Jr., the American Baptist minister, 
activist, humanitarian, and leader in the African-American Civil Rights Movement dreamed 
about as the “beloved community”:  
I have the audacity to believe that peoples everywhere can have three meals a day for 
their bodies, education and culture for their minds, and dignity, equality and freedom 
for their spirits. I believe that what self-centred men have torn down, men other-
centred can build up. I still believe that one day humankind will bow before the altars 
of God and be crowned triumphant over war and bloodshed, and non-violent 
redemptive goodwill will proclaim the rule of the land (King Jr., cited in Chunakara 
2013:68). 
In the current political and religious climate in Nigeria, King’s dream sounds illusory because 
those who should have called the political powers to account for their disorderly behaviour 
seem to be benefiting from the oppression of the people. Therefore, national transformation 
will be difficult to achieve in Nigeria if the Church’s missio-political identity and vocation 
does not experience a radical transformation (Ezikwesili, 2013:4-6). This would require the 
Church to remain true to its participation in the missio-Dei, and begin to hold the oppressive 
structures accountable to social justice. But how can this be done when in the wider Christian 
community of Nigeria where some of its more affluent and influential Pastors travel all over 
the world in their private jets (Vanguard, 05 July 2014)? Could it be argued that this situation 
may be contributing to negatively shaping the violent context of Jos, Plateau State?  
 
 
1.4.5. Jos Plateau State 
Jos as the capital of Plateau State lies in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria (Nwafor 2002:12). 
Plateau State was created on 03 July 1976 by the Murtala Mohammed regime, from the 
former Benue-Plateau that in turn had been established in 1967 by the Yakubu Gowon regime 
(Gutip 1998:13). According to the 2010 Census, the population of the State stood at 
3,178,712 (Higazi 2011:3-4, PIDAN, 2012:20). Plateau State takes its name from the Jos high 
plateau that dominates the State’s topography (Higazi 2011:3). The State occupies a land 
mass of 30,913 sq. km, and lies some 1220 metres above sea level (PIDAN, 2013:34). There 




In 1996, Nassarawa State was split off from Plateau State (Higazi, 2011:5) and received its 
own capital, Lafia. Hence, Plateau State was a much larger geo-political region when it was 
created in 1967. 
 
It ought to be mentioned that Plateau State was initially created by the colonial government 
as part of the northern geo-political region; but the post-colonial Federal Government of 
Nigeria restructured the regions created by the Richard Committee created in 1948 into 
constituent States and later into geo-political zones (Barnes, 2007:594). Plateau State is no 
longer part of the northern Region (PIDAN, 2012: 34-36) but part of the Middle Belt. The 
State now belongs to the Middle Belt as one of the dominant Christian States in this region 
(Barnes, 2007:592), along with Benue, Taraba, Nassarawa, Kogi, and Kwara (Kukah, 1993:x-
xii). All the States within the Middle Belt are dominated by Christians (Kukah, 1993:xi-xiv). 
Plateau State, again, forms the largest Christian-dominated State among these States, which 
puts it at risk because of its geo-religious position9 because while the entire Middle Belt is 
made up of minority ethnic groups (Barnes, 2007:594), it also lies in-between the south and 
north, which is made up of majority ethnic groups. While the southerners claim the State 
religiously as Christian, Muslims in the north also want to assimilate the area (Kukah, 
1993:xiv). Plateau State, apart from its cool weather and scenic beauty (Danfulani and 
Fwatshak, 2002:243), serves as a magnet for migrants and refugees because some Muslims 
who are uncomfortable in the Christian south migrate to Plateau State, whereas some 
Christians who are uncomfortable in the Muslim north migrate to Plateau State, creating 
tension through religious and political rhetoric (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002:243). 
 
 
1.4.6. The Local Government Areas of Plateau State and their Respective Ethnic 
Groups 
Higazi (2011:4-8) describes the population of Plateau State as being multi-religious as well as 
multi-ethnic, with over thirty registered ethnic groups (2011:6). However, the report of the 
                                                 
9 Located between the south and the north, the Plateau State is being pulled from both directions: By the 
southern Christians religiously and by the northern Muslims geographically. Christians in Plateau State seem not 
to be satisfied with the way the Muslim north treats them, so they prefer the southerners, which the northerners 
do not like. But the literature is clear about how the northern elites maltreat the non-Muslims in the north. Ladi 
Shehu, a prominent Christian politician once remarked to Journalists: “People from the upper north were Okay, 
they were proper northerners, and if you are a Muslim, well, that improves your position, but if you were from 




Plateau Peace Conference of 2004 (cited in Modibo, 2004:4) provided more comprehensive 
data including non-registered ethnic groups, thus putting the total number of ethnic 
nationalities in the State at fifty-four. Each of the seventeen local government Areas within 
the State have no less than three different ethnic groups. These ethnic groups constitute the 
original inhabitants in the respective local government areas. The Plateau State Gazette10 data 
on ethnic and religious distribution of the population within the seventeen local government 
areas of the State that excludes other Nigerians who have migrated to the State for socio-
economic and other factors. Accordingly, the ethnic groups that fall under this local 
government are: 
  
i. Jos North and Jos South LGC: Berom, Hausa/Fulani, Anaguta, Afizere, Buji, 
Yoruba, Igbo, and Irigwe (Christian majority).  
ii. Barkin Ladi LGC: Berom, Hausa/Fulani, Gashish, and Igbo (Christian majority).  
iii. Ryom: Berom, Ateng, and Hausa/Fulani (Christian majority).  
iv. Bokkos LGC: Ron, Mushere, Kulere, and Hausa/Fulani (Christian majority). 
v. Mangu LCG: Mwaghavul, Pyam, Bijim, Kadung and Hausa/Fulani (Christian 
majority). 
vi. Pankshin LGC: Ngas, Kadung, Mupun, Fier, Takkas, Nyeleng, Tambes and 
Hausa/Fulani (Christian majority). 
vii. Kangke LGC: Ngas, Tal, Taroh, and Hausa/Fulani (Christian majority). 
viii. Kanam LGC: Boghom, Taroh, Kantana, and Hausa/Fulani (Muslim majority). 
ix. Bassa LGC: Imoh, Rendre, Iregwe, Myango, and Hausa/Fulani (Christian majority). 
x. Langtang North LGC: Taroh, Hausa/Fulani, and Igbo (Christian majority). 
xi. Langtang South LGC: Taroh, Hausa/Fulani, and Igbo (Christian majority). 
xii. Wase LGC: Hausa/Fulani, Taroh, Jukun, Kwala, Kadung, and Mwaghavul (Muslim 
majority).  
xiii. Mikang LGC: Yom, Taroh, Tal, Montol, and Hausa/Fulani (Christian majority). 
xiv. Qua’an Pan LGC: Doemak, Pan, Quan, Myernyang, and Hausa/Fulani (Christian 
majority). 
xv. Shendam LGC: Goemai, Ngas, Taroh, and Hausa/Fulani (Christian majority). 
xvi. Jos East LGC: Afizere, Berom, and Hausa/Fulani (Christian majority). 
 
                                                 
10 Plateau State Gazette, 2004:1; Plateau State, Nigeria’s Most Endowed State, 




The above statistics are not exhaustive as there are other ethnic groups that have migrated 
from other parts of Nigeria into the Plateau State, as well as other minor ethnic groups that 
have been assimilated by some of the major ethnicities in various areas (Ostien, 2009:28).  
 
This present research study has not been able to obtain detailed statistics relating to the 
religious groups in the various local political constituencies because of the sensitivities 
associated with religious conflicts. Accordingly, it has become an offense to discuss detailed 
religious statistics (2006 National Census Bylaws: 23-26). Hence, the list that is presented 
here represents approximate data and cannot be accepted as being exact. However, they 
present a fair representation of the complex nature of Plateau State. 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Map of Plateau State and its seventeen local government areas (Modibo 2012:3).11 
 
1.4.7. The Plateau State before the Violent Conflicts 
Prior to 1980, Plateau State was considered to be a peaceful and hospitable environment 
(Danfulani 2002:2). The Federal Road Safety Commission of Nigeria named the Plateau 
State the motto “Home of Peace and Tourism” (Danfulani 2006:2, Ambe-Uva 2010:2-3). 
However, after the 1980s, Plateau State began to lose its acclaimed peaceful status because of 
incidents of religious violence that occurred between Christians and Muslims. Since the mid-
1980s, the Plateau State has experienced violence that began among some of its ethnic groups 
                                                 




that ultimately changed the environment into one tainted by religio-political violence 
(Danfulani, 2006:4-8). Higazi (2011:12-16) notes however that the violence in the Plateau 
State is the result of complex factors ranging from ethnic, religious, political, and land issues. 
 
 
1.4.8. The Religious Diversity of Plateau State 
Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002:246-249) argue that Plateau State is a pluralist State and the 
inhabitants of Jos, in particular, whose population Danfulani puts at 800,000 to 100,000 are 
made up of Christians, Muslims, and African Traditional Religionists, with the majority 
population being Christian (2002:249). Out of the sixteen governors (military and civilian) 
that have ruled the State, only five have been Muslims (PIDAN, 2012:33). These five 
Muslims were given the opportunity to govern because they were military men imposed on 
the State by the central Nigerian government (PIDAN, 2012:36). All civilian governors of the 
State have been Christians. No followers of African Traditional Religion (ATR) have ever 
governed the Plateau State since its inception as what happened in Benue-Plateau State in 
1967 (PIDAN, 2012:34). Modibo (2012:3-6) provides the following statistics regarding 
political power sharing in Plateau State that indicates the Christian domination of the political 
arena: 
The incumbent Governor and his Deputy are Christians. The House of Assembly 
which consists of twenty-one elected members has only two Muslim representatives. 
Of the seventeen Local Government Chairmen [sic], only two are Muslims. The 
Executive Council which consists of eighteen Commissioners has two Muslims only. 
Out of twenty-eight Permanent Secretaries in the various Ministries and Parastatals, 
only two are Muslims. All the three Plateau’s Senators are Christians, while the eight 
Representatives to the National House of Assembly have only two Muslims (2012:3-
6). 
Modibo however, omits to emphasize a controversial aspect of the Nigerian Constitution that 
determines the rules for political power sharing must be based on one’s status as an indigene 
or a settler as opposed to being citizen (2012:4-5). Within the Muslim-dominated States of 
the northern regions, Christians are not allowed to share political power in the system of 
governance (Ostien, 2009). This undemocratic practice is not conducive to peace-building. 
 
Christianity and Islam are the main religions in Plateau State with the COCIN being the main 
Christian denomination (Datiri, 2013; COCIN President’s Speech at Synod, 2013:4). The 




institutions compete for political influence and control and the COCIN appears to exert the 
most influence when compared to other denominations (COCIN President’s Speech at Synod, 
2013:4). This scenario places the COCIN in a strategic role within society where it can use its 
position of influence for selfish reasons or for the common good of the society in the ways it 
competes with and enters into conflict with the State (2013:4-5). 
 
Figure 1.4 below presents the religious plurality of the Plateau State and the dynamics of the 
relationship between religions and State. Arrows pointing to Plateau State highlight the 
competition for control of the State and its resources that exist among its religious groupings. 
Arrows pointing away from the State indicate the State’s interest in using the religious 
institutions for their own political ends. The State is interested in this kind of ecclesial 
partnership because it serves as protection from criticism by the Church with its powerful 
constituency that would otherwise weaken its political authority (Boesak, 2005:169). Within 
this State, there exists an inherent conflict between the State and the religious groups over 
who has the power to shape the social order. Such an underlying conflict also exists among 
the religious groups themselves over who should have the most significant political influence 
with the Government of the State. As a consequence, the quest for power, as postulated by 
Raiser (2013:132-134), is at the centre of this competition. 
 
The unhealthy relationship between Church and State can lead to an incestuous co-habitation 
of religious institutions with oppressive political structures which in turn may lead to loss of 
prophetic witness of Church to the State. In turn, this may result in an environment that 




                       
Figure 1.4. A constructed diagram illustrating the religious diversity of Plateau State, Nigeria 
 
1.4.9. An Overview of the Violent Conflict in Jos from 2001-2010 
Violent conflicts first erupted in Jos on September 7, 2001 and have increased regularly up to 
2010 (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002:4-7). The acts of violence in 2001 followed a 
demonstration staged by some Christian youth who opposed the appointment of Mohammed 
Muktar (a Muslim) to public office because of what they identified  as  his unacceptable 
human rights record, referring to his behaviour in his former public service job (Danfulani 
and Fwatshak 2002; Ambe-Uva, 2010; Ostien, 2009:40). The Christian youth were able to 
successfully influence the decision of the State to revoke Mohammed Muktar’s appointment 
and eventually replace him with a Christian appointee. Accordingly, this political action 
exposed the complex nature of the Church-State relationship in Jos (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 
2002:6-7). This thesis argues that the complex and contradictory influences that shape the 
Church and the Plateau State relationship in Jos have, to some extent, contributed to creating 
an environment where violence is used as a tool to settle differences between religious groups 
and other parties.  The conflicts in Jos which have lingered over years have claimed 




                                                 




1.4.10.  The Church of Christ in Nations 
The Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN) is an evangelical denomination formed as a result 
of the nineteenth-century evangelical missionary advances into Sub-Saharan Africa (Fatokun, 
2013:349). It was founded by the Sudan United Mission (SUM), led by Dr. Karl Kumm and 
his three companions (Ambrose H. Bateman, John Burt, and Lowry Maxwell) in 1904 
(Goshit, et al., 2013:6). The Sudan United Mission (SUM) was itself the result of a combined 
effort by missionaries from different mainline denominations in Europe that organized 
themselves to respond to serious challenges in the Sudan that involved the Christianization of 
indigenous tribes who were being overrun by Muslims (The Light Bearer, 1907:12-13; Gutip, 
1998: 4-6; Goshit, et al., 2013: 2-5). The missionary body included Anglicans from Great 
Britain, the Christian Reformed Churches from the US, the Lutherans from Denmark and the 
Dutch Reformed Church from South Africa (Goshit, et al., 2013:7). The mission came into 
existence primarily to “rescue” indigenous tribes from perceived spiritual “darkness” and 
from the clutches of Islam by bringing to them what they considered was the light of the 
gospel of Christ (2013:7-8). This suggests that their evangelization strategy was not based 
upon mutual respect, but instead devalued the traditional religious beliefs and lifestyle of the 
African people in their mission objectives. It could be argued that their motives might have 
led—at least in some degree—to become religiously and culturally insensitive in their 
approach towards Islam. Such western religio-cultural insensitivities towards other cultures 
were common among nineteenth-century evangelical missionaries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Bediako, 1995:191-198; Gray cited in Kalu 1980:14-16). Across contemporary northern 
Nigeria, the Fellowship of the Churches of Christ in Nigeria that were founded through the 
activities of the Sudan mission became the Christian group most affected by the Islamic 
terrorists known as Boko Haram13 (Goshit, et al., 2013:12).  
 
Out of the 3.1 million inhabitants of the Plateau State, 84.5% are Christians, 12% are 
Muslims and 3.5% are African Traditionalists (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002, Higazi, 
2011:6). Of the 84.5% Christian, 65% are COCIN members (Datiri, 2013:16) with various 
other Christian denominations making up the remaining 35%. Datiri (2013:17) also reveals 
that the Plateau State Civil Service is dominated by COCIN members who occupy 80% of the 
positions. Similarly, followers of the COCIN also dominate governmental structures making 
                                                 
13 According to Philip Ostien (2009:6-8), Boko Haram is Hausa language (commonly spoken in northern 




up 80% of members of the Executive, 85% of the legislature and 80% of it judiciary (Datiri, 
2013, Bewarang 2013:24). The dominant position of the COCIN denomination was affirmed 
by the former COCIN President who in a speech during his last Synod meeting described the 
COCIN as synonymous with Plateau State: 
Mr. President Sir, Plateau people love you and will continue to love you with prayers 
and best wishes. It is on record that COCIN members across Nigeria as well as the 
wonderful people of Plateau State voted overwhelmingly for you in the 2011 general 
election. As you know, the seat of COCIN is in Plateau State, and its patriotic people 
are predominantly COCIN members, thus making Plateau State synonymous with 
COCIN…the Presidency will not forget COCIN very easily…COCIN has not only 
been at the door of the presidential villa but right inside the villa. The name “COCIN” 
and what it stands for will not be strange to the Nigerian President and most of the 
several State Governors (COCIN President’s Speech at Synod, 2013:2). 
The above speech can be interpreted to mean that there was not only intimate co-habitation 
between the COCIN and the Plateau State that may have worked against the contributions of 
other religious groups, but that there was also conflict and competition between the COCIN 
and the Plateau State.  
 
 
1.5. Research Parameters of the Study 
 
1.5.1. The Research Problem 
The main research problem that informs this study seeks to identify and critique the nature of 
Church-State relationship that exists between the COCIN and the Plateau State in the context 
of violent conflict in Jos. The study seeks to investigate why Christian youth could have 
successfully opposed the appointment of a Muslim to a political position (Danfulani and 
Fwatshak, 2002:248). What could have been the reason that informed their opposition and 
why the State government yielded to their reaction and later replaced the Muslim (Modibo, 
2012:3-6)? What nature of Church-State relationship exists between the Church and the State 
that seemed to work against a Muslim’s appointment to public office in a pluralist context of 
Jos?  
 
The study takes into account the missio-political identity and vocation of the Church and its 
implication for the well-being of the entire residents in the society. This missional perspective 




co-operate for the well-being of the society. Within the context of Jos, the critique of the 
Church-State relationship is also aimed at examining the extent to which the nature of the 
relationship has influenced the violent conflicts among the citizens of Jos between 2001 and 
2010. Since the State is responsible for promoting social order, the missional role of the 
Church as a very important religious institution within the Nigerian society ought to focus on 
fostering peaceful co-existence based on a culture of dialogue, religious tolerance and peace-
building (Gawerc, 2006:447; Raiser, 2013:4-5). 
 
 
1.5.2. The Hypothesis  
The hypothesis that guides this study argues that an unhealthy relationship between the 
COCIN and the Plateau State became a significant contributing factor for the violence that 
engulfed the city of Jos from 2001-2010.  This relationship inhibited an effective, fair, just, 
and equitable discharge of peace-building measures in the State (Ostien, 2009:16-18; 
Modibo, 2012:4-6). The silence and inactivity of the Church in the conflict appears to be 
linked to its questionable relationship between the Church and the State. This argument is 
based on the premise that when Church and State maintain a mode of relationship that is 
questionable, it can facilitate violence among its citizenry. 
 
In spite of Plateau State’s public commitment to good governance the violence that affected 
the city of Jos, it also suggests that there are important variables at work in the society that 
influence the nature and the intensity of the conflicts (Ambe-Uva, 2010:12). In view of this, 
the hypothesis guiding this study argues that: 
 
The violence that engulfed Jos between 2001 and 2010 was fed and 
exacerbated, to some extent, by an unhealthy Church-State relationship 
between the Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN) and the Plateau State 
which inhibited effective counter measures and the building of peace.  
 
The missional identity of the Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN) as a local evangelical 
denomination would suggest that it should be pro-active in missional vocation in promoting 




conflict within the society (Hewitt 1996:11; Haralambos and Holborn, 2008:399; Jain, 
2012:194). Religion that is non-life-giving can become a threat to the social order by creating 




1.5.3. Key Research Question and Sub-Questions 
The key research question that guides this research is as follows: 
 
To what extent has the colonial and post-colonial Church-State relations 
between the COCIN and the Plateau State served to foster peace-building 
and peaceful co-existence among the residents of Jos, Plateau State, 
Nigeria from 2001 to 2010? 
 
This question calls for the search of relevant literature on Church-State relations and informs 
the choice of a systematic literature review as the method of identifying the necessary 
documents. Linked to this key research question are the following sub-questions:  
 
i. What are the key missio-political factors that have shaped the COCIN and the Plateau 
State relationships from the period of British colonialism in Nigeria? 
 
ii. What is the nature of relationship that has developed between the COCIN and the 
Plateau State, Nigeria?  
 
iii. In what ways has the relationship between the COCIN and the Plateau State fostered 
peace-building in Jos, Nigeria?  
 
iv. What would be a possible Afrocentric Church-State model of relationship between the 
COCIN and the Plateau State that would be more life-giving and contribute to 
improve peaceful co-existence among the residents in Jos, Nigeria? 
                                                 
14 Violence as used in this context is usually the result of rivalry promoted by extremists and fundamentalist 




1.5.4.  The Research Objectives  
The main objective of this study is to examine whether, and in what ways, the nature of 
relationship that exists between the COCIN and the Plateau State facilitates or inhibits the 
process of peace-building among the residents of Jos. This objective may be achieved 
through the following steps:  
 
i. A systematic analysis of the key missio-political factors that have shaped the Church-
State relationship in Nigeria since the period of British colonialism. The idea is to 
explore the religio-political roots or colonial and missionary legacies that might have 
shaped Church-State relations in Nigeria generally and the COCIN and the Plateau 
State in particular.  
 
ii. A critical examination of the colonial and post-colonial nature of relationship between 
the COCIN and the Plateau State in Nigeria. This may also demand that historical 
models of Church-State relations that have emerged from the history of Western 
Christianity be explored to see what they have offered in terms of the promotion of 
the wellbeing of the citizens in their respective dispensations.  
 
iii. A critical evaluation of the ways in which the post-Independence nature of Church-
State relationship that exists between the COCIN and the Plateau State may or may 
not advance and/or inhibit peace-building measures and deconstruct the policies and 
ideologies responsible for the life-denying violence in Jos, Nigeria. These 
perspectives will serve as signposts to critique the post-independence nature of the 
relations that the COCIN and the Plateau State have practised and also help identify 
the possible peace-building measures that are needed. 
 
iv. Postulating a possible Afrocentric model of a Church-State relationship between the 
COCIN and Plateau State. This will involve deconstructing the dysfunctional policies 
and ideologies that shape the Church-State relationship that exists between the 
COCIN and the Plateau State, which manifested in violence among the residents of 
Jos. An alternative Afro-centric and more contextual model is needed to equip the two 





v. Analyse several broader issues concerning the constructive and destructive roles that 
religion can play in the society. This analysis will include how the State can misuse 
religion for the legitimizing of oppressive policies and structures that may trigger 
violence instead of promoting peaceful co-existence. Emphasis will be given to ways 
in which the COCIN has used its relationship with the Plateau State to promote or to 




1.6.  Scope and Limitations  
This study is limited to the missio-political critique of the nature of Church-State relationship 
that exists between the Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN) and the Plateau State, in the 
context of violent conflict in Jos, Nigeria. Although the study alludes to the violent conflicts 
that to place between Christians and Muslims in Jos from 2001 to 2010, it also seeks to 
address issues surrounding what constitutes constructive Church-State relations, and how this 
serves to facilitate peace-building and the wellbeing of the residents within the pluralist 
context of Jos. Although the study is about Church-State relations within Nigeria, the primary 
focus is restricted to a particular Church and State in a particular context, namely, Plateau 
State and the COCIN. This means that the study will not focus on the nature of Church-State 
relations between the COCIN and other States within Nigeria as well as those outside 
Nigeria. Using the missio-political lens to critique the nature of the COCIN’s relationship 
with the Plateau State will involve the need to interrogate issues of socio-economic and 
political nature that affect the local people experiencing fullness of life.  
 
 
1.7.  Literature Review 
There is no intention to give an elaborate literature review section in this study because the 
entire study is based on the systematic review of literature. This means that the exclusion of a 
detailed literature review as a separate section in the study is deliberate. Accordingly, this 
section will be restricted to but a brief review of the key scholars that have interrogated the 





i. The Journal of the Sudan United Mission: The Light Bearer, 1907, 1952, and 1970, 
provide the primary information on the COCIN-State relations during the colonial 
period. These volumes identified contradictory positions of the COCIN’s policy of 
relations with the State, namely: Church-State separation, and Church-State 
partnership respectively. Both of these appear under the heading: Christian Influence 
in Government (1907:65, 1970:34).  
 
ii. Jan Harm Boer serves as stand-alone-scholar in this study in the area of colonial and 
missionary information concerning Church-State relations in northern Nigeria. In his 
(1979) book, Missionary Messengers of Liberation in Colonial Context: A Case Study 
of the Sudan United Mission, (Amsterdam: Roppi), Boer provides much about the 
missionary interactions with the colonial administration and how it shaped Church-
State relations. He also highlights the missionary theologies and understanding of 
colonialism, which shaped the COCIN’s perception of politics and the State. In his 
(1984) book, Missions: Heralds of Capitalism or Christ? (Ibadan: Day Star Press), 
Boer argues that the SUM failed to teach their converts about politics until it was near 
the time of Nigerian Independence when they realized that the religio-political and 
economic interest of Christians and the Church would be absent or minimal in the 
political arena that they misinform them (Christian converts) to get involved in 
politics to defend Christian interests. If this is what happened, one could well-argue 
that part of what constitutes an uncritical relationship between the COCIN and the 
Plateau State that appears to feed violent conflict in the State, emerged from poor 
missio-political political legacy from the Western missionaries. Even though Boer 
(1984:5-7) seems to provide justification for the poor political education to be 
influenced by dualistic philosophy which affected the missionaries, this justification is 
hardly convincing because the same mission provided religio-political support for the 
colonialists in their political programme by painting colonialism as a divine 
arrangement (1984:30-34). Therefore, if the SUM lacked socio-political expertise, 
how did they know that colonialism would lead to a better Africa? This situation tends 
to support the argument that the SUM deliberately refused to train their converts in 
politics as a political strategy to create a space for their home government (Great 
Britain) to control and colonize the Nigerians. Could this serve as a signpost to the 
nature of relations between the COCIN and the Plateau State? In his (1984) article, 




Journal 19/2, 167-191), Boer maintains that the nature of Church-State relations 
between the COCIN and the State was shaped by the legacy of the colonial period in 
which the SUM with its British heritage was influenced by the prevailing thought on 
Church and State relations that evolved in that society during the early twentieth-
century. Again, the question is how long will the COCIN and the Plateau State 
continue to repeat this colonial/missionary model of Church-State relations? Why is it 
that the COCIN and the Plateau State have been able to change almost every structure 
of their respective institutions, yet have failed to reconstruct the Church-State model? 
Indeed, the COCIN and the Plateau State have had enough time to adjust or 
reconstruct dysfunctional models that they inherited from the colonial 
powers/Western missionaries. 
 
iii. Harry R. Boer’s popular (1976) textbook: Harry R. Boer, A Short History of the Early 
Church, (Grand Rapids, MI) serves as a primary resource to understand how the 
historical models of Church-State relations in the West have evolved with special 
focus on the Greco-Roman model and the Constantinian model (Boer, 1976:42-53). 
This text has revealed how the historical development of Church-State relations 
models evolved from the Greco-Roman period down to the Reformation era, which I 
have used as background to understand the development of the COCIN-Plateau State 
relations. Boer (1976:45-53) shows how each of the models failed to cater for the 
wellbeing of the poor citizens. The Roman Empire persecuted Christians for failing to 
worship the State, but the underlying reason was that Christians were poor and 
uninfluential citizens in the society (1976: 42-47). Minority groups were always 
victims of Church-State relations; this became worst during the time of Constantine 
because the persecuted Church became a persecuting Church against the minority 
religious groups in the society (1976:137-146). The Reformation period did not do 
better either; this is because Martin Luther and John Calvin divided the society into 
Church and State as if there were no other religious groups in the society 
(Dillenberger, 1962:349). The question remains then, how, and to what extent were 
the poor and minority groups protected by these models? Could it be a similar 
situation within the COCIN and the Plateau State, Nigeria? 
 
iv. John C. Nwafor is also an important scholar for the study. His (2002) book, Church 




key resource for the nature of Church-State relations in Nigeria. Although he tends to 
focus more on the Roman Catholic Bishops (Nwafor, 2002:130) than the larger 
Church community, his views nevertheless serve as a signpost for the Church-State 
relations in the country. Nwafor has discussed at length the juridical relations of 
religion with the State in Nigeria, which helps one to know that Nigeria, though 
constitutionally a secular State, is struggling with religious violence (2002:97-98). 
However, his over-emphasis on the role of the Roman Catholic Bishops in the 
promotion of social justice (2002:3-131-186), instead of addressing the role of the 
entire Church in relation to the State in Nigeria leaves much to be desired. This speaks 
volumes about the fact that when the Church is divided along denominational lines, it 
tends to affect its relationship with the State. As each Church denomination competes 
for a space in the State, its critical vocation may become compromised.  
 
v. Philip Ostien’s on-line article “Jonah Jang and Jasawa: Ethno-religious Conflict in 
Jos, Nigeria: Muslim-Christian Relations in Africa,” (Muslim-Christian Relations in 
Africa, August 2009)15 is important to this present study because it not only focuses 
on the nature of Church-State relations, but also delves deeper into the relationship 
between the key political leaders in Jos and the religious groups across the Plateau 
State (2009:15-28). Ostien’s position on the politico-religious climate in Jos also 
clearly reveals the rate of competition between religious groups and politics in the 
State (2009:4-6). If State governors themselves, who are expected to serve as 
custodians of peace and justice, can take the centre-stage in discriminatory campaigns 
against sections of their citizens (Ostien, 2009:17-19), the situation becomes 
unfortunate for the other minorities in such contexts. In this situation, one may expect 
the Church to speak out and hold the State accountable for social justice, but if the 
Church is silent, one cannot help but conclude that there may be an uncritical 
relationship extant between the Church and State. 
 
vi. Allan Aubrey Boesak in his (2005) book: The Tenderness of Conscience: African 
Renaissance and the Spirituality of Politics, (Stellenbosch: SUN Press) offers himself 
as an instrumental lens for critiquing the nature of Church-State relations that exists 
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between the COCIN and the Plateau State. His theory of critical solidarity and 
distance was found relevant and indispensable for this research because of his critique 
of the South African apartheid context, where the denial of human rights and equality 
were glorified. This is related to the religio-political context of Jos, where, because of 
the controversial Constitution, minorities are discriminated against because they are 
said to be settlers and must go back to where they belong if they want to enjoy their 
human rights (Danfulani, 2006:7-14). Boesak’s call for critical solidarity and distance 
from oppressive structures is relevant for the COCIN if the Church lives up to its 
missio-Dei. Where the Nigerian Constitution tends to mislead the State and diverts its 
attention from protecting all residents, the Church ought to be critical of that policy. 
This is because the Church is not dependent on the country’s Constitution for its 
prophetic vocation,  but rather on what the missio-Dei dictates by which the, “eternal 
outreach of Creator, Liberator and Sustainer to the created cosmos in which the 
Church can participate” (Bosch, 1992:114-115). The State may claim Constitutional 
controversy for its failure but the Church cannot.  
vii. Jesse N. K. Mugambi has produced a number of texts important to this present study. 
Three in particular should be mentioned: From Liberation to Reconstruction: African 
Theology after the Cold War, (Nairobi: English Press, 1995); Christian Theology and 
Social Reconstruction, (Nairobi: Action Publishers, 2003), and his chapter entitled 
“Theology of Reconstruction,” pages 139-149 in African Theology on the Way: 
Current Conversations, edited by Diane Stinton, London: SPCK, 2010,) serves in this 
present study as other lenses for critiquing the COCIN-Plateau State relations in the 
context of violence in Jos. The reconstruction lens presupposes that Nigeria as a 
country has failed and become fragile (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2008), hence the need for reconstruction. Mugambi calls for 
reconstructing colonial and dysfunctional ideologies that tend to characterize Church-
State relations in Africa because they tend to divide people and cause violence 
(1995:xv). Mugambi’s position serves to counter any tendencies of continuous 
blaming of the colonial/missionary factors for African Church-State failures.   
 
viii. David Jacobus Bosch in his (1991) seminal work: Transforming Missions: Paradigm 
Shifts in Theology of Missions, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books), is key to offering the 
main framework of a missio-political critique that undergirds this present study. 




for the total well-being of creation (1991:114-116). God’s intention is for the holistic 
wellbeing of not only some, but the entirety of creation. This calls for the Church and 
the State to cultivate a leadership that is geared towards achieving it. When the 
Church embraces its missio-political mandate properly, it goes a long way to guide the 
State towards the promotion of social justice and an accountability for all (1991:115). 
The mission of God is all-embracing and does not treat people on the basis of being a 
settler or an indigenes. 
 
ix. Roderick R. Hewitt’s (2012) book: Church and Culture: An Anglo-Caribbean 
Experience of Hybridity and Contradiction, (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications) 
was found very helpful because of his understanding of Church and culture and the 
theology of inculturation. This lens reveals the fact that when religion and local 
cultures are not at home with each other and tend to produce hatred instead of love 
and peace in the society. When the Christian faith is treated as a foreign commodity, it 
becomes a curse instead of a blessing to the people; this is the point at which religion 
fails people and ends up destroying lives and property. An inculturation of the 
Christian message creates an awareness that God loves all people and that Christianity 
has not come to divide them.  
 
x. Two important local publications should also be mentioned: Nanwul Gutip’s (1998), 
Church of Christ in Nigeria: Birth and Growth, (Jos: Crossroads Communications), 
and that of Zaphaniah Goshit, Pauline Lere, Bitrus Tang’an, John Longkat, and 
Nanwul Gutip, eds., History of the Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN) 1904-2013, 
(Jos: Hamtul Press Ltd., 2013). Together, these two books have offered important 
insights into the local history, establishment and development of the COCIN. 
However, the two scholars have relied more on the historical aspect of the Church 
than its relationship with the State. Accordingly, they have argued that the founding 
Western missionaries meant well for the local people by carrying the Christian 
message and establishing education and healthcare facilities to supplement the efforts 
of the State (Gutip, 1998:4-12; Goshit, et al., 2013:1-6). 
 
xi. Finally, I have exhaustively consulted other unpublished sources such as minutes of 
COCIN Synods, letters, Speeches of its various leaders at official functions, as well as 






1.8. Structure of the Thesis 
This study is divided into eight constituent chapters: 
 
i. Chapter One: In this opening chapter I have set the stage by introducing the study. 
Here, I have discussed the background of the study, including my motivation for the 
study, its context, the research problem and hypothesis, as well as the research 
questions that will guide the study. Also included in this chapter has been the scope 
and limitation of the study, a brief literature review of the key scholars since the entire 
study is focused on systematic literature reviews and the research objectives.  
 
ii. Chapter Two: In this second chapter I will focus my attention on the theoretical 
framework that will be utilized in approaching the present study. The main framework 
that undergirds this study is a missio-political critique of the nature of Church-State 
relations that exists between COCIN and the Plateau State. In this framework, I will 
utilize Boesak’s theory of critical solidarity and distance, to converse with a theology 
of social reconstruction, as well as Church and culture and the theology of 
inculturation. 
 
iii. Chapter Three: Here, I will lay out the research design and methodology I have 
utilized in the study. This will be based on the key research question that undergirds 
this study and the systematic literature review used as the means of data collection for 
the study. By so-doing, the key research question set the parameters (i.e., the colonial 
and post-colonial periods) for the types of literature that I have both accessed and 
reviewed.  
 
iv. Chapter Four: In this chapter I will trace the models of Church-State relations that 
have evolved within the context of the beginning of Western Christianity from the 
time of the Ancient Greco-Roman world through to the contemporary era in order to 
determine how well they have served the people of their periods. This information 
will serve to critique the colonial/missionary model of Church-State relations the 





v. Chapter Five: Here, I will evaluate the religio-political and economic factors that 
shaped the development of Church-State relations during the colonial period in 
Nigeria in general and COCIN-Plateau State in particular. This is aimed at 
determining the extent to which the politico-colonial and missionary legacies 
contributed in shaping Church-State relations and its implications on peace-building 
and the promotion of the wellbeing of the citizens. 
 
vi. Chapter Six. In this chapter I will evaluate the post-colonial search for peace-
building measures in Jos by using the theoretical frameworks to critique the 
understanding and practice of Church-State relations between COCIN and the Plateau 
State.  
 
vii. Chapter Seven:  In this chapter I postulate the contextual Suum-Ngi model of 
Church-State relations as an alternative Afrocentric Church-State model of relations 
between COCIN and the Plateau State. The chapter argues that the Suum-Ngi model 
has the potential to foster better peace-building measures that could serve to improve 
peaceful co-existence among the warring factions in Jos. Suum-Ngi emphasizes and 
the recognizes the common humanity that binds all human beings together regardless 
of what they might have constructed for themselves. Consequently, it possesses 
important  ingredients to serve as a model for religions and State because most 
religions within the African context embody sum-ngi as a model for peaceful living 
since all religious people are first human beings before they constructed their 
preferred religions.  
 
viii. Chapter Eight: In this chapter, I will present the conclusion of the study as well as 
identify its contribution to the production of new knowledge. Finally, I give some 
sign-posts for future research work. 
 
 
1.9. Chapter Summary 
In this opening chapter I have sought to set the stage for the study. I began by stating the 





In referencing the prevalence of violence and destruction of life within the context of Jos, 
Plateau State, Nigeria, I called into question the missio-political mandates of the Church and 
State within the context by examining the ways in which their relations have or have not 
facilitated violence and contributed to peace building.  I briefly outlined the research problem 
and the accompanying research questions and objectives of the study that will require an 
appropriate contextually relevant theoretical framework and methodology. I concluded the 
chapter by providing clarity on the scope and limitations of the study.  
 
In the chapter which follows, I will explore the theoretical framework that undergirds the 
present study. I will reference the missio-political lens through which the study will be 
critiqued. This will be informed by three contextually relevant supporting theories for the 
effective construction of the framework, namely: social reconstruction, critical solidarity and 








A theoretical framework has been described by Mouton (1996:xi) as:  
The relevant pre-existing lens grounded on existing body of theoretical and empirical 
knowledge that is pertinent to the research problem at hand, and stands as a guide to 
the on-going research. 
It also constitutes an indispensable aspect and guide to any meaningful scholarly research. 
Since knowledge is continuous and inter-connected, a theoretical framework serves as a 
stepping stone for linking on-going research to an existing body of knowledge that has been 
successfully applied to explain a similar phenomenon in the past, which strengthens the 
process and conclusion of the present study (Peil, 1982:9-12). Without a theoretical 
framework, it becomes impossible to determine the nature and parameters of the existing 
literature to be reviewed and the hypothesis that is to be derived and proved (Mouton, 
2013:91-92). This means that a theoretical framework is indispensable for any attempt at 
scientific research. Maluleke (2000:50) illustrates the indispensability of a theoretical 
framework in scholarly research with an analogy: “Leaving theoretical framework out of 
research is tantamount to entering a war zone without ammunitions.” This is a valid 
observation because the reliability and validity of any research for knowledge hangs on the 
theoretical framework used. 
 
The fragility of the Nigerian State increased significantly from the time the military took 
power in 1966 (Adesina, 1973:486-487). However, since amalgamation, Nigeria has 
functioned as a deeply-divided State (Danbazau, 1991:9-16). In view of this, Nigeria has 
fallen victim to what Rotberg (2002a:126-128) has described as the characteristics of a failed 
State:  
Rise of criminal and political violence, loss of control over borders, rising ethnic, 
religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities, civil war, use of terror against own 
citizens, weak institutions, and deteriorated or insufficient infrastructures. Others are 
collapse of health system, rising level of infant mortality and declining life 
expectancy, end of regular schooling opportunities, declining levels of GDP per 




leading to starvation, leaders who destroy the economic and political fabric of the 
country, and questionable legitimacy.  
Where the Church collaborates with the State in syphoning public resources for the benefit of 
the Church, it participates in deliberately weakening the State instead of being prophetic to 
promote social justice for all. 
 
In order to identify and critique the relationship that exists between the COCIN and the 
Plateau State on the basis of their missio-political vocations, the principal theoretical 
framework is informed by Mugambi’s theology of social reconstruction conversing with 
Boesak’s theory of critical solidarity and distance and Hewitt’s Church and culture 
perspectives on the role of inculturation in equipping the Church to bear authentic witness 
within a culture. The diagram below illustrates how the supporting theories converse with 
each other and with the main missio-political framework: 
 
 




















2.2. The Theoretical Framework 
 
2.2.1. The Missio-Political Lens 
A missio-political perspective invites the Church’s missional identity, vocation and witness to 
converse positively and critically with the political objectives of the State and its citizenry to 
work for the common good that facilitates fullness of life for all. For the Church to either 
withdraw from or engage the State in an uncritical manner means compromising its missio-
political vocation. The missio-political mandate leaves out any tendency toward a symbiotic 
relationship with the State because the missional identity of the Church necessitates that it 
holds the State accountable to social justice (Bosch, 1977:12). According to Bosch (1977:12), 
by the Church having a missio-political responsibility to the society, this means that: 
No political solution has any revelation background—not even democracy. The 
Church has to direct critical questions at all suggested political solutions. Jesus, who 
was motivated by compassion in all his dealings with humanity, offers the Church a 
criterion for determining whether a particular government is good or bad.  
Boesak agrees with Bosch by arguing that “critical solidarity and distance is the Church’s 
eternal vigilance on the political activities of the State until justice and peace reign in the 
society” (2005:155-156). In view of this, when the Church’s ministry and mission become 
oppressive in its understanding, structures and praxis, then it compromises its allegiance to 
the missio-Dei (1991:7-8). The missio-political identity and vocation of the Church, 
according to Hendericks (2006:330) necessitate that the needs of the people are viewed as 
holy and that the Church must take sides to ensure that these needs are met. Therefore, a 
missio-political perspective calls on the Church to constructively to take part in all the affairs 
that are life-giving to all residents within the society while shunning everything that is life-
denying or militates against the common good (Wallis, 2013, 2014: 4-26). A missio-political 
vocation is not a decision of the Church but it is the content of the liberating and restoring 
mission of God placed in the hands of the Church for the sake of the wellbeing of society. It 
is from this perspective that a missio-political lens is being utilized as the framework for 
critiquing the nature of relations that exists between the COCIN and the Plateau State. A 
missio-political lens finds expression in theories of social reconstruction, critical solidarity 






 2.2.2. The Missio-Political Mandate of the Church  
The critique of the relationship between the COCIN and the Plateau State will be framed 
through the use of a missio-political lens to interrogate their competing, contrasting and 
complementary identities and vocation within the public sphere of Jos. Thorogood (1988:12-
16) maintains that the Church is not a political institution in the world; however, the world 
sets the missional agenda of the Church and thus cannot function as a casual bystander or 
spectator in the public sphere. Through its life and work, the Christian community must bear 
witness to the mission of Christ who came to offer life to all creation (John 3:16). Ball 
(2006:399) argues that the Church fulfils its divine mandate by proclaiming the Lordship of 
Christ. Its missional mandate is to enable the Word of God to be incarnated in the world. The 
Church acts as the visible presence of Christ’s work for the salvation of all creation and its 
role in the world cannot therefore be restricted to the private sphere of life (Cummins, 
1964:1420). 
 
The Church must therefore stand for social values that are consistent with the good news that 
it proclaims, and to put the concrete needs of human beings before abstract causes (Ball, 
2006:362-363). In practical terms, this means that the Church should give priority to those 
who are socially and economically vulnerable and ensure the political responsibility of all 
citizens, regardless of race, creed, sex, or class, through freedom of conscience and political 
judgment, the separation of powers, and freedom of speech for all (Pilgrim, 1999:115). 
Therefore, if the wellbeing of the community is healthy, then the Church and State will take 
the credit; but if it is dysfunctional, then both institutions bear the blame (Igboin, 2012:7-9). 
This implies that the manner in which the Church relates to, or cooperates with, the State in 
discharging their respective responsibilities may affect the community’s well-being. Raiser 
(2013:4-5) classifies “the particular responsibility of the religious traditions” as: 
Being advocates of a culture of dialogue and peace…the preservation of a sustainable 
order in which peoples and nations are able to co-exist…they serve as custodians of 
the foundations and rules that maintain order and provide protection from chaos and 
self-destruction.  
The Church’s missional identity values diversity within community and a commitment to a 
culture of non-violence and respect for life, tolerance and truthfulness, solidarity, a just 
economic order, equal rights and a wholesome partnership between men and women (Raiser, 
2013:5). The relationship between the Church and the politics of the State can be negative as 




suggests that this negation condition is possible when the State and Church develop 
exploitative and discriminatory relations when they compete for power that causes discord 
rather than peace-building. Accordingly, Raiser (2013:2) argues that: 
Religious differences and tensions are among the key reasons for the civil conflicts 
and disputes of the recent decades. In view of this, religion is a highly problematic 
factor in the political arena and, thus, needs to be neutralized as far as possible and 
kept out of the political process. 
The Church’s role in the society must facilitate the positive reconstruction of all elements of 
life that negate against the well-being of all creation. However, there are some forms of 
fundamentalist expressions of faith that are intrinsically hostile toward the State structures 
that can be viewed as competing or threatening to the integrity of the State (Beck 2010:54). 
The Church’s contribution to peace building within society therefore requires clarity in is 
missional identity and vocation that does not divert its attention into non-productive 
competition for power with the State in the public space (Raiser 2013:2). Küng (cited in 
Raiser 2013:2) states that “there [will] be no peace among the nations until there is peace 
among religions.” This is a pertinent observation as it relates to the Nigerian context because 
if part of the social function of religion is the promotion of peace, then its propensity to 
fostering violent actions among its followers must be critiqued. 
 
Whether the Church plays a constructive or destructive role within the society depends on 
how its adherents are equipped to engage with the State institutions and the wider society 
(Haralambos and Holborn 2008:408). Accordingly, the missio-political mandates of the 
COCIN and the Plateau State call into focus the quality of the leadership and the nature of the 
policies they adopt and enact that are fair, accountable, and transparent in their response to 
the needs of the people. 
 
2.2.3. The Missio-Political Mandate of the State  
Ferguson (2004:120) describes the task of the State as the maintenance of justice and peace 
within its national borders, and when necessary, if no other peaceful method can be 
employed, appropriate but limited force can be used. Political authority exercised by the State 
is regarded as a divine appointment that exists for the community’s well-being. Raiser 




The central task of the State and politics, in the classic paradigm of the sovereign 
nation-State, is the maintenance of law and order. Sovereignty in external relations 
means the right to enforce national interests, if necessary by using military force and 
to ward off any interventions and interference in internal affairs. 
 
Therefore, politics, whether it is tied to State institutions and the struggle for power, or to the 
daily life of common citizens and the way they want or do not want to live, is aimed at 
creating social order for the sake of promoting the common good (Raiser 2013:21-22). 
Arendt (1998:46) also points out that politics encourages and prepares the stage for the free 
participation of all citizens in decisions that affect their destiny as a community. Civil society 
is the sphere where the practice of good governance focuses on constructing the social order 
in a manner that advances the total well-being of the community. The State remains faithful 
to its mandate only when it creates an environment where every citizen finds fulfilment and 
fullness of life (John 10:10 NIV). Anything short of this amounts to oppression and the denial 
of human rights which serves to foster violence among the citizenry. For the State to 
successfully fulfil its mandate, the prophetic vocation of the Church and other religious 
groups becomes necessary (Igboin, 2012:4-6). The State can also fail to be objective and fair 
with regard to how it shares resources among its citizens and non-government institutions. If 
resources are misused to form political alliances that will consolidate its power-base at the 
expense of other citizens, which may result in the destabilization of peace within the 
community (Ishaku 2009:30-31). In situations where the State takes sides with one particular 
section of society, or with other religious organizations, while neglecting others, this too may 
result in violence. People usually react negatively to governmental acts of injustice that 
compromise social justice, fairness, peace, and integrity for the benefit of all its citizens 
(Raiser 2013:5), especially when government policies tend to favour one section over others. 
 
2.2.4. A Theology of Social Reconstruction  
In order to ensure that the missio-political lens can contextually engage with the subject of 
this study, three additional complementary Afro-centric theories are employed to strengthen 
the interrogation of the subject. The first input comes from Jesse N. K. Mugambi, a renowned 
Kenyan theologian who in the mid-1990s advocated for a theology of social reconstruction as 
a new paradigm for theorizing and practicing theological critique within the diverse African 
religio-cultural contexts (1995:2). This had come about because of the fundamental political 




during the 1960s and 1970s, and was partly informed by the argument that religion and 
politics are intimately linked within African societies. Where there exists a healthy, critical 
and respectful relationship with the State, then society may experience peace and well-being. 
However, when the relationship sours and becomes dysfunctional then society generally 
becomes unstable. Mugambi’s theology of social reconstruction calls for a re-organization of 
those unhealthy modes of relationships, policies and structures which promote 
marginalization and discrimination among the citizenry that may lead to violent acts that 
destabilize society. This theory also calls for the promotion of common political, economic, 
and social participation by the entire citizenship.16 In the context of Jos, where political and 
religious leaders exclude and alienate minorities and label them as “settlers,”17 this 
necessitates an in-depth process of social reconstruction because of the ongoing threats to 
peace with the society. Mugambi (1995:12) defines “reconstruction” as an engineering 
concept that denotes the re-working or restructuring of something that has become 
dysfunctional in order to make it function once again. The concept of remaking the social 
order to function better becomes an important lens to critique the relationship between the 
COCIN and the Plateau State.  
 
Mugambi’s contribution strengthens the missio-political lens and offers African contextual 
hermeneutics important insights concerning how contemporary States experience social 
conflict. As a result, this can become a transformative reality when in partnership with 
religious institutions that embrace theologies of social reconstruction. Mugambi laid the 
theological foundation for his theory by comparing the first-generation of African 
Independence leaders to the lack of team leadership in the Hebrew Bible story of Moses 
whom God used to liberate the children of Israel from Egypt (Exod.10:1-6; 18:13-23 NIV). 
Although Moses recognized some deficiencies in his leadership through his inability to 
communicate well with the people, he was hesitant in using others like Aaron, whose gift in 
public speaking was better than his own (Exod. 18:18 NIV). Mugambi argues that African 
leaders within the Church and State also engage in autocratic and non-participatory models of 
                                                 
16 “This theology should be constructive rather than destructive, inclusive rather than exclusive, integrative 
rather than disintegrative, pro-active rather than reactive, complementary rather than competitive, program-
driven rather than project-driven, people-oriented rather than institution-oriented, participatory rather than 
autocratic, regenerative rather than degenerative, future sensitive rather than past sensitive, co-operative rather 
than confrontational and it should consult rather than impose” (Mugambi, 1995:v). 
17 The term ‘Settlers’ is popularly used to refer to those who or whose parents and grandparents came from 
elsewhere and stayed in Jos, whose descendants have lived all their lives in Jos and know of no other place of 
origin. The term is coined not only to label them but to leave them out in the rain by excluding them from 




leadership and governance even when they claim to embrace Western ideologies of 
democracy and its accompanying social and economic structures of capitalism that promote 
political domination, racial oppression, economic exploitation and cultural imperialism 
within contemporary Africa. Although Mugambi approaches the need for social 
reconstruction from the realities of the wider African context, his Kenyan socio-political 
context may have informed his perspectives. Instead of using an African theology of 
liberation as his model of critiquing African society, he postulated an African theology of 
social reconstruction as a corrective counter-measure (Mugambi, 2010:141). Indeed, 
Mugambi identified an African theology of liberation as possessing certain weaknesses such 
as “colonial domination, racial oppression, economic exploitation, cultural imperialism, and 
cold war manipulations” (2010:141). Consequently, Mugambi offered the theology of social 
reconstruction as a better and more relevant alternative for the African context to deconstruct 
self-centred and lone-ranger type politics inherited from the colonial ideologies which have 
become dysfunctional and life-denying for the African context and its communal life. A 
theology of social reconstruction provides therefore a lens for reconstructing dysfunctional 
policies of discrimination, marginalization, exclusion and the exploitation of minorities 
(Mugambi, 1995: xv). Mugambi calls therefore for the promotion of a communitarian 
community identity among Africans (cf. Joubert and Alfred, 2007:3), where each member of 
the community, whether in the minority or majority group, becomes involved in the affairs of 
the community. This is linked to a missio-political framework as informed by missio-Dei, a 
framework which calls on the Church and State—especially in pluralist religious societies—
to work for the common good. 
 
Mugambi’s background seems to reveal that disunity, domination, and discrimination 
threatened the unity of the Church in Kenya and prevented it from being the exemplary 
missional community that should proclaim good news (Mugambi, 1995: xiv). However, it 
could be argued that Mugambi has left unaddressed the contributions of the Church to the 
creation or resolution of social crises within society.  
 
Furthermore, this study is aware of the criticism which Mugambi’s theology of reconstruction 
has received from scholars. Tinyiko Maluleke’s criticism stands out strongly against 
Mugambi: He cautioned Mugambi against any pretentious claims to final theologies (1997b: 
6-8). He further observed that all theological and philosophical systems are tentative and 




reconstruction formed part of such criticism against Mugambi. To these, Mugambi responded 
in his second book (Christian Theology and Social Reconstruction, 2003:61-67), though he 
claims that his first book (From Liberation ton Reconstruction: African Christian Theology 
after the Cold War, 1995). 
  
As to what differences exist between liberation and reconstruction and what processes either 
of these utilizes, Mugambi responded in his second book by outlining and explaining that 
liberation and reconstruction were not mutually exclusive; rather they were complementary 
and related; liberation is always followed by reconstruction and not the other way round 
(2003:61). Concerning their differences in processes, Mugambi responded that while the 
process of liberation is a process is a period of war, reconstruction is a process of laying 
down arms and taking on building implements and tools for building (2003: 61). 
Secondly, liberation and reconstruction are socio-political processes with history and specific 
contexts. The actors in the processes are ordinary human beings determining to liberate 
themselves from the oppressors. Religious commitment often provides the motivation and the 
rationalization of the struggle; but the results are expected in history. Failures are expected in 
the process and do happen because not all struggles for liberation are successful; and even 
those which succeed are partial (2003: 62). 
Thirdly, in the processes of liberation and reconstruction, the distinction between theology 
and ideology is often blurred because oppressors use religion to justify their oppressive 
regimes. As the oppressed organize their process of liberation they formulate their own 
interpretation of religion, which provides legitimation for their struggle (2003: 62). 
Fourthly, liberation and reconstruction never reach perfection because they are human 
processes bound to be militated against by manipulations and miscalculations. Fifthly, the 
processes of liberation and reconstruction within the same community involves all sectors of 
the population, including religious leadership. Finally, at the pedagogical level, the symbols, 
models and tools for inculcating commitment to liberation are different from those needed 
reconstruction. Liberation requires dialectics of war; while reconstruction requires dialectics 
of nation building (2003: 63). While the task of liberation requires people who operate like 
war commanders, reconstruction requires all people within the community to participate 
(2003: 74-75), here reconstruction requires social consciousness (2003: 75). 
On the one hand, the pedagogy of liberation focuses on: concentration of war, focuses on the 




on destruction, focuses on industry of weapons, focuses on regimentation, based on central 
command, uses hierarchical leadership, and emphasizes on competition (2003:75-76). 
On the other hand, the pedagogy of reconstruction focuses on concentration on peace, focuses 
on the liberated agent, sees the liberated as subjects, sees the liberated as center of power, 
puts emphasis on rebuilding, focuses on industry of implements and tools, focuses on 
decentralization, focuses on personal initiatives, emphasizes horizontal leadership, and 
emphasizes cooperation (2003: 76). In all these processes, Mugambi sees the Church at the 
center of reconstruction because of its proximity with all sectors of the community. 
 
In spite of the shortcomings of his theory of social reconstruction, it remains a relevant lens 
for this present study, because Mugambi calls for reconstruction beyond the religious circles 
to include all other sectors within the society (1995:2). This multi-disciplinary application 
makes the concept functionally relevant for critiquing the Nigerian context where numerous 
factors combine to feed violence in Jos (Modibo, 2012:6-8; Ostien, 2009:16-18; Danfulani, 
2006:4-7).  
Another African scholar whose insights give credence to Mugambi’s theory of social 
reconstruction is that of Kinoti, (1997:225). Kinoti argues that the Church in Africa should be 
more relevant, contextual and purposive in it missional engagement with Africans. Kinoti 
also urges African theologians to start creating a suitable theology for Africans as a matter of 
urgency: 
We may be inspired by the biblical narrative of Nehemiah’s reconstruction of the wall 
of Jerusalem. We may be motivated by the urgent need to pick up the pieces of our 
lives. We may be desirous to restore the image of the corporate life of our 
communities as we visualize the image to be. Some may even be literally in the 
middle of reconstructing their houses recently burned down by arsonists for political 
reasons. Whatever our individual circumstances here and now in Africa, the cry 
is…restore (Kinoti, 2010:226). 
Mwaura’s (2010:128) perspective on the theology of social reconstruction is determined from 
the academic discourse on human identity. She argues that in all human beings there is a 
common humanity that should be the unifying factor above any other social constructs. 
Africans should therefore return to their heritage of community-identity instead of 
emphasizing ideologies that cause division among them (2010:128). Accordingly, the Church 
and Christians in pluralistic communities should engage in dialogue with peoples of other 
faiths if they are to be faithful to their missional identity that advocates: salvation, liberation, 





The vital ingredients of social reconstruction that could be applicable to the Jos context 
should include the promotion of social justice, political participation by all sectors of its 
citizenry, fairness and respect for human dignity, life-giving policies, promotion of dialogue 
between the warring parties, tackling of the root causes of violence through the eradication of 
poverty at the grassroots level, eradicating unemployment among the youth, and the re-
awakening of the prophetic voice by the COCIN (Raiser, 2013:142-143). In this study, I 
argue that the policies of Plateau State tend to encourage divide and rule of its inhabitants, 
and are thus in serious need of a radical change that will facilitate the cultivation of a culture 
of accommodation between the indigenes and the settlers (Tobias and Klein, 2003:18). In 
short, if the COCIN must be true to its missio-political identity and vocation, then it has little 
option but to encourage the one-ness of humanity bound in their common origins, essence, 
and destiny despite religious and political diversity (Lusa, 2010:23).  
 
Through its strategic position within the State, the COCIN is particularly privileged to hold 
the State accountable to function in the interest of the common good of all (Boesak, 2013, 
2014:24-24). If the Plateau State Government is to cultivate an attitude of impartiality within 
the pluralist environment then, “good governance is pre-requisite for the existence of peace, 
respect for human rights, and social progress” (Ruwa 2001:8). Social reconstruction, in line 
with the missio-Dei, calls for social justice in order to promote just peace among all of the 
citizenry. Acceptance of the social construction theory of Mugambi would mean that the 
COCIN needs to remain vigilant in its advocacy of equality of all before the law so that those 
that live on the margins of society are not exploited by those who have access to economic 
and political power and resources. (Hunsinger, 2006:352).  
The social reconstruction theory of Mugambi implies that the COCIN remains true to its 
participation in the missio-Dei, which also requires it to be non-supportive of those policies 
of the State that are life-denying. The COCIN needs to be pro-active in resisting the 
temptation of collaborating with oppressive policies by speaking out against such policies as 
well as maintaining a critical distance from the undue benefits of oppression. A proper 
understanding of its missio-political mandate calls on the COCIN to work for the fair 
treatment of all sectors of its citizenry. In Mugambi’s theory of social reconstruction, this 
leads into the second supporting theory of critical solidarity and distance that is argued by the 




supporting theories that support the main framework of mission-political critique because the 
two others operate within its scope; and promotes its scope. 
  
 
2.2.5. Theory of Critical Solidarity and Distance 
Allan Boesak is concerned about how Christianity (Church) that came to South Africa came 
as a department or spiritual counterpart of the colonial government. He describes how the 
Church co-habited with and identified wholly with the colonial agenda without “prophetic 
calling and no critical distance nor critical presence in the society (2005: 134). He further 
laments what he calls “the criminal appropriation of the land, the genocide of the Khoi and 
San, the destruction of whole cultures and the enslavement of people, indigenous and 
imported, which was not only permissible but unavoidable and absolutely necessary for 
colonial project, and therefore the will of God (2005: 134).  
In view of the above, Boesak’s theory of critical solidarity and distance emerged from the 
role of the Church within the society of his South African context and experience of apartheid 
regime. Boesak’ thesis focuses on the silence of the post-apartheid Church in South Africa 
(2005: 133). Boesak builds his theory on Trevor Manuel’s idea of incarnating God in the 
context of South Africa, which means that the Church ought to maintain its prophetic, kingly, 
and priestly role of promoting social justice in the society instead of dancing to the tune of 
oppressive apartheid government. This is a call for continuation of the good work which the 
Church stood for during the struggles for independence. (2005: 133). 
Boesak blames the established Churches for failing to create prophetic instance; instead, only 
missionary societies whom he regards as prophetic minorities created such prophetic 
instance. Instead, the established Churches continued to find biblical justifications for slavery 
and racism in the South African society (2005: 134). The Dutch Reformed Church appears to 
be the target of this criticism because of its use of Romans 13 to promote slavery. In his call 
to the prophetic minorities to continue the good work that they did during the struggles for 
liberation, Boesak alluded to the report of the Foundation for Peace and Justice: 
We believe that the Church still has political responsibility in the sense that we 
should continue to seek the Lordship of Jesus Chris over every area of life. The 
prophetic task of the Church is not yet over and must be fulfilled at least as 
vigorously now as in the past. Moreover, when a new government is in place we 
shall have to be as clear as we tried to be vi-sa-vis the white minority regime. The 
watch word here is “prophetic faithfulness”. We shall also have to continue to 
respond to calls from the community to act with them in order to address the wrongs 




   
The above background shaped Boesak’s theory of critical solidarity and distance which is 
being utilized as a supporting theory to critique the role of church-state relationship that has 
turned destructive to the citizens in Jos, Nigeria. 
 
Boesak (2005:168-169) has written exhaustibly on issues of social justice for the oppressed in 
the South African society and the wider African context. The concept of critical solidarity 
challenges the Church not to withdraw from its social responsibilities, but instead should 
refrain from participating in all forms of injustice in the society (2005:157). Critical solidarity 
is therefore grounded in the Church’s mandate to witness and promote justice, peace, and 
meaningful life for people in the world. As with Mugambi, his approach to issues of social 
reconstruction calls on the Church to practice its mission with a critical solidarity and 
distance towards any oppressive structures as a way of being faithful to the mandate of the 
missio-Dei, that calls for fullness of life for all (2005:165-166). Boesak sees the Church as 
ordained by God to hold the State accountable to the rigours of social justice and the well-
being of the entire society.  
 
Boesak’s theory of critical solidarity and distance was nurtured and evolved out of religio-
political experiences within the South African context (2005:24-25). His struggle as an anti-
apartheid activist in the United Democratic Front (ADF) taught him about the dynamics of 
domination, oppression, marginalization, the denial of human rights and dignity, and 
discrimination (2005:167-168). Boesak resisted the oppressive White oligarchic regime with 
an alternative vision of society that valued unity and equality of humankind that is advocated 
by the Christian message of justice and love for the neighbour (2005:169-170). The Dutch 
Reformed Church (DRC) during the period of apartheid rule (1948-1994) served as the 
religious institution that offered theological legitimacy to the oppressive White regime. 
Boesak himself being a reformed theologian was passionately critical in his condemnation of 
the theological and moral illegitimacy of the policies of exclusion practiced by the Church 
and State (2005:141-143).  
 
Bosch, a member of the Dutch Reformed Church, had earlier argued within the Apartheid 
context that the missio-Dei mandate of the Church is liberating news therefore cannot be used 
to legitimize oppression (Bosch 1991:7-8). Boesak therefore argued for a missio-political 




relate to oppressive State/Church institutions that rule through oppressive structures. Critical 
distance affirms the legitimate right of the Church to hold the State responsible for the 
wellbeing of the wider society (Boesak, 2005:134-135). Molefe (cited in Boesak 2005:169), 
also posits that the Church must reject the incestuous co-habitation with any government 
institution because it will make it to fundamentally compromise its mission. According to 
Boesak: 
Leaving the State to its devices is not forgivable. It deprives the State of 
understanding its vast possibilities and its own limitations, the exciting heights its 
power can achieve, and the fearsome boundaries beyond which its power cannot, dare 
not, go. It deprives politics of the wholesome confrontation with spirituality and the 
call to radical conversion. It deprives politicians of the always necessary reminder 
that they are not God, but servants of God for the good of the people. It deprives most 
of all, the powerless and the voiceless of their voice and their future. At the end, it 
will deprive the nation of the redemption of its soul. The Church is called to be a 
prophetic, healing, critical, and eschatological presence. No political sea can change 
that, though it is no easy task (Molefe cited in Boesak, 2005:169).  
Therefore, critical solidarity and distance will serve to question the manner in which the 
COCIN has demonstrated its ministry and mission within Jos and how has it has sought to 
address unjust policies of the State. The COCIN’s missional credibility will therefore be 
determined by its capacity to demonstrate whether its missio-political engagement has 
employed the dynamics of critical distance in developing its relationship with the State and 
whether it has resulted in the promotion of peace-building and overcoming violence in Jos. 
 
The result of the strategic position that the COCIN holds in the Plateau State (Datiri, 
2013:18) could result in its numerical strength becoming the cause of missional weakness. 
The nature of its relationship with Plateau State makes the COCIN vulnerable and runs a 
grave risk of compromising its missional integrity because of its inability to maintain a 
critical distance from the State.  
 
As a consequence, the COCIN’s attitude towards the conflicts in Jos raises serious questions 
concerning its relationship with the State (Commins, 1964:1419). Has the COCIN been able 
to offer prophetic guidance to the State to act justly to all of the inhabitants of the State 
whether they are Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and Atheists (Haralambos and 
Holborn, 2008:407)? The theory of critical distance invites the Church to speak out against 
injustice and not to collaborate with oppressive structures. Accordingly, Boesak’s critical 
solidarity and distance framework serves as a vital lens for examining the nature of the 




holding the State and Church accountable to serve the common good of all its citizens. 
However, just as social reconstruction is not possible if the Church fails to maintain its 
critical solidarity and distance from the State, critical solidarity will also require that the 
Christian message is effectively appropriated in the culture and contexts of the people. When 
the Christian message takes on indigenous roots within the local context, then its capacity to 
transform lives is heightened. However, when it remains a product controlled by external 
forces, then its efficacy within the local culture is severely restricted. In view of this, a third 
conversation with Hewitt’s perspectives on Church and culture (2012) and the challenge of 
inculturation offers an afro-centric critique of the process by which the Church’s witness to 
the Christian message within a cultural context can make it life-giving and meaningful. 
Christians and Muslims cooperate fully within their local contexts in matters relating to their 
cultural celebrations such as inter-religious marriage, seasonal festivals, community 
development efforts, business transactions, and come together to give a joint response to 
natural disasters; however, when it comes to religious disagreement, they take up arms 
against each other is a signpost that the Christian message has not taken root in the culture 
(Adetunji, 2013:316-319).  
 
It could be argued from the above that even the manner in which the Christian message is 
handled and understood by local people may result in it becoming life-denying and source of 
sorrow instead of life and blessing whenever it remains a foreign commodity to the local 
people and culture. Even the manner in which Christian was brought to many parts of Nigeria 
could facilitate denial of life among its converts if not properly rooted in the local cultures. 
For example, Asetunji (2013: 354) noted how a Western missionary threatened a local chief 
with Chritianity during the pre-colonial Nigeria, when he stated: “War is often a means of 
opening the door for the gospel to enter a country. A sword of steel often goes before a sword 
of the spirit.” This clearly shows that there is no such thing as a “pure Christian gospel” 
anywhere; therefore, inculturation is inevitable if Christianity is to maintain its life-giving 
posture. 
 
2.2.6. Church and Culture  
Coming from the background and experience of churches within the Anglo-Caribbean and 
Jamaica in particular, and how the practice of slavery by the Eurocentric forces destroyed the 




inculturation of the gospel in every culture. He laments how the gospel and cultural 
explorations within these churches occupy very little, if any, significance in the global study 
of the sociology of religion (2012: xvii). Hewitt is of the view that, to a great extent, the 
historical development of Christian Churches in Jamaica has contributed to the emergence of 
new ways of understanding and practicing the Christian faith that is more attuned to its 
African heritage (2012: xvii). 
From his immediate local context, Hewitt argues that the phenomenal rise and impact of 
Pentecostalism and Rastafarianism in Jamaica constitute a fundamental break with the 
inherited dominant Eurocentric worldview (2012: xvii). From this, one could argue that 
though Hewitt focuses more on his immediate local context, it is worth noting, as he also 
argues, that this exploration recognizes that the process of inculturation is not limited to local 
experiences (2012: xvii). It implies that there are also international ramifications because of 
globalization. Each culture is able to incarnate the gospel in unique ways that impact on other 
cultures to reveal fresh understanding of the Christian faith among the local receivers (2012: 
xvii).  
The choice of Hewitt’s theory of inculturation as one of the lenses for this study is informed 
by the similarity of his context to Jos, Nigeria, where colonial factors played destructive roles 
in treating human dignity and respect resulting to many forms of resentment and conflicts. 
Hewitt dwells elaborately on the history of the encounter between colonial and missionary 
forces who sought to dominate and demand the local culture to either give way or absorb into 
the Eurocentric culture.  
 
In an attempt to resist the overthrow of their culture and identity, Rastafari culture has 
evolved as a contemporary shaper of Afrocentric identity and counter cultural critique 
through its integrative language, religion and music (201: xx). The Rafstafarian culture 
emerged as an African indigenous response that challenges ideas about life because instead of 
European image of Christ, their message portrays the Emperor of Ethiopia, a black man, as 
the true and living God who has returned as the messiah (2012: xx-xxi). Whether this culture 
was genuine or not, it is interesting to note that in the struggle for liberation, the relationship 
between theology and ideology becomes blurred (Mugambi, 2003: 62). Since the white 
colonialists used religion to oppress the Jamaicans, the Jamaicans responded by formulating 
their own understanding of Christianity in search of liberation (Mugambi, 2003: 62). The 






The permanent, violent domination of naturally-dishonoured persons…the process 
by which the system of slavery sought to humiliate and undermine the African’s 
sense of self and connectedness with others and one’s own community. “Slave” was 
used to describe the Africans in the Caribbean to deprive them of any cultural, 
ethnic and national identity that would affirm them as persons to be valued (2012: 
3)  
  
“If the gospel is to be understood, if it is to be as something which communicates truth about 
real human situation…it has to be communicated in the language of those to whom it is 
addressed and has to be clothed in symbols which are meaningful to them. And since the 
gospel does not come as a disembodied message, but as a message of a community which 
claims to live by it and which invites others to adhere to it, the community’s life must be so 
ordered that it “makes sense” to those who are so invited” (Comblin, 1977: 141). For the 
gospel to be effective, it must be lived out within the cultures of the individuals that it wants 
to encounter. The Christian faith is essentially a cultural phenomenon and cannot exist except 
in cultural forms (Hewitt, 2012: 14). John Waliggo also describes inculturation of the gospel 
in a beautiful manner: 
  
Inculturation asserts the right of all people to enjoy and develop their own culture, 
the right to be different and live as authentic Christians, while remaining truly 
themselves at the same time. It makes Christianity at home in the culture of each 
people, thus reflecting its universality. It becomes a prophetic and liberative 
movement which rejects colonial Christianity and proclaims the liberty of all 
peoples to serve God within their own basic worldview, thus eliminating the 
constant danger of dualism or dichotomy in their lives (cited in Hewitt, 2012: 17). 
  
With this brief background from which Hewitt approaches theology of inculturation from 
experience, the choice of his perspective is relevant for this study because of its similarity 
with the way in which religion is being used destructively in Jos, Nigeria. 
 
As an Afro-Jamaican theologian, Hewitt (2012: 18) argues that the Church’s witness to the 
Christian gospel within a culture involves an on-going process (inculturation) to make Christ 
and his liberating message better understood and lived by people of every culture in a 
meaningful way, locality, and time. Unless the Christian message becomes life-giving within 
the context and culture of a people, it remains foreign, enslaving and destructive to their local 
social and cultural interactions. Hewitt, defines his theology of inculturation as: 
A way of doing theology that deliberately seeks to interpret the Christian faith from 
the perspectives of the socio-cultural contexts and historical life experience of 




In this situation, the Christian message transforms culture and is also transformed by the 
culture in a way that the Christian message is reinterpreted anew (Hewitt, 2012:17). Hewitt 
seems to suggest a mutual transformation between the two forces (i.e., the gospel message 
and the culture of the people), but it is this mutual transformation between the gospel 
message and the cultural contexts and experience of the people that may not always be 
constructive. Shorter (1988:11) defined inculturation theology as follows: 
The incarnation of Christian life and of the Christian message in a particular context, 
in such a way that this experience not only finds expression through elements proper 
to the culture in question (this alone would be no more than a superficial adaptation) 
but becomes a principle that animates, directs, and unifies the culture, transforming it 
and remaking it so as to bring about a ‘new creation. 
Any superficial adaptation of the Christian life and message by the Church without it taking 
deep root in the different cultural contexts of the people to whom it is brought will prove in 
the long term not to foster fullness of life because it ceases to be faithful to its missio-Dei 
vocation.  Since the Christian gospel that the Church communicates must be incarnated 
within the cultural contexts of the people, one can suggest that there is no “pure gospel” that 
exists because all expressions of its message are contextual experienced. However, according 
to Hewitt (2012:17-18), great sensitivity and care is needed when the Church transports the 
Christian message across different cultural contexts. Each time the process of inculturation 
must begin anew, involving local people who can honestly interpret the Christian message of 
good news into appropriate cultural meaning systems. When this fails to take place, the 
people’s comprehension and practice of that message can become non-liberative. The 
purpose of missio-Dei is to liberate people from all systems that dominate and oppress them; 
this includes religious or political institutions that use power unjustly to dominate and 
oppress others even if they claim that the same Christian message justifies their unjust 
actions.  
 
Within the pluralist-religious city of Jos where religious and ethnic identities dominate 
politics, the members of the COCIN can be viewed as threatening by other religious groups if 
their expressions of the Christian gospel results in discrimination against those who do not 
belong to their group.  Accordingly, the inculturation of the Christian message of God’s love 
must be influenced by fidelity to the missio-Dei which demands the radical transformation of 
all cultural practices that bequeath death instead of life. The inculturation process must be 




Christian gospel and people’s cultural experiences in a manner that affirms the promised 
fullness of life that is at the core of the missio-Dei. According to Hewitt18 there are:  
Two deceptive, deadly, infectious and attractive viruses offered by all extremist 
religious groups; these are certainty and superiority, once infected one becomes 
addicted and dangerous to oneself and others. Ideologies and theologies that foster 
‘certainty and superiority’ are dangerous because their ultimate goal is to seek 
political and economic benefits and powers. These become instruments of greed that 
are used to oppress others. 
While these theories are being used to critique the relationship of COCIN and the Plateau 
State, I am nevertheless aware of the unique contextual differences of Nigeria and will make 
adjustments where applicable. These theories offer important benefits of promoting peace-
building by calling for the deconstruction of oppressive, marginalizing, discriminatory, and 
exclusionary structures and policies that feed violence and deny people the opportunity to be 
human. The issue of equal rights and justice are central issues that must challenge the COCIN 
to exercise its critical solidarity and distance from those of the State’s life-denying policies 
that justify oppression. Social reconstruction, critical solidarity and distance, and the 
inculturation perspectives of Church and Culture are important lenses for this study. 
However, as Kuyper has argued, great care must be taken in how the Church relates to the 
State and the local culture because: 
The goal of Christian social and cultural action is not to confessionalize society. What 
we want is a strong confessional Church but not a confessional civil society nor a 
confessional State…By its influence on the State and civil society the Church of 
Christ aims only at a moral triumph (italics in the original), not at the imposition of 
confessional bonds nor at the exercise of authoritarian control (Kuyper cited in Bratt, 
1998: 197).  
One of the temptations of the Church is to make the society Christian as if its message can be 
forced on people in the society. Kuyper’s perspective is valid because in the Nigeria political 
context, the different States or regions are influenced by the dominant religion within that 
State, be it Christianity or Islam; and wherever religious minorities are present, the religious 
majority dominates them (Danfulani, 2006:12-20). It is within this contradictory setting of 
religion and politics that the missio-political relationship of COCIN with the Plateau State in 
Jos is being critiqued by this study.  
 
 
                                                 





2.3. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I have sought to explain the theoretical lens and accompanying theoretical 
framework that I will use to interrogate my research. Through the use of a missio-political 
lens with three supporting theories to complement and strengthen the framework, the central 
ingredients I have identified and analysed will serve as key resources to critique the 
relationship between the Church and State in the Nigerian city of Jos. The three supporting 
theories of (i) a theology of social reconstruction, articulated by the Kenyan theologian, 
Mugambi, (ii) that of critical solidarity and distance by the South African theologian-activist, 
Boesak, and (iii) the dynamics of Church and culture by Roderick Hewitt present essential 
components of the missio-political discourse.  
 
In the chapter which follows, I will focus on the methodological approach that I utilized for 
this present study. Being a non-empirical study its main access to information was generated 
through a systematic review of all of relevant literature through various libraries, databases 
and research engines. Accordingly, I will seek to explain how this methodology was utilised 





RESEARCH DESIGN: METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapter discussed the theoretical framework and its indispensability in 
producing critical research. It used three supporting theories within a general missio-political 
framework to approach the study. The theoretical framework served to guide the review of 
literature and the choice of hypothesis for this study. It ought to be stated from the onset that 
because of the sensitive nature of this study which deals with violent conflict in Jos, and how 
resentments are still high among the warring factions, empirical method of data collection 
may not yield the desired outcome of the research; this limitation as well as the key research 
question, has informed my choice of literature reviews as method of data collection instead. 
 
In view of the above, in this third chapter, I will focus on the methodology based upon a 
critical analysis of literature that I chose through a systematic review method of identifying 
relevant data that could contribute in answering the key research question for the study. In 
what follows, I will supply a brief overview of the systematic review and the rationale for 
choosing this method.  
 
The literature utilized in this methodological inquiry revealed that the method can either take 
a “purist form” where a comprehensive search is made of all evidence through extensive 
searches of multiple databases or  a “pragmatist form”  where “it is possible to conduct a 
systematic review of only one database—albeit accompanied by supplemental searches as 
long as this is done systematically and with transparency over the methods used and 
acknowledgement of the systematic review’s limitations (Bambra, 2009:17).  Strech and 
Sofaer (2011:120-122) caution that while either of these can still be called “systematic 
review,” they have their respective strengths and limitations. This is in agreement with 
Bambra’s (2009:17-18) observation that on the one hand, “while the purist form of systematic 
reviews has the advantage of covering a wider scope of evidence or information, it has a 




other, “the pragmatist form of systematic reviews saves time, cost, and energy as its strength 
but it risks the missing of potentially relevant studies or information.” 
 
In this study, the pragmatist form is preferred because of its determination to adhere strictly 
to the systematic-ness of data collection. One database has therefore been identified as the 
main source of data collection to be accompanied by supplemental searching of relevant 
texts, academic peer-reviewed journals, website citations, archival materials, conference 
papers, and minutes of Church synods, speeches from Church leaders, Church newsletters, 
and Church reports and news coverage of major events (Bambra, 2009:17). 
 
Following the methodological logic postulated by Wilson, et al., 2010:15-16), this chapter 
also presents the details of the study process that has been followed and also justifies the data 
collection procedures and analysis (2010:16). Also included in this chapter is the essential 
background to the fundamental guidelines which are common in the various approaches to a 
systematic review methodology, as well as the supplementary hand-search methods used 
within the main methodology. 
 
 
3.2 An Overview of the Systematic Review Methodology 
Systematic reviews, according to Sleep and Clark (1999:307): 
Represents one method for identifying, evaluating, and synthesizing available 
evidence relating to a single phenomenon.” By this definition, Jennifer Sleep and 
Elizabeth Clark imply that systematic literature reviews is “a rigorous and exhaustive 
process for searching and appraising both published and unpublished literature on a 
specific phenomenon or question (1999:307). 
Systematic reviews has been said to differ from traditional literature review methodology in 
that it adapts and adheres to a strict scientific design so as to make it comprehensive and yet 
minimize the chance of bias and ensure reliability (Arksey and O’Malley, 2005:22-23). 
Arksey and O’Malley (2005:23) further note that: 
Systematic review is a method that focuses on a well-defined question which helps to 
set the parameters where appropriate study design can be identified beforehand 





The peculiarity of this method lies with its systematic-ness which Bambra (2009:17-18) 
attributes to its attempt to: 
Systematically locate research both published and unpublished, and critically 
evaluates them on grounds of relevance and predetermined methodological criteria; 
and combines the results of the various studies and subjects them to scientific scrutiny 
in order to give a summary of the best evidence to answer the research question 
(Bambra, 2009: 17-18). 
In line with Arksey and O’Malley, Kitchenham, et al., (2007:vi) argue that:  
Systematic review is a method of evaluating and interpreting all available research 
relevant to a particular research question, topic, or phenomenon of interest with the 
aim of presenting a fair evaluation of a research topic through the use of trustworthy, 
rigorous and auditable methodology.  
Some scholars agree that the systematic reviews as a method has a long history because even 
though its systematic-ness was not emphasized at the beginning, some of its techniques and 
features were used by educational researchers to search, retrieve, and synthesize literature in a 
number of different ways (Slavin, 1996; Lipsey and Wilson, 1993; Davies and Schulman, 
2000/2007; Petrosino, et al., 2000; Torgason, 2003). While Chalmers, et al., (1989) traces the 
history of systematic reviews to researchers of medicine and agriculture in the eighteenth-
century, Slavin (1986) and Petticrew and Robert (2006) argue that “systematic reviews 
originated with educational researchers.” However, both opinions agree that educational 
researchers only used some of its techniques and features like “meta-analysis” and “research 
synthesis” but the phrase “systematic reviews” was a recent one that was initially used in 
medical research (Slavin, 1996; Torgason, 2003). It clearly shows that the method is fairly 
new in the field of social sciences research such as theology. The systematic review method 
serves to foster objectivity in research by its rigorous nature of synthesizing evidence from 




3.3. Rationale for Choosing the Systematic Review Method for this Study   
A research methodology serves as a roadmap or architectural design that guides the process 
of data collection and the general flow of the study and protects the process towards reaching 
the right destination (result) to answer the chosen research question(s). Systematic literature 
reviews has been presented as “a research method in any given study that guides the 




1999:307). Accordingly, a research method does not end at data gathering but it serves as a 
‘guide’ throughout the research process and ensures that the right outcome is achieved. On 
the rationale for choosing systematic literature reviews as a method, Fink (1993:3 cited in 
Okoli and Schabram) observes that: 
Systematic literature review can be done for personal intellectual reasons or in order 
to understand what is currently known about a topic but one is not ready to embark on 
primary study.  
Mulrow (1994:35-40) agrees with Fink that: 
For a reliable outcome and valid knowledge to emerge, a single study should not be 
considered in isolation but positioned within the totality of research in a given field to 
give a more complete picture of the phenomenon.  
Against this background, systematic literature reviews as a method has been chosen because 
it is the best method that allows the tracing of relevant literature on the nature of Church-
State relations between the COCIN and the Plateau State, Nigeria, during the colonial and 
post-colonial history of Nigeria, as well as the extent to which the nature of that relationship 
served to foster or inhibit peace-building among the citizens of Jos. This approach also 
enables the revisiting of the State-Church relationship paradigms that have been suggested by 
scholars and thereby build on the ground that has already been raised. Accordingly, this was 
the most relevant method that could provide the tools to answer the research question in this 
study.  
 
Baxter and Jack (2008:545) argue that a “systematic review is significant to conceptually 
determine the factors that lead to the realization of or inhibition and stagnation of a 
phenomenon from realizing its objectives.” The hypothesis of this study argues that the 
nature of the relationship between the COCIN and the Plateau State is a phenomenon that has 
failed to promote peace-building among the citizens in Jos because of their uncritical 
solidarity; a situation which has contributed to the intractable violence among the citizens in 
Jos from 2001-2010. The rationale for choosing this method serves to answer the research 
question after the published and unpublished studies on the subject covering the specified 
periods were systematically reviewed, synthesized, and analysed. 
 
Drawing upon Kaunda’s argument for the validity of systematic literature reviews as a 
method for theological studies (Kaunda, 2013:18), it is necessary to integrate the relevant 




nature of the relationship between the COCIN and the Plateau State. The systematic literature 
reviews method became necessary to locate, appraise, and synthesize studies that have been 
made on Church-State relations or religion and politics in Nigeria and the wider sub-Saharan 
countries so as to facilitate an analysis of the factors for and against peace-building within 
Jos. The study calls for adherence to a procedure for the synthesis of research that is held to a 
high standard of objectivity, systematic review and rigor, in order to arrive at a concrete 
evaluation of the phenomenon (Cooper and Hedges, 1994:13).  
 
The systematic literature reviews method will also help to make sense of the large body of 
information that has been accumulated over the years by scholars of religion and politics on 
the issue of Church and State because the method has the ability to manage potentially 
“unmanageable” amount of information (Petticrew and Robert, 2006:3). 
 
 
3.4 Methodological Procedure 
I adopted such a specified and rigorous procedure by which to examine and synthesize 
existing research by carefully applying a specific contextual technique (Arksey and 
O’Malley, 2005:22-25).  
The flow of systematic literature reviews begins with an observation of a phenomenon which 
serves to provoke a question (Sleep and Clark, 1999:310) which I as the researcher aims to 
answer. In this study, the phenomenon so observed refers to the decade of violent conflict 
that engulfed the city of Jos, from 2001-2010, and the seeming inability of  the COCIN and 
Plateau State to use dialogue to curb said violent conflict and restore peace between the 
warring parties. In view of this, the observation prompted the question:  
 
To what extent have the colonial and post-colonial Church-State relations 
between COCIN and the Plateau State served to foster peace-building 
among the citizens of Jos, Nigeria? In another way, what historical factors 
could be responsible for this violence? 
 
Subsequently, the question also served to determine the parameters of the research as well as 




correctly answer the question. The research question also helped to fulfil the requirement of 
systematic literature reviews which is supposed to be as thorough as possible in identifying 
primary studies that are suitable for answering the research question (Arksey and O’Malley, 
2005:24; Kaunda, 2013:20).  
 
Having preferred the pragmatist form of systematic literature reviews to the purist form, its 
formal procedures which involve searching for the main and relevant studies from one named 
electronic database to be accompanied by supplemental searches such as checking references, 
citations, and hand-searching relevant academic peer-reviewed journals, and various archival 
materials have been followed strictly (Bambra, 2009:16). A search was made of databases 
from various libraries in Nigeria and South Africa as well as online search engines, the 
ATLA Religion database, World Council Churches Peer Review Journals, Globethics, Wiley 
Online library, and Google Scholar. I found that the ATLA Religion Database offered more 
relevant studies; as a result I subsequently used it as the sole database. The strategy followed 
in searching for relevant studies was developed from the key phrases or concepts from the 
key research question that guides the study (Arksey O’Malley, 2007:24; Strech and Sofaer, 
2011:123). 
  
In step one, the key phrases which were searched included: “Church-State relations in Nigeria 
during colonial period,” “Church-State relations in Nigeria during the post-colonial period,” 
“Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN),” “Jos, Nigeria,” “Plateau State,” “Nigeria,” “Benue-
Plateau State,” “Peace-building in Nigeria,” “peace-building in Plateau State, Nigeria,” 
“violent conflict in Jos, Nigeria,” “missio-political,” “mission” and “pluralistic society.”  
 
In the second step, the key phrases that I searched were names of the four pioneer indigenous 
pastors of COCIN: “Bali Fallang,” “Toma Tok Bot,” “Damina Bawado,” and “David V. Lot.”  
 
In step three, the phrases searched were names of the COCIN”s founding missionaries: 
“Herman Karl Wilhelm Kumm,” “Ambrose H. Bateman,” “John Burt,” “Lowry Maxwell,” 
“H. G Farrant,” and “William M. Bristow.”  
 
In step four, the key phrases searched were former names of the COCIN in the Hausa 




focused its work: “Ekklisiyar Kristi A Sudan (EKAS),” “Ekklisiyar Kristi A Nigeria 
(EKAN).” 
  
In step five, the key phrases searched were names of the British High Commissioner in 
charge of northern Nigeria during the colonial period and the first indigenous governor of 
Plateau State: “Fredrick Lord Lugard” and “Joseph Gomwalk.” 
 
The first level of literature search was from the ATLA Religion Database which yielded a 
total of 15,775 references. Out of these, 102 articles were included in the final selection. 
Because of the sheer volume of data discovered, the recommendation of Kaunda (2013:20) 
that the entire process of systematic review methodology should be conducted by two or 
more researchers is a sensible one. Based upon the strategy used in this study it is indeed 
advisable that future researchers using the systematic literature reviews method should 
consider co-opting research assistance to facilitate the process. 
 
The second level of literature search was the supplemental hand-search of relevant academic 
journals (Arksey and O’Malley, 2005:24), the COCIN’s The Light Bearer being the major 
and earliest publication of the Sudan United Mission (SUM) concerning its activities in 
northern Nigeria being first published in 1907 (The Light Bearer, 1907; Goshit, Lere, 
Tang’an, Longkat, and Gutip, 2013:4-8). Another key Journal that was hand-searched was 
Ambe-Uva’s Identity Politics and the Jos Crisis: Evidence, Lessons and Challenges of Good 
Governance (2010).  
 
The supplemental hand-search helped to trace those articles and journals that covered the 
colonial and post-colonial history of Nigeria and especially Plateau State. The hand-search 
strategy also enabled me to search the COCIN and Plateau State’s historical and political 
archives respectively in Jos. Concentrated attention was given to the boxes that focus on 
policies on religion and politics or Church-State relations, speeches by COCIN’s leaders, 
minutes of fund raising, and video coverage files covering official functions of the Church 
from both the colonial and post-colonial periods. The archival materials were particularly 
relevant because they revealed the nature of relations between the SUM and the colonial 
administration in northern Nigeria when COCIN and Plateau State were still part of the 
northern region of Nigeria, and were yet to attain the status of the COCIN and the Plateau 





A further hand-search was executed for books from the libraries of University of KwaZulu-
Natal, South Africa, University of Jos, Nigeria, Theological College of Northern Nigeria, and 
the library of Plateau State’s University, Bokkos, Nigeria. These data sources yielded a total 
of 450 references including the boxes from the archives, out of which 30 were identified as 
the study progressed and were treated as part of those accessed from the online database 
(Kaunda, 2013:21-22). 
  
Inclusion and exclusion of primary studies was the third level. This study was premised and 
restricted to publications in English and Hausa languages; Hausa is the lingua-franca that is 
spoken by the majority of the ethnic groups who live in the middle belt to the northern part of 
Nigeria, where the SUM’s missionaries established their mission stations from 1904-1907 
(The Light Bearer, 1907:2-4). Most of their publications were in the Hausa language because 
English was not common because of the restriction of missionaries and their schools from 
this region by the colonial administration (Metuh, 1986:28-30). The study is also focused on 
Church-State relations or religion and politics in Nigeria within the context of violent conflict 
in Jos, Nigeria. All the published and unpublished studies that were accessed in these two 
languages and which focused on relations between Church and State within the context of 
Nigeria and some wider sub-Saharan African countries and fell within the period between 
1904-2014 were carefully consulted so as to select potentially relevant materials based on 
their abstracts and titles (Wilson, et al., 2010:16). All peer reviewed journals and articles on 
Church-State relations, religion and politics, and religious violence in Jos were included. 
Drawing on Arksey and O’Malley’s procedure (2007:24), “full texts of these studies were 
retrieved and their qualities assessed for a final decision on whether to include or exclude 
them.”  
 
It implies that many articles, books, archival materials, and Church pamphlets that were 
published or unpublished in German, French, Portuguese, Taroh, Berom, and Mwaghavul 
were excluded because I could not access them linguistically. Materials on Church-State 
relations or religion and politics that were not primarily focused on Nigeria and immediate 
sub-Saharan Africa were also excluded. All duplicate studies and reports of the same studies 
in different Journals were equally excluded from the reviews. All published and unpublished 




addressed different issues other than the COCIN and Plateau State. Figure 3.1. below 















   
     










Figure 3.1. Flowchart of study selection (inclusion/exclusion) 
Adapted from Kaunda (2013:22) 
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Hand search of text 
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Scanning total of titles and abstracts for 
duplicates and relevancy: 7,500 
Total articles reviewed: 200 
85 Studies excluded for the 
following reasons: 
Published in German, French, 
Portuguese, Taroh, Berom, and 
Mwaghavul. 
Not focused on Nigeria and sub-
Saharan Africa 
Published earlier than 1904 
Repeated in other Journals and 
pamphlets 
Not related to Church-State 
relations 









A total of 200 studies were selected for review from the initial 7,500 studies. After a careful 
and critical reading of these studies, 75 studies were again selected for inclusion in the 
review. 
 
The fourth level was data extraction which forms the core of systematic reviews (Pawson, 
Greenhalgh, Harvey, and Walshe 2004:23). Based on my research question, after all the 
relevant studies were identified, an extract was systematically scrutinized and the applicable 
information from each study was extracted. Data extraction in systematic literature reviews, 
as argued by Sleep and Clark (1999:308), “must ideally be extracted by at least two 
independent reviewers who should then agree on a final version through consensus.” 
Involving two independent reviewers is important because the essence of systematic review is 
to minimize bias and drawing a wrong conclusion (Sleep and Clark, 1999:307; Oakley, 
2005:429; Strech and Sofaer, 2011:125). Again, this study concurs with the argument of 
Sleep and Clark (1999: 307) that “a second reviewer be co-opted to select and critically 
appraise studies independently and extract the relevant information in order to limit bias.” 
Future researchers who intend to use the systematic literature reviews method are therefore 
advised to consider the option of co-opting second reviewers (Bambra, 2009:16).  
 
According to Pawson, et al., (2004:23): 
Systematic reviews normally proceeds by lining up primary studies that have made it 
through the quality filter, fine-tuning the set characteristics through which they are 
compared, combing through each study to extract precisely the same nugget of 
information from each source and recording them onto standard grid. 
  
Following the procedures above, the studies which met the inclusion/exclusion criteria were 
systematically summarized and then subjected to vigorous appraisal in an integrative way in 
order to show how the study holds together (Kaunda, 2013:23). Baumeister and Leary 
(1997:109) have therefore argued that: 
Literature must be summarized and presented in a way that makes its relationship to 
the whole study integrative and its themes explicit [sic] in this kind of literature 
presentation, critiquing of primary data is critical because it is the essence of 
systematic reviewing.  
In view of the above, it is only when the reviewer digs deeply into the primary studies and 
listens deeper than what is printed on the outer pages of the texts that their messages emerge 




offering a descriptive analytical method which involves the use of mutual framework to all 
relevant studies in an interpretative analytical method. The interpretative method becomes 
necessary because a phenomenon can only be fully understood through subjective 
interpretation and not just description (Kaunda, 2013:23). Livesey (2006:4) argues that: 
Scientifically, it is admitted that there may be many interpretations of the same 
phenomenon, but they also maintain that these interpretations are in themselves part 
of the scientific knowledge. 
Concerning the necessity and relevance of interpretative approach, Gadamer (1960/1989:267-
269) opined that: 
A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He [sic] projects a 
meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. 
Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he/she is reading the text with 
particular expectation which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he/she 
penetrates into the meaning and is understanding what is there [sic]. A 
hermeneutically trained consciousness must be from the start, sensitive to the text’s 
alterity. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither ‘neutrality’ with respect to the 
content, nor the extinction of one’s self but the foregrounding and appropriation of 
one’s own fore-meaning nor prejudice. 
In the data extraction, the historical and textual analyses of investigation is used especially in 
chapters four and six which focus on the critique of the missio-political factors that shaped 
Church-State relations between the COCIN and Plateau State during the colonial and post-
colonial periods (Ahanotu, 1977:335).  
 
This method reveals how economic matters have influenced Church-State relations to the 
detriment of the society because it has always been life-denying to the citizens (Kumm cited 
in Boer, 1983:172-173). Having investigated the common themes during the successive 
periods of the development of Church-State relations, and having consecutively assessed 
complementarily with the circumstances between the COCIN and Plateau State, it would 
seem to suggest that political and economic power have been militated against critical 
solidarity and distance between the COCIN and the Plateau State. 
 
The fifth and final stage was to synthesize the evidence (Kaunda, 2013:25). In synthesizing 
the data, particular attention was paid to the relevant and recurring themes and theories of the 
Church-State relationship, comparing them with the COCIN and Plateau State, critically 
analysed them to form the basis for an alternative model of Church-State relations for the 





The missio-political lens that is supported by additional theories of social reconstruction by 
Mugambi (1995:xv), critical solidarity and distance by Boesak (2005:169), and Church and 
culture by Hewitt (2012:17), served as the interpretative tools to synthesize, analyse, and 
interpret the findings about the nature of relationship that exists between the two institutions 
within the general purpose of what the local Church and the State are called to be, and to do 
in serving the well-being of the society. 
 
The social reconstruction focuses on the need to renew, rework, restructure, reshape, 
reorganize, reconstruct, and resuscitate those dysfunctional policies and ideologies that have 
marred the relationship of the two entities, making it life-denying for the citizens in Jos, 
Nigeria. On the other hand, the theory of critical solidarity and distance calls on the Church 
(COCIN) to engage the State and hold it accountable for the well-being of the citizens in Jos. 
Human right, dignity, and equality need to be respected in accordance with the missio-Dei. 
Finally, Church and culture perspectives on inculturation offer an important tool for 
exploring the extent to which the Church seeks to communicate and establish message of the 
Christian gospel with deep and authentic roots within the local culture of Jos. The assumption 
is that when the Christian message is not rooted in the people’s culture, it runs the grave risk 
of mis-educating and mis-evangelizing the people. All the theories call on the Church and 
State to implement their missio-political mandates as contained in the missio-Dei, which 
focuses on respect for common humanity before the Creator and the need to uphold it for the 
well-being of the citizens. 
 
In view of the above, this study will postulate an alternative Afro-centric model of Church-
State relations, which locates all human beings within the context of a common origin, 
sharing a common essence, and heading to a common destiny; hence the need to respect each 
other despite religious, political, cultural, and ideological differences. This will serve as a 
signpost to prod the COCIN and the Plateau State in the process of deconstructing the 
existence of any life-denying ideologies, and to serve as an alternative model that will foster 
peace-building among the citizens. All these lenses are geared towards what Kaunda 
(2013:25) refers to as a “praxis-oriented and call for change for the better in society” because 
they are: 
Systematic and praxis-oriented and seek to find alternative symbols, myths, images, 




[better future of Church-State relationship between the COCIN and Plateau State]. 
They could also be considered as relational-and-life praxis-oriented that call for 
transformed relationships that reflect equity, justice, transparency, participation, and 
affirmation of life by rejecting death-dealing ideologies in the society. They 
emphasize the inter-relationship in the society of human beings and nonhuman 
creation. [They] are conscious of “multi-cultural” and “multi-religious” contexts, they 
are culture-sensitive and [nationally] dialogue oriented. Such is the kind of 
perspective that has been maintained throughout the study (2013:25, italics in the 
original).   
The missio-political vocation and mandate of the Church and State as embodied in the praxis 
of missio-Dei is all about just and life-giving relationships among human beings and the 
entire creation (Lusa, 2010:24). The achievement of this nature of relationship calls for the 
urgent reconstruction of dysfunctional ideologies by the State, a response of critical solidarity 
and distance from oppressive structures that are informed by inculturation of the Christian 
message within the local cultures. In the pluralist context of Jos, there must be an effective 
use of religion in a manner that brings constructive social change in society instead of using it 
for destructive and discriminatory purposes that results in the breeding of violence and death 
among the citizenry. 
 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
In summary, this third chapter, being the methodological chapter, has provided the overview 
of the chosen methodology for the study: systematic literature reviews. The rationale for 
choosing the systematic literature reviews as a research methodology for this study was based 
on the understanding that it provides the critical tools to answer the research question. It also 
serve as a roadmap in guiding the search for the relevant literature and how to analyse and 
synthesize the large pool of literature that fell within the parameters of the research question 
and met the eligibility criteria. 
 
The methodological sequence was also presented showing the four major steps of the method 
from the observation stage, formulation of the question, rigorous search for literature, data 
extraction, synthesizing the result, and drawing a conclusion. 
  
The flowchart indicating the inclusion/exclusion criteria is also included to show the rigour of 





Finally, I gave the explanation on how the methodology fit into the three principal theories 
used in this study, and their application on the COCIN-Plateau State relationship.  
In the chapter which follows, I will give attention to the different models of Church-State 
relationship that have emerged within Western society and which have been influenced by 
Christianity. Three such models will be used to interrogate how the COCIN-Plateau State 





MODELS OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS THAT EMERGED 
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF WESTERN CHRISTIANITY 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I will focus on the survey of the different models of Church-State relations that 
have emerged and evolved over the period of Western Christianity. I will aim in this chapter 
to explore the nature and circumstances that characterize how these models promote or 
inhibit conflict resolution and peaceful co-existence in pluralist contexts.  
 
The rise of Christianity and the emergence of the Church in the Greco-Roman world have 
been accompanied by tensions and at times strategic alliances between the two competing 
powers. From the Greco-Roman world era up to the present modern period, various models 
of Church-State relations have emerged. The intention here is not to cover all the models in 
this chapter, but to present important examples of how the Church-State relations have 
functioned in different periods and different contexts. Three of the models are identified as 
examples because they represent major paradigms in the development of Church-State 
relations. 
 
The Greco-Roman model, emerged within a context where religion and State had been 
treated as one according to Baker (1959:1). In the fourth century CE according to Boer 
(1976:106), ‘the Constantinian model’ emerged when religion (Christianity) was used as a 
political weapon to strengthen the system of governance of the empire by the first 
‘Christian’19 emperor (Wand, 1937:123). The final model emerged during the Protestant 
Reformation and was championed by Martin Luther and John Calvin during the sixteenth 
century (Dillenberger, 1962:364). This was the period when the Church-State ‘marriage of 
convenience’ that was initiated by Constantine and guided Church-State relationship for 
                                                 
19 I put Christian in quotation marks to indicate that history scholars differ on the actual conversion of the 
emperor given the political environment and his motive for declaring Christianity the religio-licita (legal 
religion) (Wand, 1937:123-124) of the empire. Some scholars have criticized him for using Christianity as a 




many centuries, was called into question by the reformers. During this period, the Lutheran 
model (Two-kingdom model) and the Calvinist model (Theocratic model) will be examined. 
 
 
 4.2. The Greco-Roman Model  
Prior to the Greco-Roman political era, the Greek world was dominant (Wand, 1937:124; 
Boer, 1976: 1). Religion and the State existed together and were expected to promote the 
well-being of the State and its citizens. The development of Church-State relations during the 
Greco-Roman period was shaped threefold, by a Roman imperial agenda, Greek thought and 
Jewish religious and cultural traditions (Wand, 1937:125; Boer, 1976:1-2). The Greeks saw 
both Church and State combined as an ethical institution, which focused on promoting the 
common good of the pólis.20 Richard Kraut (2002:208) argues that “religious Temples were 
built using public money because religion was not separated or regarded as sacred from the 
profane.” Priests were paid from the public fiscal because religion was almost a department 
of the State. The Greeks upheld justice and equity in their religio-political culture. Everyone 
was thought to be equal in the community and deserved fair treatment by the religio-political 
culture (2002:208). However, during the time of Aristotle, it is claimed discrimination against 
women, children, labourers, and harlots replaced the just and equitable religio-political 
culture as women were excluded from State participation because Aristotle thought that their 
faculties were not developed enough for social functions (2002: 214-215).   
 
The Roman Empire includes peoples from different nationalities and ethnicities including 
Palestine, which became a province in the empire in 63 BCE (Boer, 1976:1). Christianity 
evolved out of the history and religion of the Jews who lived in Palestine. Although 
conquered by the Romans, the Greeks continued to influence the philosophical construct of 
the people’s lives in the empire (Wand, 1937:124-126). While Roman power and law 
controlled the military, political, social, and economic life of the people of the empire, Greek 
thinking (i.e., philosophy) influenced intellectual discourse in education and therefore shaped 
the religious posture of the empire (1937:126). 
 
                                                 
20 The Greek word polis [πόλις], (lit: ‘city’) originally referring to the ancient Greek city-states (Baker 1959:1-




Greek thinking gave rise to various religions forms, including: nature religion, mystery 
religion, and state religion (Boer, 1976:1-3). These religions were expected to foster the 
prosperity of the State and satisfy the uneducated citizens while philosophy satisfied the 
educated class. These religions still had strong political aspects because they were chiefly 
meant to make sacrifices to the emperor, who was regarded as a god. The emperor was a 
symbol of order and prosperity of the State. As a consequence of this, religious devotees were 
expected to make sacrifices to him as a means of serving the common good of the society 
(Muthuraj, 2008:351). 
 
The Roman Empire with its diverse cultural and religious practices found that unity lay in its 
ability to control its citizenry. To achieve the unity in the empire, all religions were to direct 
their worship to the emperor or face persecution (Muthuraj, 2008:352). Although the various 
religions were allowed to worship in their temples, all sacrifices were required to be offered 
to the emperor. This meant that any religion that failed to comply was regarded as an 
unlawful religion in the empire for refusing to promote the interests of the State (2008:354). 
This scenario set the stage for the nature of Church-State relations that prevailed during this 
period. The followers of the young Church with their Jewish monotheistic heritage risked 
being classified as participants in an illegal religion (2008:356). Church-State relations 
became hostile Christians were treated as second-class citizens because of their refusal to 
worship the emperor was treated as an act of treason (2008: 356).  
 
The Jews received special status and were exempted from worshipping the emperor in order 
to keep peace in their geo-region. According to Boer: 
Their population was so large that they were found in all regions of the empire, they 
were prosperous, they were well organized by common bonds of race and religion, 
and they were influential people in the society even though their monotheistic religion 
prevented them from complying to worship another god (1976 43-45).  
Boer further noted that “the Roman Empire was careful not to offend important people in the 
empire” (1976: 45).21 However, the minorities were subjugated under them (Barnes, 
2007:598). In view of the preferential treatment given to the Jews over Christians, and how 
the State marginalized Christians, it appears that Church-State relations during the Greco-
Roman period worked against the interests of the poor, the marginalized, and the common 
                                                 
21 This point will be further explored in the chapter in relation to the situation in northern Nigeria where the 
colonial government also treated the majority Muslims as special people with special status because they were 




citizens because they were attracted to religions that were critical of the State (Boer, 
1976:103-105). 
 
As people of other nations embraced Christianity, its difference from Judaism became even 
more pronounced. The Jews also resented those from their community that converted to 
Christianity, regarding them as heretics because they did not follow the laws of Moses (Boer, 
1976:45) Christianity was therefore declared religio-illicita (lit: an illegal religion in the 
empire) (Muthuraj, 2008:356). The Church experienced persecution because its attraction to 
the marginalised peoples within the society threatened the authority of the official religious 
and political power.  
 
From 64 CE, the Church became outlawed with Christians becoming victims not necessarily 
because they opposed the State, but because they were classified as people that gave their 
allegiance to another authority instead of the State. It was not until the fourth century CE 
when Constantine came to power that the status of the Church changed (Muthuraj, 2008:357). 
It could therefore be argued that the Greco-Roman Church-State model served for the good of 
the powerful but for the masses of the people, it did not.  
 
 
4.3. The Pre-Constantinian Period 
Before Constantine came to power, the Roman Empire was seriously characterized by 
political division and a series of wars among the powerful (Wand, 1937:130-134). However, 
amidst these wars, many people were becoming Christians so that the Christian population 
was expanding very fast and with a concomitantly strong resolution not to worship the State 
(Muthuraj, 2008: 354). As Christian influence grew across the empire, the poor and 
uninfluential fell victims of socio-economic and political circumstances while the rich 
business class celebrated with the State elite. This could also be seen as the marginalization 
of minority religious groups within pluralist contexts. This situation mirrors to some extent 
the context of the Plateau State where minority religious groups also appear to be 
marginalized because they are said to be settlers and non-indigenes (Mwadkwon, 2001:58-
59). As a consequence, Church-State relations during the Greco-Roman period down to the 




Marginalization and suppression of the poor became normative and institutionalized State 
policies that tolerated no perceived threats to its hold on power.  
 
The next period and model to be discussed is that of Constantine which began in the fourth 
century CE that functioned without any significant improvement in building social justice and 
peaceful co-existence between the poor and the rich (Wand, 1937:134). In this case, the 
Church, was co-opted as a strategic partner with the State in further marginalizing minority 
religious groups under the pretext of purging the State of paganism (cf. Boer, 1976:101-102). 
Although the model is largely attributed to Constantine, this model spilled over and 
influenced Ambrose of Milan after Constantine. 
 
 
4.4.  The Constantinian Model 
 In the fourth century CE, through the intervention of Constantine as Emperor, the Roman 
State brought an end to the persecution of the Church. Constantine had to overcome many 
external and internal threats to his political power in the empire (Boer, 1976:106). The entire 
empire was divided along political interests that left the poor at the mercy of political 
opportunists and technocrats. Motivated by his desire to unify the empire, Constantine 
declared Christianity, not only as a legal religion but the official religion of the State 
(1976:100-105). Constantine’s strategy (cf. Edit of Milan in 313 CE) (1976:138-139) 
provided more security for Christians by aiding the Church and clergy with public grants 
from the State. This followed his purported vision on the eve of the Battle of the Milvian 
Bridge in 312 CE which he saw a sign of the cross and heard a voice telling him to use it 
(enter into partnership with) in order to defeat his enemies (1976:102-104). As a result 
Constantine fought under the protection of the Christian God. Whether or not Constantine 
truly converted to the Christian faith is not the concern of this study. The concern is rather his 
partnership with the Church to consolidate State power across the Roman Empire.  
 
As the Roman Emperor, Constantine sought peace with the Church by returning all Church 
property that was confiscated during the period of persecution (Muthuraj, 2008:350). He also 
relieved the clergy from civic duties and built Churches for Christians. The Church ceased to 




had previously been regarded as a threat became advantageous so that many rich people 
opted for the ministry (Boer, 1976:134).  
 
The question that was left unanswered was why many people of high social status within the 
society opted for Church membership and to enter its ministry. The Church became an open 
community that welcomed all classes of people: the poet, the philosopher, the artist, the 
politician, the military officers, the architect, and the banker worshipped openly together with 
the labourer, the farmer, and the trader but only the rich could agitate for entering the Church 
ministry as clergy (Boer, 1976:134). The Church therefore became very influential and 
important in the society because it was no longer persecuted. Accordingly, Christianity 
became a popular civil religion.  
 
While the earlier pagan emperors saw the State and the pagan religions as a unifying factor, 
Constantine saw the Church and State as the unifying factor and other religions as a threat to 
the State and its power. The pagan emperors built pagan temples, Constantine built Churches; 
the pagan emperors supported Roman priests, Constantine supported Christian clergy; pagan 
emperors suppressed Christianity, Constantine suppressed paganism and heresy; the pagan 
emperors persecuted Christianity, Constantine, along with the Church persecuted non-
Christian religious groups (Boer, 1976:135, Muthuraj, 2008:350). The Church and State elites 
entered into what Stout (1999:178) describes as a “marriage of convenience” in which the 
Church was reduced to something like the chaplaincy of society: 
With the Church was freed from State persecution, its prophetic voice became muted 
within the society as it became more absorbed with inner-ecclesial controversies 
about doctrines rather than critical involvement with the daily struggles of life faced 
by the ordinary people within the society (Stout, 1999:175).  
In the model of Church-State relations under Constantine, the power of the State would be 
used to enforce decisions agreed to by the Ecumenical Council (Boer, 1976:139). 
Ecclesiastical Bishops had the right to settle disputes between Christians in their courts, and 
have their decisions enforced by the laws of the State (Stout, 1999:176). Church leaders and 
the State elite became allies in maintaining the social stability within society. While the State 
was busy creating a Church-State, the Church was busy creating a State-Church, a situation 
which Karl Barth describes as “the particular problem of the Constantinian shift” (Barth cited 
in Stout, 1999:177). The Church as an ally of the State lost its critical voice in agitating the 




the society. By so-doing, actions of injustice and violence against minorities within the 
society failed to trigger corrective engagement by the Church (Fernandex, 2004: xi-xii). 
  
Every religion has the potential for injustice and oppression of others when it uncritically 
cooperates with a State that is not consistent with just and ethical behaviour. In pluralist 
contexts, as Barth has argued (Barth cited in Stout, 1999:178), there should not be a national 
or State Church tied to the interests of any particular government. An important lesson 
emerging from the above situation is that no Christian society can exist in isolation to the 
influences of other competing ideologies. In the same manner, no government can genuinely 
claim to be authentically Christian in its identity and practice (Stout, 1999:179).  
 
The Constantinian model of Church-State relationship influenced the erosion of the spiritual 
integrity of the Church, which in turn resulted in the rise of the persecution of those that the 
Church regarded as non-Christian and heretics (Muthuraj, 2008:350). The Church eventually 
became lazy and over-dependent on the State to provide for its material needs. Church 
leaders became very influential within the society. The former persecuted the persecuting 
Church. With the social and economic privileges that came in being a State Church, the status 
seemed to inflict an intentional amnesia of their past history of once being a persecuted 
community. They persecuted Christians that did not follow strict Church doctrines and people 
of other faiths. The Constantinian model of Church and State relations therefore failed to 
promote the common good for all citizens because of their discriminatory and corrupting 
policies.  It could be argued that the ‘marriage’ between Church with the State when 
Constantine made Christianity as a legal and official religion of the empire did not result in 
any fundamental change in improving the situation of the poor and uninfluential members of 
the society. Rather, the Church was co-opted to strengthen the power base of the influential 
elites. The persecution of the poor during this era continued but the target group was 
changed. Other religions groups were deemed to be threats and were duly persecuted (Boer 
1976:136-138; Maluleke 2010:152).  
 
The emerging Church that resisted the temptation to worship the State in the pre-
Constantinian period radically changed course during the Constantinian era of the fourth-
century CE. This experience of Church-State relations seems to suggest that the kind of 
leadership that the Church adopts or practices contributes to the model of relations that it 




principled and theological understanding of Church-State relations. Each leader that comes 
on board may relate to the State based on personal motivations and interests that may easily 
succumb to intense political pressure of the State leadership.  
 
Bishop Ambrose of Milan made some efforts to set down some principles that separated the 
powers of the Church from the State (Maluleke 2010:152). However, his actions were 
motivated by the Church’s desire for power and control of the State. He alluded to the 
principles of the original and primitive State by declaring that: 
The original and primitive State was purely democratic, like the community of birds, 
wherein ‘the laws are common to all and are observed by all with common devotion’; 
wherein ‘what is lawful and unlawful is the same for all without exception’; and 
wherein ‘all share the same dwelling place, obey the same ordinances, and take part 
in the same counsels…all people observed their turn in working and in ruling; and 
none were perpetual workers or perpetual rulers. It was truly an ideal State. But lust 
for power in human beings led to monarchy, because when they had obtained their 
ruling turn, they refused to lay it down. This ended in degeneration of the State. 
Monarchy, thus, is a declension from the ideal State and was brought about by lust for 
power. Since the lust for power is sin and of the devil, monarchy is a consequence of 
sin (cited in Muthuraj, 2008:52). 
Ambrose’s policy sounded as a champion of justice and objectivity, which he regarded as 
central to the legitimate State, but he was equally either unconsciously or consciously pulled 
by the same lust for power even though he declared that: 
The piety of justice is first directed towards God; secondly towards one’s country; 
next towards parents; last towards all (cited in Muthuraj, 2008:352).  
The piety of justice as being first directed towards God was Ambrose’s tactful way of 
subjecting the State under the Church, which was a continuation of Constantine’s Church-
State model. Nevertheless, Ambrose actions seem to support the impression that he did much 
better than the Constantinian model of Church-State relations in promoting social justice and 
the wellbeing of all its citizenry. 
 
Ambrose also classified the Church as being too good to be associated with what was merely 
a human institution (State) and therefore he tried to subject the State to the Church without 
emphasizing their distinct spheres of operation (Boer 1976:148-149). Although he spoke out 
against social injustice in the society, he was unfair to the State in many instances 
(1976:150). Again, power was the core issue when Ambrose challenged the Emperor 




to the Bishops” (1976:148-150). Ambrose did everything within his power to subject the 
State to the Church’s authority through his theological argument that:  
God must be preferred to State or country; religion must be preferred to patriotism; 
the community of the Church must be preferred to the Roman people; an absolute 
sovereign has a duty to God; the emperor is subject to the divine laws; the emperor, 
more than ordinary human beings, is under obligation to obey the supreme Lord; he is 
indebted to God alone for his empire and victories; for the emperor is at the head of 
the Christian laity, and is a son of the Church and must submit to the authority of the 
Church (Ambrose cited by Muthuraj, 2008:353).  
Ambrose postulated two views of Church-State relations: First that the State should be 
dependent on the Church; second, that the Church is independent of the State, and hence the 
State should not interfere in the matters of the Church. According to Ambrose, the Chritian 
State had two functions:  
Protecting the Church against her great enemies, heresy and paganism. Second, that it 
was the duty of the State to call for general councils of the Church, and to endorse 
and implement their decisions while lacking the right to interfere or influence the 
formulation of the decisions, nor has the State a right to interfere in what has been 
decided (Ambrose cited in Muthuraj, 2008:353).  
Just as the State used the Church during the time of Constantine to achieve its political ends, 
the State was being used during the time of Ambrose by the Church authorities to enforce 
Church policies and marginalize groups that opposed the policies of the Church within the 
general society. 
 
Constantine and Ambrose could well be accused for using religion to subjugate the people for 
political ends as well as to oppress groups in the empire that were considered to pose threats 
to their authority. Muthuraj (2008:368) accuses Ambrose of injustice against minorities by 
using the State to oppress those that were said to be heretics and followers of non-Christian 
(Pagan) religions. Accordingly, he misused the Church’s authority to influence the State to 
deny the rights of minority religious groups in the empire. The root cause of the political 
tension between Church and State can therefore be traced back to Constantine’s strategy for 
political expediency and the donation of landed property to the clergy which Cairns 
(1996:189) considers to be the seed of political tension between the Church and State.  
 
The lust and competition for power by the religious leaders with the State continued into the 
tenth century CE when the German emperors were humbled by having to make the difficult 




were not sovereign in their nation in religious matters pertaining to the Church and the 
religious life of the people (Muthuraj, 2008:368; Cairns, 1996:189-190).  
 
All these events exposed the controversial issues concerning separation between religious and 
State authorities. When it came to the functions of the State, the Church sought its protection 
and deposition of heretics and dealing with other religious threats and challenges. However, 
the playing fields were not level because the State was denied the right to interfere in Church 
affairs (Ambrose cited in Muthuraj, 2008:354). There was no reciprocity in the relationship. 
This attitude serves as a warning and a signpost to indicate caution that dominant religious 
institutions within society are prone to misuse their power and influence so as to exert 
corrupting favours from the State and to misuse its authority within the society for narrow 
political ends that discriminate against other groups.  
 
The Constantinian model down to the time of Ambrose also failed to promote social justice in 
the society because marginalization and exploitation of the minority groups was a common 
occurrence in the society. The dynamic of the State co-opting the Church against minority 
religions seemed to run throughout. These models of Church-State relations will feature again 
during the discussion on the relationship of the COCIN as the dominant religious group in the 
context of Jos, Plateau State. It will be argued that part of the deteriorating socio-economic 
and socio-political conditions of the people points to the nature of Church-State dynamics 
with has a long influential legacy that goes back to the Constantinian model of the fourth-
century CE.  
 
 
4.5.  The Reformation Model 
To a large extent, the Protestant Reformation was a watershed event in the relationship 
between Church and State. The formation of the Lutheran Church in particular has within its 
body politic, missio-ecclesial perspectives on what constitutes the quality of the relationship 
that ought to guide the Church and State relationship in the course of discharging their 
responsibilities to its citizenry. When the Protestant Reformers emerged in the sixteenth-
century, they called for a radical separation between Church and State. The Protestant 




examined: The two-kingdom model conceived by Martin Luther and the theocratic model 
proposed by John Calvin. 
 
 
4.5.1. The Two-Kingdom Model 
Martin Luther is responsible for the two-kingdom model of Church-State relations. In his 
Luther’s Works, Stephen Phiri (2010: 23) noted that Luther presented his model of Church-
State relations under the heading: “Temporal Authority: To what extent it should be obeyed” 
(1523). Luther used several terms for the State: Civil law, Temporal Authority, and the 
Sword (1523:81). He referred to the Church as “kingdom of God,” but he located both State 
and Church in God’s plan. Luther divided humanity or “the children of Adam [and Eve]” into 
two kingdoms: one of God under Christ, and the other of the world under the civil authority. 
Those who belong to the kingdom of God are those he called ‘true believers,’ while 
unbelievers22 belong to the kingdom of the world (1523:83). For Luther, the two kingdoms 
have their respective functions delegated to them by the same God.  
 
 
4.5.1.1. The Kingdoms of this World 
According to Luther’s perspective, God is the one who ordains kings, magistrates, and all 
other human authorities to restrain evil people from perpetrating their evil designs in the 
society. This kingdom is necessary because there are evil people in the world (1523:85). If all 
people were believers, there would be no need for this kingdom because it would serve no 
purpose since true believers do not need the law because they already do what the law 
requires by the power of the Holy Spirit that dwells within them. However, in practice this 
understanding is not supported by the actions of some members of the clergy who have 
participated in violence against women and children as reported in the Rwandan genocide 
and Roman Catholic priests involved in acts of paedophilia (O’Brien, 1988:91-93; Redmond, 
1993:230-237). One could argue further that if Christians do not need the law, why did God 
give laws? Luther would equally respond that the reason why God gave so many laws to 
God’s people was to restrain them from the wickedness of their “outer man” (human nature) 
                                                 
22 Unbelievers, according to Martin Luther, in this context, refers to those who do not believe in Jesus Christ. To 
him, unbelievers include all non-Christians in the world. This needs to be defined because everyone believes in 




since believers still constitute inner and outer parts (physical and spiritual) (Luther, 1523:89). 
Furthermore, Luther cites the Apostle Paul’s first letter to Timothy to show that laws were 
not meant for believers but for unbelievers, but since both of them still live together, laws 
were necessary to hold sinners accountable (1523:90-91). This meant that temporal authority 




4.5.1.2. The Kingdom of God 
For Luther, those people who are not Christians belong to the kingdom of this world and are 
therefore considered to be under the law (Luther 1523:91-92). Luther emphatically believed 
that the majority of people are under this kingdom (1523:93). Because unbelievers are 
considered to naturally engage in evil works, God provided a different government for them 
to restrain them from doing evil. If this were not so, Luther believed that men and women 
would harm each other because of wickedness. Luther asserts that law and gospel are needed 
in the world and therefore no one should aim at ruling the world by the gospel or civil laws 
alone (1523:103). This meant that if any State wanted to apply Christian principles alone in 
political governance, it must first fill the world with real Christians before doing so 
(1523:104). Also, if any State suppresses Christian principles in political governance, it must 
be conscious that civil laws alone are inadequate in leading peaceful life in the society. 
According to Luther, the gospel and the sword23 are needful in society. In line with this, 
Bonhoeffer (1955:335) posits that: 
Luther provided a reason for the existence of the State or government both as a 
coercive power and as protector of outward justice. 
One may argue that the two-kingdom model only served to address persistent problems that 
existed between Church and State relations that resulted from the Constantinian model. 
However, Luther’s perspective does not seem to allow space for the Church to participate in 
social transformation. This is partly the reason why Pannenberg (1977:127) argued that 
“Luther’s model cannot be regarded as the final and decisive word for Christian theory of 
politics,” because it does not seem to treat salvation as holistic. One does not even know 
                                                 
23 Sword in this context refers to the Temporal Authority and its legitimate monopoly on the use of force to 
control and regulate the practice of wickedness in the society. Luther used Temporal Authority, Law, and Sword 




where to put the demarcation between the two kingdoms. Luther’s model seems to have 
influenced a pietistic approach to the State, and closed all the doors for those believers who 
wanted to serve God in the secular realm. The model is hardly realistic in a world where 
Christian vocation is needed to help restore justice and peace in contexts of conflict. The 
model finds a fierce opponent in the Calvinist approach which tends to put all spheres of this 
life under the Lordship of Christ (Barth cited in Stout, 1999:176-178). Barth also counters the 
principles of the two-kingdom by asserting that: 
Political systems were attempts undertaken by men in order to secure the common 
political life of man by certain co-ordinations of individual freedom and the claims of 
the community by establishing the laws with power to apply and preserve them 
(Barth cited in Stout, 1999:175).  
Barth’s position may be informed by his Calvinist tradition which tends to put the State under 
the spiritual authority of the Church, as will be discussed below.  
 
Luther’s model has little space for the Church to participate in the peace-building process in 
secular society. It is the responsibility of the State to deal with peace-building because it has 
allotted the promotion of external peace-building activities to the State alone, while the 
Church is said to constitute people who automatically cultivate the art of peaceful living. By 
this, it implies that Luther subordinated the secular to the spiritual, which means placing the 
Church over the State. The two-kingdom model also fails to recognize that the Church is only 
one of the religious organizations in the secular realm (Fernandex, 2004:xi-xii). Luther’s 
perspectives have also failed to take into account that religious institutions, including the 
Church, have contributed to instability within societies. It was the socio-economic factors that 
set the context for the peasant war and the sufferings of the common people that 
characterized the Protestant Reformation period. In addition, the Semitic races served as a 
warning that one must be suspicious of Luther’s Church and State model (Dillenberger, 
1962:345-456). This is especially relevant for any attempt in the twenty-first century to 
appropriate Luther’s perspectives on Church and State relations. According to Fernandex, 
Luther “did not know that the in the dawn of the twenty-first century, religion (Church) 
would emerge as a vital political force or that theocracies would compete to compete with 
authoritarian systems and liberal democracies” (2004:xi-xiii). This model denies the role of 
the Church to participate in the social function of society. If humanity is divided between 
Church and State, where are the other religious groups to be placed? The ideology of this 




context of religious plurality and cultural diversity this becomes a recipe for fostering social 
instability within the State. The model leaves much to be desired because of its implied 
agenda of seemingly advocating that Christianity be recognised as the sole legitimate religion 
in the world. If this is the case, then it is exactly one of the root causes of religious radicalism 
in the twenty-first century. The non-recognition of others and their existence in society is at 
the root of much violence. Although Hovland (n.d:68) argues that “the Church in pluralist 
contexts ought to defend the right of other religious groups.” Such reasoning seems to lack 
practical demonstration in pluralist societies. This model is therefore seriously dysfunctional 
in the twenty-first century context because most societies no longer operate theocratically. 
However, in the pluralistic context of Jos, Plateau State’s, the Church and State relationship 
seems to function as a throwback to Luther’s two Kingdom model that resulted in the 
exclusion of others and therefore produced instability within the State (Ostien, 2009:16-18). 
It could be therefore argued that no single Church-State model of relations could become 
normative universally because all must become open to constant critique. 
 
 
4.5.2. The Theocratic Model 
The theocratic model of Church-State relations as advocated by John Calvin emerged in his 
major (1536) work, Institutes of the Christian Religion Book IV, Chap. XX, under the 
heading Of Civil Government. Calvin introduced and argued for a “Christian Polity” (Phiri, 
2010:24). Calvin taught unquestionable obedience to the secular authority whose duty was to 
safeguard external expression of righteousness (McLellan, 1997:46-47). As with Luther, 
Calvin left the responsibility of promoting what Luther called ‘outward peace,’ which he 
called an “external manifestation of righteousness” to the secular authority (1997:47). For 
Calvin, internal religion was left in the hands of the Church; but he did not take the separation 
between the spiritual and secular spheres to the extreme like Luther. He later realized that the 
relation of civil to spiritual authority was potentially one of close co-operation (1997:47-48). 
In view of this realization, Calvin concluded that both institutions were closely aligned. 
However, Calvin subordinated the State to the Church so that both secular and ecclesiastical 
representatives derived their authorities from God; while their close relationship was aimed at 





If by ‘kingdom of God,’ Calvin also meant the Church like Luther did, then this laid the 
foundation for his theocratic model. One could argue that since the Church practically 
controlled the State by imposing Church principles on the State during Calvin’s time, he was 
influenced by the religio-political environment to postulate the model. The theocratic model, 
therefore, makes the State a department of the Church and the Church dictates what the State 
can do. This model practically implies that the State exists to serve the purpose of the Church 
in the world by promoting external peace for the cause of righteousness. Both Luther and 
Calvin could be accused of subordinating the State to the Church. This further implies that all 
other religious groups in society should join the State in an indirect pursuit of the interests of 
the Church. It means that the State adopts Church principles in governing the State.  
 
While it may be valid to argue that both the Church and the State exist by the reason of 
serving God’s purpose in the world, care must be taken not to divide humanity into Church 
and State; or subordinate the State with its diverse groups under the Church. The Theocratic 
model has the potential of religious fundamentalism because it seems not to accommodate 
and celebrate religious pluralism in the world. Calvin’s call for unquestionable obedience to 
the State could infer that the State exists to serve the Church effectively. As with Luther’s 
two kingdom model, Calvin’s theocratic model exhibits many shortcomings for pluralist 
contexts in the twenty-first century.  
 
Central to the failures of the Church and State models discussed above is the misuse of power 
by both institutions. Samuels (2006:8-10) has argued that:  
For sustainable peace, the governance framework will have to be more inclusive and 
build up broader stakes of participation in the peace-building process” (and that) “the 
search for institutional structures that encourage moderate behaviour is a crucial 
aspect of governance structures in post-conflict environments, and is widely viewed 
as a key to preventing the return to conflict. The pure majoritarian democratic model 
is generally considered unsuited to conflict-prone and divided societies.  
For the Plateau State and the COCIN to work for improved co-existence among the residents 
of Jos, Nigeria, human rights and dignity ought to be respected through socio-political and 
economic inclusion. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Daily Conflict (Preventing 
Deadly Conflict, 1997 blog), in its Final Report suggests that: 
In societies with deep ethnic [and religious] divisions and little experience with 
democratic government and the rule of law, strict majoritarian democracy is self-




weak, populations may vote largely along ethnic lines. Domination by one ethnic [or 
religious] group can lead to a tyranny of the majority.  
This thesis argues for an alternative model of Church-State relations that may lead to better 
peace-building processes in the pluralist context of Jos that draws together all in 
conversations across their different traditions and ideologies.  
4.6. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has undertaken a brief examination of selective models of Church-State relations 
that have emerged in the history of Western Christianity. This background information serves 
to shape the nature of the interrogation of the COCIN-Plateau State relations in Nigeria. An 
overview of the Greco-Roman, Constantinian, and Protestant Reformation models of Church 
and State relations reveal how they have evolved in relation to religio-political dynamics with 
the different contexts. However, all of the models have fundamental weaknesses because of 
the use of power that does not promote the common good of all. In the name of Church and 
State relations, the persecution of others who are considered to be a threat to powerful 
authorities was tolerated to the benefit of both the State and the Church. The models claimed 
to promote the well-being of the people in the society. However, it was the influential elites 
within the nation that benefited through the promotion of their own interests more than the 
poor and the weak who were generally denied their rights. The misuse of power by the 
dominant Church in partnership with the State also resulted in serious discrimination against 
other religious groups within the society and marginalizing them to function on the margins 
because they are excluded from participating in shaping policies that affect the lives of the 
people.  
 
Finally, the colonial/missionary model of Church-State has been given a full chapter because 
the literature has revealed some important colonial/missionary factors that shaped Church-
State relations in Nigeria generally, and COCIN-Plateau State relations in particular. The 





COLONIAL/MISSIONARY MODEL: DEVELOPMENT OF CHURCH 
OF CHRIST IN NATIONS-STATE RELATIONS IN NIGERIA 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
This chapter continues the conversation on the models of Church-State relations by 
examining that which emerged during the Enlightenment period and directly informed the 
development of the modern missionary movement. Accordingly, it was the work of SUM 
missionaries that directly influenced the religio-political context that contributed to the 
emergence of the colonial/missionary model of Church-State relations that developed 
between the COCIN and the Plateau State within the wider politico-colonial development of 
Nigeria. This chapter begins by surveying the colonial contributions towards the making of 
Church-State relation in Nigeria. 
 
The Nigerian society was not a homogenous nation before colonization. What is today 
Nigeria is a product of amalgamation in 1914 by the British colonial decisions (Salawu, 
2010:345, Uzoma, 2004:650-654). Nigeria emerged from the fetters of colonial rule in 1960 
with influential competing centres of political power. It is interesting to note that the 
Christian and Islamic presence in Nigeria is more domineering than in many other parts of 
the world. The creation of Nigeria as a sovereign State began with the emergence of regional 
States and powerful political elites who took up the ‘reins of power’ with many unresolved 
relational problems from the colonial period. These included such as issues as gender justice, 
ethnic tensions, and unhealthy religious competition; all of which came to the fore in their 
struggle for power and the control of natural resources (Lenshie, 2012:49).  
 
The development of Church-State relations in Nigeria can be traced back to the British 
colonial strategy and its impact on the relations between Christians and Muslims in the 
development of the Nigeria as a sovereign State. The response of the SUM and other 
missions to the colonial strategy served a critical milestone in the development of Church-
State relations in Nigeria (Boer, 1979, 1983, 1984:34-40). The colonial strategic interest and 




powers that were competing for the control of Nigeria. Absolute loyalty was sought by the 
British to foster their colonial objective of unity which would facilitate the British colonial 
government’s economic goals and political allegiances. However, while the southerners did 
not vehemently resist colonialism and its objectives, the Muslims in the north resisted 
because they already had their Caliphate in place (Kukah, 1993:1-8). The colonizers had to 
offer a concession to the Muslims indirectly through their Emirs, and to keep Christian 
missions off their domains (1993:14). This concession did not go without affecting Christian 
missionaries and their activities in the north because they were prohibited from evangelizing 
and converting Muslims (Adesina, 1973:489-490). This enabled the Muslims to accept 
British colonialism on the basis that the British colonial government signed an agreement to 
prohibit all Christian missionary activity among the Muslims (Adesina, 1973:490).  
 
The preferential treatment demanded from the British colonial government by the Muslim 
leaders (Adesina, 1973:491) was not only meant to protect and promote Islam as the 
dominant religion of the region, but to strengthen their political advantage. Part of the terms 
of agreement demanded that no non-Muslim should rule over Muslims, while Muslims were 
free to rule over non-Muslims (1973:490). Indirectly, this arrangement served as denial of 
equal rights and justice for all.  
 
This chapter will therefore argue that the colonial strategy and objective set the stage for the 
unhealthy nature of Church-State relations in Nigeria. Central to this examination of Church-
State relations in Nigeria will be the interplay of religion, ethnicity and politics and their roles 
in fostering violence and or peace-building within the city of Jos. 
 
  
5.2. The British Colonizing Strategy Conversing with Nigerian Cultures 
Nigeria became a unitary nation State in 1914, when the southern and northern provinces 
merged together as one nation (Adesina, 1973:482). However, this was not strictly a unitary 
nation, but an association of ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups with their different 
independent geographical diversities (Schwab, 2004:43). Although each province is made up 
of diverse ethnic groups with their unique way of life and traditional religious practices, they 




differences. With the arrival of Europeans and the implementation of their divisive policies of 
colonial rule,24 the different ethnic groups were forced into a new political arrangement of 
false unity, a phenomenon which Schwab describes as “an artificial creation” (2004:9). 
Although the diverse ethnic groups did not always live harmoniously with each other before 
the coming of British colonialism, the arrival and policies of the new colonial master 
exasperated the problem.  
 
 
5.2.1. The Colonial Policy of Indirect Rule that Shaped Church-State Relations in 
Nigeria 
British colonialism in Muslim-dominated northern Nigeria used a model of governance that 
contributed to a slower rate of socio-economic development than the governance model used 
in the Christian-dominated southern regions of the country. (Barnes, 2007:594-598) In the 
northern regions, the Muslim Emirs offered themselves as partners and became embedded 
within the colonial system and acted as proxies for their British colonial masters. They used 
this apparent intentional strategy of cooperating with the British colonialist to prevent 
Christian missionaries from making further inroads to evangelize their (Muslims) territories. 
This strategy of indirect rule benefited the British colonial rulers because it enabled them to 
gain control of the region without much difficulty through the agreement made with the 
Muslim Emirs (Goshit, et al., 2013:25-26). The British colonial government in Nigeria gave 
preferential treatment to the authority of the Muslim Emirs25 and placed all other local 
traditional African leaders in the northern region under their delegated control (Barnes, 
2007:595). This strategy resulted in the promotion of Islam in the north as the dominant 
religion and consequently contributed to policies that undermined and discriminated against 
the spread of missionary Christianity and the Church as an institution. Christian leaders and 
traditional leaders were required to submit to the political authority of the Emirs (2007:596). 
This had negative consequences for State and Church relations and because the Christian 
community viewed their situation as discriminatory and unjust and it remains a key 
                                                 
24 Divisive colonial rule in this context refers to the British policy of indirect rule where they ruled the Muslim 
northern communities through their local Muslim rulers; but they ruled the southerners directly. This policy was 
divisive because it railed against Christian missionaries and the progress of the Christian message in northern 
Nigeria. It not only pitted Muslims against other religious groups, but the policy also forcefully subjected non-
Muslim communities to come under Muslim rulership, creating superior/inferior competition between them 
(Barnes, 1968:34-35).    




contributing factor to the ongoing poor relations between the Christians and the Muslims that 
became a conduit for violence to be used in response to perceived entrenched oppression 
(Barnes, 2004:60-65). However, as Ikenga-Metuh (1986:37) has argued, local Christian 
missions have also contributed to the rejection of external Christian missionaries coming to 
the north because they presented Christianity as a foreign religion, while Islam became 
inculturated26 into the way of life of the local people. Consequently, the entire political 
scenario in the north was shaped by the strategic alliance between the colonial government 
and the Muslims on one hand, and the minority Christian community and other African 
indigenous religions on the other. This research thus argues that the historic legacy of 
injustice helped to create the destabilizing conditions of political instability in the northern 
part of Nigeria which today the Boko Haram27 is exploiting to achieve their objective of 
creating an Islamic State (Awojobi, 2013:330-331; Lesmore, 2015:151). Hence, the colonial 
policy of indirect rule contributed to the underdevelopment of northern Nigeria and the 
general insecurity of the region (Ojo 1985:15).  Ekineh (1997:24) posits that the northern part 
of Nigeria also lagged behind politically, economically, and socially, because of the lack of 
Western education which is the price that Muslims had to pay for the rejection of Christian 
missionaries and the enjoyment of indirect rule (Ojo, 1885:25). 
 
Although Muslim leaders offered political leadership in the northern regions, their 
governmental civil service was dominated by southerners who were mostly Christian and 
considered to be better educated to manage the administrative affairs of government offices 
(Ekineh, 1997:25; Ojo, 1985:14). This dichotomy and apparent contradiction in the political 
affairs of the north cultivated a toxic environment of resentment and mistrust between the 
Muslim-dominated northerners and Christian dominated southerners that had negative 
consequences for future Church-State relations (Gutip, 1998:46). 
 
 
5.2.2. The Politics of Divide and Rule 
British colonial policy in Nigeria resulted in the displacement of people from their ancestral 
homes and facilitated inter-tribal and ethnic tensions According to Schwab: 
                                                 
26 The term ‘Inculturated’ in this context is an outsider-culture or concept that has taken root and is at home with 
the local understanding of the local people. 
27 The militarist group, Boko Haram lit: “western education is forbidden,” refers to the Nigerian-based Islamic 




Nigeria was undone by societal ethnic, and religious conflict that played havoc with 
politics, culture, and peoples’ lives. Still the contemporary profile of the country was 
actually drawn at the time of British colonial rule when the separate domains of the 
territory, parts of which once incorporated expansive kingdoms with complex 
systems of government, were abruptly thrown together as an artificial creation, where 
union was so sudden, that the British, who created it have often doubted whether it 
could survive as a political entity (2002:43).  
This perspective confirms that the multi-ethnic nature of Nigerian society that functioned for 
centuries in competing kingdoms with different systems of governance was transformed by 
the British into a foreign-designed hybrid concoction of different territories which were 
legally structured into a unitary State. Multi-ethnicity does not necessarily serve to bring 
division among Africans because Africans have for centuries lived in harmony with different 
ethnic groups, speaking different languages and embracing different religions. However, the 
British colonization and missionary movement brought with it an ideological commitment 
that promoted Western individualistic culture as a prerequisite for promoting economic and 
educational development. This ran counter to the Ubuntu corporative community building 
bias of Nigerian tribal societies (Fatokun, 2013:346). When the European powers began the 
“scramble for Africa”28 from 1884-1885, they did so without any sensitivity towards the 
diverse cultures of the Africans, carrying out their policy of divide and rule by pitting 
communities against each other (Young, 1994:104-106). Within the context of Nigeria, at the 
time of its Independence, the colonial policy of divide and rule had created deep animosities, 
suspicions and fears between northern and southern leaders, with one side worried about 
being dominated by the other:  
As things are, it appears Nigeria will be governed all her life by Northerners who 
were once the most backward people in civilization. If we allow Northerners to 
govern us, then in about ten years from now Nigeria will only be regarded as 
Northern land –and thus all our birth rights sold to the backward set of people…I fear 
our being controlled by a dictatorial type of government such as can be seen in all the 
Muslim countries today. We shall all be subject to control by feudal lords who rule by 
Muslim decree…This means we shall be ruled by whatever the Koran says…My fear 
about Nigeria is very great now. I don’t know what will be the end of the crisis. There 
is no peace all over the country. This is the result of the selfishness of some of our 
political leaders. My greatest fear for the unity of the country is disunity among tribes 
as a result of clamour for power by greedy politicians (‘Free 1964’ cited in Diamond, 
1988:76).   
The above perspective identifies the selfish behaviour of politicians who benefitted from the 
divide and rule policies that contributed to instability within the society. The Nigerian Prime 
                                                 
28 The ‘Scramble for Africa’ took place in the Berlin Conference in Ghana in 1884-85 and refers to the colonial 
event where the Western Powers shared out the countries of the African Continent among themselves to be 




Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, (1960-1964) claimed that greedy politicians were the 
worst threat to the unity of Nigeria and that the biggest obstacle to national unity was not to 
be rooted in the cleavage of Nigerians to their different ethnic communal groups, but rather to 
“the clamour for power by politicians” (Balewa 1961 cited in Diamond, 1988:76). The 
fundamental weakness of British colonial policy in Nigeria was the intentional desire to 
discourage the development of a common or shared national identity between northerners and 
southerners. This Achilles heel fostered poverty, instability and underdevelopment of the 
country that was later exploited by local leaders who were immature and addicted to the 
accumulation of power for selfish advancement and not in the interests of holistic national 
development. Nwabueze offers a poignant critique of the British colonial policies in Nigeria: 
The British Colonial government did in Nigeria discourage, initially at any rate, such 
a policy of social integration. Southerners living in the North were segregated in 
separate strangers’ quarters outside the walled periphery of the native towns. As a 
result, contact between the two peoples lacked that degree of closeness and intimacy 
necessary for the fostering of a consciousness of a common national identity and the 
opportunity for promoting mutual understanding through a shared communal life was 
lost (Nwabueze cited in Ojo, 1985:16).  
This thesis postulates that the failure of British colonial policy to build national unity among 
Nigerians does not excuse post-Independent Nigerian leaders of their dismal record of 
continuing and expanding divide and rule policies that are responsible for the contemporary 
State of disunity, under-development, poverty, and violence within the country. It is therefore 
an invalid and dishonest argument to continue blaming the effect of British colonialism after 
more than fifty years of Independence for the contemporary socio-economic and security 
conditions within the country that allowed over 200 female students in Chibok on 14-15 April 
2014, to be kidnapped by Boko Haram (Bagaji, et al., 2012: 33-37).  
 
 
5.2.3.  Missionaries and the Colonial Government’s Collaboration against African 
Cultures  
The colonial project along with its accompanying ally of Christian missionaries came to 
Nigeria in the nineteenth-century. The literature informs that the first Roman Catholic 
missionaries (Portuguese) came to Nigeria as early as 1509 (Adetunji, 2013:345), while the 
Protestant-Evangelical missionaries came later in 1842, paving the way for the British 
colonialists who followed in 1861 (Adesina, 1973:484). They annexed Lagos which was not 




with an agenda for promoting of the British understanding and practice of colonization, 
civilization, conversion, and the Christianization of the “heathen” (1984:171). These 
constitute the agenda items of their political, commercial, and military objectives. Missionary 
H. W. Karl Kumm, the founder of the COCIN (The Light Bearer, 1907: 1-4; Gutip, 1998:3-6; 
Goshit, et al., 2013:2-5), describes colonialism in a favourable way because according to his 
understanding, the missionaries and colonial masters had a similar agenda:  
A country is a “colonial” where the dynamic is in foreign hands, nourished by a 
foreign capital, directed by foreign personnel, inspired by foreign spirit of enterprise, 
primarily directed toward foreign interests. A “colonial” country is therefore a 
country…of which people and land are, in the last instance, instruments and means 
for foreign purposes, and where foreign decisions determine the peoples’ destiny” 
(Kumm cited in Boer, 1984:170).  
The British colonialists needed the missionaries to use Christianity to prepare the Africans 
with the Christian gospel so as to make governance much easier for them (Boer, 1984:53; 
Barnes, 2007:591). Indeed, the early missionaries shared a disparaging view of Africa:  
Africa was a dismal picture of utter darkness without any redeeming features at all; 
there is a land in this wonderful world, called ‘The Land of Darkness…dark are the 
bodies of people who live there, darker are their minds, and darker still are their 
souls—the great land of darkness (Kumm, 1907:15; Boer, 1984:125).  
This sounds like pride, but it could as well be an expression of shock at what was happening 
in the pre-colonial missionary era in terms of slavery and other inhuman practices. Both the 
missionaries and colonial masters refused to see through their biased colonial lens what was 
positive about African culture and religions. For example, as Kumm argues, the curse of Ham 
(Gen. 9:24-29 NIV) was meant for the African condition because:  
For centuries and millenniums Africa has been in the grip of demons. Chains have 
bound it, chains of superstition and idolatry, chains of ignorance and physical 
slavery...hell, where Satan has his seat (van den Berg, 1956:80).  
This is a deadly demonstration of paternalism by a Christian missionary. However, as Goshit, 
et al., (2013:3-6) have argued, Kumm painted Africa the way he did because he wanted to 
draw the attention of his British partners and financiers to the African project. Whichever 
way one looks at it, one would also expect the mission to criticize the excesses of 
colonialism, which is lacking from the SUM’s agenda and relations with the British 
colonialists. 
 
In contrast to Africa whose cultures were considered of the devil, Europe was presented as 




West became what they were through the bible and Christian influence. He concluded 
therefore that northern Nigeria needed an education based on “Christian European principles 
because there was need to uphold the integrity and humanity of ideals of which Christian 
civilized nations were so justly proud” (1910:129). The highest of virtues were attributed to 
the West, especially liberty and justice. Britain was regarded as the purest example of these 
virtues because she outshone all other nations with: justice, faithfulness, honesty, and liberty 
that were valued more highly in Britain than any other State on earth (1910:130). Boer 
(1984:172) posits that:  
It was only a small step from such attitudes to approval of the colonial enterprise as a 
divine task imposed upon the Christian West by God himself. Africa had to be 
brought into the kingdom of God. Mission and colonialism were thus lumped 
together.  
It could therefore be argued that the missionary movement in Nigeria was also a colonial 
project. The colonial leadership and missionary institutions engaged Africans with a death-
dealing pride and arrogance that led to the stripping of the local Africans of their traditional 
culture. Missionary Rooker represented this proud colonial ideology when he states:  
How strangely England was compelled to take over the Sudan! Was there no divine 
purpose in this occupation? And could England be so selfish as to let the River of life 
flow by the Sudanese without pointing them to its healing water? O no! A thousand 
times no! To restore justice to the oppressed, to set the captives free, to help men and 
women to live in peace and comfort, to educate them in gentle arts and science—that 
is the noble aim worthy of an English administration (Rooker cited in Boer, 
1984:173).  
Christian Missions from Great Britain were to be regarded as indispensable partners in the 
British colonial project in Africa and therefore necessary for its development and 
maintenance (Boer, 1984:176). The missions gave colonialism a divine stamp of approval 
and acceptance evidenced by the way Ruxton expressed this perception: 
It was well within God’s plan to establish his kingdom. The natives of the Sudan, we 
are told, have come under our rule, so that we…might bring them under the rule of 
the kingdom of God. So shall the kingdoms of this world become the kingdom of our 
Lord and of His Christ…may the kingdom of our Lord be extended in our time over 
all peoples of Africa…to His glory, their salvation, and England’s honour (The Light 
Bearer, 1934:266). 
The missionaries served to make the arrival of British colonialists less reprehensible to the 
Africans because of their comparatively close relationship with the local people. Christian 
missions also had a strategic interest in wanting to halt the advance of Islam throughout the 
rest of Nigeria. However, there were also political and economic aspects to their activity. The 




continent and it was their strategic intention that these resources did not to fall into the hands 
of other Muslim-competing nations. The colonial policies made it legally mandatory that the 
local ethnic groups that owned these commodities must provide them for the services of the 
British Empire (Boer, 1984:176). This partnership between the colonialists and the Christian 
missions left entrenched negative and positive political and ecclesiastical legacies within 
Nigeria. The symbiotic relationship between the colonial government and Christian missions 
has influenced Farrant’s description of the relationship as “complementary” (1984:176). One 
is therefore not surprised at the instructive statement that was published at the headquarters of 
the SUM (i.e., the founders of the COCIN). It unapologetically stated that: 
They should exercise full cooperation with the government, and…that agents of the 
SUM should endeavour to inculcate in the minds of their neighbours …principles of 
loyalty to government and obedience to its demands (The Light Bearer, 1970:64-65).  
However, according to Kumm, this was just a mask by the SUM because while they 
supported colonialism, they also remained aloof from outright direct participation in politics 
(1970:57).  Kumm consistently argued that colonialism would one day help Africa occupy a 
responsible and respected position in the council of nations, the parliament of humankind 
(1970:197). As for the SUM, their perspective on British colonialism described it as:  
A form of imperialism based on divine mandate and designed to bring liberation to—
spiritual, economic, cultural, and political–by sharing the blessings of the Christ-
inspired civilization of the West with a people suffering under satanic forces of 
oppression, ignorance and diseases, effected by a combination of political, economic 
and religious forces that cooperate under a regime seeking the benefit of both ruler 
and ruled (Boer, 1984:177).  
Their founding perspectives laid the foundation for what I would argue to be a compromising 
Church and State relation framework that has weakened the contemporary missional response 
of COCIN to the governance and societal challenges within the context of Jos where it serves.  
 
 
5.2.4. Colonial Resource and Human Exploitation 
Colonial politics were based on an economic structure, for colonialism was at base a political 
and economic arrangement (Boer, 1984:167-168). The British were primarily and 
predominantly interested in West Africa not only for political reasons, but rather as the 
source of large, cheap and freely available raw materials as well as a market for its British-
manufactured goods reimported back to Africa (Fatokun, 2013:348). A colonial government 




cutthroat competition from other foreign firms in Nigeria (2013:348). For example, the 
presence of French and German commercial interests within the West African region 
received the security support of their respective national governments. Accordingly, the 
British government was also pushed to support and provide similar protection for its 
commercial interest (Boer, 1984:168). One could argue that the death-dealing violence that 
emerged within northern Nigeria can be attributed not only to the political discriminatory 
policies by the Muslim majority administration against Christian minority residents, but also 
because of the competition by commercial trading interests that sowed seeds of division and 
insecurity among the local people (Boer, 1979:302). It could be further argued that although 
as a political system, colonialism caused great damage to the development of the Nigerian 
economy, the policies of the British missionaries also helped shape the environment in which 
British economic political interests thrived (Boer, 1984:171). The colonial socio-economic 




5.3. Nigeria as a Country 
The socio-political, religious and economic construct of Nigeria from the period of 
colonization to the post-Independence period has bequeathed intractable problems that affect 
nation building (Barnes, 2010:16-18). The name ‘Nigeria’ was coined by British Journalist, 
Mrs Flora Shaw, the wife of the British colonial administrator when the northern and 
southern regions were merged in 1914 by Frederick Lugard (Crowder, 1973:23). The name 
was derived from the River Niger, one of the two main rivers that run through the country. 
The other is the River Benue (Political map of Nigeria, 1967). This means that Nigeria is a 
colonial representation and definition of Nigerian people as people with black skin as the 
Latin adjective “niger” from which it is derived is a variation of the Spanish and Portuguese 
noun, “negro” or “black.”29  
 
Nigeria is commonly regarded as the most populous African country with a population of 170 
million people, but also as the most deeply divided country (Higazi, 2011:26-28). As a 
consequence, any theological research has to find its point of departure within the historical 
                                                 





experiences of the Nigerian peoples. Such a theology will also reflect the historical legacy of 
the Nigerian religio-political context. It ought to be remembered that colonialism left 
destructive legacies in Nigeria because of what happened to the traditional cultures including 
the religions of Africans. This study focuses primarily on the context of Jos which is located 
in the northern region where the Plateau State is located. The northern region has evolved 
since the 1990s to become an unstable region30 of Nigeria because of the socio-economic 
deterioration and continuing religio-political violence. It is within this context that an 
understanding is sought on the effects of the colonial and western mission’s policies in the 
development of the COCIN-Plateau State relationship within Jos (Larger and Ukiwo, 
2007:4). PIDAN (2012:6-8) has argued that before the colonial period, the various ethnic 
groups living around the Plateau State lived together under the guidance of their traditional 
religions and cultures which focused on the dignity of the human person and community life 
(Uzoma, 2004:5651). The traditional religions of Nigeria, as with most polytheistic African 
religions such as Shirih,31 embodied an all-inclusive attitude to other religious beliefs. The 
notion of the one and only true religion or the one and only one God is absent from their 
world-view (Ikenga-Metuh, 1986:35). It could therefore be argued that Nigerians exercised 
greater tolerance, hospitality and openness to other religious practices before the arrival of the 
monotheistic missionary brand of Christianity and Islam.  
 
More than 250 ethnic groups lived around the Middle Belt, where Plateau State is located, 
and co-existed with their competing political and economic interests (PIDAN, 2012:23-26). 
These are governed within four different regions (South, North, East, and Midwest). These 
regions are characterized by religious differences with the north being dominantly Muslim, 
while the rest being dominated by Christian and traditional religion (Barnes, 2006:42). These 
provinces existed as separate kingdoms where religion and politics did not fundamentally 
divide them because traditional religions are not essentially competitive in nature but 
accommodative. For the Plateau State, the indigenous ethnic groups are Berom, Afizere, and 
Anaguta, all of which had similar cultures and practices were held together until Islam and 
                                                 
30 The instability of the northern region is informed by factors ranging from multi-ethnic posturing in the north-
central to educational backwardness compared to the south. This is further compounded by religious sentiments 
between Christians in the north-central and the Muslims in the core north (Gaiya, 2004:355-357). 
31 Shirih, according to Audu Lusa (2010:54) is sun-worship among the Kadung ethnic group in Nigeria. This 
religion holds that all people regardless of religious affiliation, race, colour, geographical location, and 
language, belong together because the sun shines on every human being without discrimination. Shirih is a 
belief that all religions are under the same sun, therefore, none of them is better than others, and hence, there is 




Christianity came in the eleventh and nineteenth-centuries respectively (Adesina, 1973:484; 
Danfulani, 2006:45). From its inception, the colonial project co-opted the partnership of 
religious institutions to achieve its objectives. This, we shall argue, contributed to unhealthy 
Church-State relations in Nigeria, and Jos in particular. 
 
Dalat (2009:34) argues that lack of the equitable sharing of economic resources is at the root 
of all the conflicts that threaten the unity and hinder the progress of Nigeria. This lack of the 
fair and equitable sharing of resources has fuelled the growing inequality and corruption 
promoted by greedy individuals who wield State power and want instant material 
gratification. Yamsat (2001:18-25) posits that: 
Nigeria has more economic resources than what all of its citizens need but that most 
of them live in abject poverty because a few individuals take more than their fair 
share.  
Yamsat (2001:6-8) also reiterates that: 
Because Nigerians seem to be religious in the extreme as well as poor, the few and 
powerful rich people use religion to exploit the poor by applying so-called “money-
pray-politics” after which they empty the State coffers to replenish their accounts.  
It can therefore be argued that this excessive greed among political elite is responsible for the 
life-denying economic injustice which forces the Nigerian masses to live in perpetual 
poverty. The two competing religions seem to have failed to promote economic justice in the 
country because they appear to be more concerned with competition for power and 
domination of the public space (Lesmore, 2015:153-154). The situation seems also to be 
exacerbated by legacies of unwholesome missionary theologies, which may be responsible 
for poor attitude towards politics in general among Christians. The missio-political mandate 
of the Church needs political engagement but where it is not understood, it becomes 
destructive.    
 
 
 5.4. Missionary Theologies that Undergird Church-State Relations in Nigeria 
As we have seen, British colonialism deliberately divided the identity and witness of the 
Church in Nigeria. This was visible in the theological divisions between the SUM 
missionaries concerning the theology that undergirded their Church-State relations because 
some missionaries were pro- or anti-government colonial policies that harmed human 




nurtured their members to obey and support the status quo. However, there were those 
Churches that perceived the colonial government and the majority Muslim community to be 
in strategic partnership and therefore nurtured their members to resist such alliances (The 
Light Bearer, 1950:391). The theology that emerged was based upon sectarian interests and 
therefore unhealthy for peaceful economic development within the pluralistic society such as 
Nigeria. J. H Farrant, the SUM’s field secretary, pleaded for safeguards in the national 
Constitution to protect the Christian minorities within the north, but since it was not possible, 
he concluded that: 
The most reliable protection for minority is its strength of character and stability of 
purpose. As far as northern Nigerian Christians go, their progress will depend much 
more upon their fidelity to Christ than on safeguards in the Constitution” (The Light 
Bearer, 1919:57:87).  
It could thus be argued that the missionaries were theologically unwise in the restricted 
Christian virtues that were taught to converts without any in-depth theology that 
conscientized them for active engagement in the political affairs of their communities. The 
SUM by default failed to develop a theology that engendered positive critical engagement 
with the two dominant religio-political forces within the north, namely: Muslims and the 
colonial political environment (Boer, 1984:185). However, there were some Christians who 
showed an interest in politics and took the initiative to oppose the injustices coming from the 
Muslim community (1984:185). The main Achilles’ heel of the missional/theological heritage 
bequeathed by the SUM to the COCIN could be summed up as one that nurtured and 
narrowed down Christian political interests so as to safeguard British colonial interests (Boer, 
1984:185). This policy deliberately restricted political concern to a narrow focus in a country 
where the Church missional identity and vocation called for engagement with wider societal 
issues (Boer, 1984:185). Therefore, according to Boer: 
Is irrelevant theology where Christians are encouraged to play politics only to defend 
their own interests has also informed why the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) 
tends to speak out only whenever it perceives a threat from Muslim, but in between, 
CAN has been largely dormant and silent (1985:185). 
This scenario paints a picture of the SUM that is both contradictory and ambivalent towards 
politics in Nigeria. The deep and entrenched suspicion of the Islamic agenda in the north has 
resulted in a perception that the SUM is anti-nationalist because of its anti-Islam concerns. 
Their rhetoric also feds into the perception that nationalism was working against what they 
felt was God’s gift of the missionary Church to Nigeria to save it from Islam. The SUM’s 




that favoured a majority Muslim north, while being supportive of colonial policies in the 
south that favoured a Christian majority. Accordingly, the SUM viewed the colonial project 
as a “gift from God” as long as it worked to the benefit of Christian missions. The wider 
wellbeing of the nation in which the economic order was under colonial strategy that bred 
inequality, injustice and under-development was not part of their theological critique of the 
colonial ideological system (Boer, 1984:186).  
The paradox was that the missionaries thought that the Christian gospel they carried would be 
a positive force for liberation and justice to what they regarded as a “dark continent” (The 
Light Bearer, 1950:45). This theological perspective gave priority to inner ecclesial concerns 
rather than postulating the outer transformation of the environment in which people live so as 
to give them fullness of life.  
Their conservative Euro-centric evangelical theology and political ideology with its 
dualism worldview underpinning offered an escapist spirituality to the people; not 
one that fostered societal well-being (Boer, 1984:187).  
According to Rookmaker (1970:453), this dualism ideology constitutes: 
A view that this world is good, but yet has autonomy of its own. The world of faith, 
of grace, of religion is the higher one, a world for which we have need of God’s 
revelation. This is where our aims and affections should beset. But the lower world, 
the world of men, the world of nature, can be understood by reason, and here reason 
reigns. It is as such non-religious, secular. Here there is no difference between 
Christian and the non-Christian, as both act according to the natural laws of thought 
and action.  
The ideology that underpinned the SUM’s theology sought to divorce their religious 
obligations from their artistic, scientific, political, social and economic participation in their 
various cultures. Rookmaker (1970:34-35) warned that:  
When Christians—even devout ones—separate these concerns from their religious 
life, they are unwittingly giving in to this long western philosophical tradition…the 
Christian must show his Christianity by avoiding immorality of some sort. 
Accordingly, this two-tier structured worldview prevented the SUM from submitting their 
understanding and practice of capitalism and colonialism to theological scrutiny because it 
accepted the dominant Western philosophical tradition of rationalism in the so-called secular 
areas of life.  
 
The Nigerian Church leaders have inherited this deficient dualistic worldview from the 
missionaries. The Church now struggles with problems it hardly understands because of its 




the more life affirming indigenous knowledge systems of its local context (Boer, 1984:6). 
The contemporary shift by the Nigerian Christians for active involvement in politics seems to 
have emerged as a reactionary move because of Muslim political pressures—not because of a 
better reading of the bible and the development of sound political theology (1984:190). 
Accordingly, Boer offers a damming critique of the Nigerian Church: 
The following features are now characteristics of the Nigerian Christian community: 
They are on guard with respect to perceived Muslim threats. They are a community 
shackled to the capitalistic order. They are proud of their sons and daughters who do 
well in the system, even though they all suspect that success is usually the result of 
compromise of, if not outright disobedience to, Christian principles. They publish 
their periodic communiques against various forms of corruption in high places, but 
they are careful never to mention names, places, and dates, for that would bring us too 
close to the home. We moralize and teach obedience while we fail to analyse the 
system (s) within which we live and work. They discipline believers from among the 
poor for breaches of personal morality, but they do not do the same to prominent 
members who are involved in political misconduct or financial misconduct 
(1984:190). 
This scenario has given rise to unhealthy Church-State relations in the country because 
religion and politics have been death traps for its citizens, to such an extent that the overt and 
covert oppression of its citizens has become acceptable. The Church has found itself as a 
beneficiary of the corrupt status quo and therefore cannot find the inner strength to disengage 
from it in order to gain the political, economic and spiritual ethic to resist the life-denying 
forces of corruption. 
 
It may be that it is the endemic high level of poverty in the north of the country that has made 
it possible for prosperity preachers to turn their brand of religious practice into an economic 
asset and a political instrument. Religion is exploited to such an extent that the poor are not 
only getting poorer but are denied the right to life. Lenshie (2012:50) describes how the 
Nigerian masses are affected: 
Religion today instead of serving as a source of healing sickness, hunger, and 
poverty, and stimulating tranquillity and peaceful co-existence among human beings, 
is used to cause sadness. It is bringing pain instead of relief, hatred instead of love, 
division instead of unity, sadness instead of joy, discrimination and destruction 
instead of accommodation and development. This is especially true between some 
adherents of Islam and Christianity. Nigeria has its own share of these negative 
phenomena.  Ethno-religious conflict has become a matter so serious and devastating 
that it can now be seen as a harbinger of the danger of a crisis such as those that have 
engulfed the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Liberia.  
One might ordinarily expect that religious pluralism would lead to greater unity and stability 




its own where religion has been used in two destructive ways: (i) as a means of acquiring 
political power, and (ii) as a way of exploiting the masses economically through false 
theology. Nigeria, after setting out as a State that was meant to be secular, is thus today 
compromised by the existence of politico-religious alliances that create an unstable 
environment that facilitates violence.  
 
The colonial/missionary factors discussed above form the wider environment from which 
COCIN-State relations developed. This necessitates an examination of the factors that 




 5.5. Politicization of Religious Demography: Christians and Muslim Perceptions 
Demographically, although the 1991 and 2006 censuses did not ask about religious affiliation 
because of its sensitive nature in the country (Gaiya, 2004:354), the Pew Forum on Religion 
and Public Life (2010:19), estimates of the numbers of Muslims and Christians in the country 
and their varying perceptions of each other. According to the 2003 Demographic and Health 
Survey, for example, Muslims constitute 50% of the population, while the 2008 DHS figure 
gives 45% and the Nigerian Ministry of Health estimates the percentage in 2008 to be is 50% 
(Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2010:19). The data on traditional religions is 
difficult to research because of its non-institutional mode of existence. In general, reliable 
Nigerian religious statistics are not easily available because of the sensitive nature of religion 
in the country. However, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (April 2010:4-9) has 





Opinions on Major Issues % 
Christians who want the bible to be made the official law of Nigeria 
Muslims who want sharia to be made the official law of Nigeria 
70% 
71% 
Christians who express positive views of Muslims 
Muslims who express positive views of Christians 
53% 
63% 
Christians who know little/ nothing about Islam 
Muslims who know little/nothing about Christianity  
54% 
63% 
Christians who attach violence to Muslims 
Muslims who attach violence to Christians 
38% 
13% 
Nigerians who say religion is very important in their lives 
Nigerians who have less concern about religion 
87% 
13% 
Christians who believe that government treats them unfairly 
Muslims who believe that government treats them unfairly 
21% 
18% 
Nigerians who want political leaders to belong to their own religious beliefs 
Nigerians who accommodate political leaders with different religious beliefs 




Figure 5.1. Christians and Muslim perceptions of each other in Nigeria 
 
For the northern part of Nigeria where Jos is located, Paden (1986:743-744) reveals that: 
Before 1967, Muslims constituted 73% of the population of northern Nigeria; 
Christians constituted 2.7% while the Animists constituted 24.3%. In 1963, the 
population of Christians showed some increase so that Muslims were 71.7%; 
Christians were 9.7% while the Animists were 18.6%.  
The 1991 census, which disregarded the religious factor, gave a conservative population 
figure of 88,514,501 (Ihemebgulem and Osabgemi, 1999:205-206), out of which 41,324,869 
(53%) was the total population of northern States including the federal capital Abuja. Patrick 
Johnstone’s Operation World figures on religious statistics for northern Nigeria in the 2001 
edition give the following:  
Out of the 58,800,000, Muslims constituted 29,446,000 (50%); Christians constituted 





One can only imagine what constitutes the 2015 data on these religious groups that exist 
within the most ethnically and religiously pluralistic part of Nigeria (Gaiya, 2004:355). With 
this data one would expect that increasing social injustice would give rise to increasing 




5.6. Economic Injustice in Nigeria 
Economic injustice in the country has in part been blamed on the Church where preachers 
mislead the citizens with promises of economic prosperity leading them to accept their 
poverty as a spiritual failure rather than as the result of corruption in governance 
(Oluwatofunmi, 2013:357-358). The prosperity preachers lull the people into a false state of 
fatalism while they themselves are enriched from the resources of the people. The Church has 
not given an inadequate response to issues of social injustice but has instead become an agent 
of injustice. The missio-political identity and vocation of the Church necessitates that it 
should address issues of injustice within the society, but the behaviour of some of its leaders 
belies this, flying around the nation in their private jets while many of their members live on 
the economic margins of society. (Igboin, 2012: 24; Oluwatofunmi, 2013:358). While the 
Church and State need to cooperate for the common good of society (Wallis, 2013, 2014:34-
36), their unhealthy alliance has proven destructive for Nigeria and its economy. The ruling 
elites use their alliance with influential religious leaders to entrench their hold on political 
power because they mutually look about each other’s interest (Oluwatofunmi, 2013:359). 
Many religious leaders in Nigeria who should speak out against injustice on behalf of the 
masses are themselves manipulated by the elites, either for reasons of personal gain, or to 
safeguard their sponsorship for Church projects (2013:359). Those religious leaders that do 
not succumb to the dominant religious political paradigm and are critical of the economic 
injustice manifesting in life-denying corruption in Nigeria are few. One such leader is the 
Most Rev. Peter Akinola, the immediate past-primate of the Church of Nigeria (Anglican 
Communion), who was not afraid to challenge the former President Mohammadu Buhari to 
tackle corruption practically: 
If the president must probe, then he must probe everybody but that will be a tough 
political and moral decision for him to take. My stand is that if we are serious about 
fighting corruption, if we are determined to make people accountable, if we are 




above their income? When a person is putting on ground what is worth his entire 
lifetime earning within four years, what other evidence do you need? The law has to 
be changed…Unfortunately, our laws are weak. I think there was a case of a person 
who stole billions of naira from the Police Pension Fund and was sentenced to N750, 
000 fine or three years imprisonment. Should that continue to be our sense of justice? 
Can that solve the problem of corruption in Nigeria? One thing you don’t fail to 
notice is that almost everybody in government is building mansions across the 
country…such culprits should rot in jail” (The Guardian, June 09 2015, blog). 
Akinola is critical of the oppressive structures in Nigeria by challenging corrupt practices as 
well as the entrenched culture of impunity that feeds social injustice. He further laments:  
I want a better Nigeria where Christopher, Benjamin, and Suzan can live anywhere 
they choose without being molested; a Nigeria where Amodu, Mohammed and Jibril 
can live anywhere they choose unmolested. I want a Nigeria that will be to me a sign 
of progress…I want a Nigeria that when I want to change my passport or to renew it, 
I won’t have to go to the Immigration office. I want a Nigeria that I do not have to 
know anybody before I get services, where everyone matters (The Guardian, June 09 
2015 blog).  
Akinola has touched on the factors that foster economic injustice in Nigeria, but he waited 
until he was out of office to articulate such critical comments. This suggests that the leaders 
that are in office are deliberately mute in addressing the important issues affecting the lives of 
the ordinary people, because of political expediency. 
 
The former World Bank’s Vice-President for Africa, Obiageli “Oby” Ezekwesili, has equally 
lamented the unjust economic situation of Nigeria, blaming the religious leaders for the 
unjust and oppressive State of the economy in Nigeria: 
 Double standards and practice of instant gratification within the Christian community 
is responsible for inhibiting the fight against corruption in Nigeria. The need to curb 
the incessant spate of double standards and instant gratification within the Church is 
very germane, if the fight against corruption will be won in Nigeria. God is looking 
for sincere men and not just position-seeking individuals who will lead the change 
against corrupt practice that has continued to paint the country dark among the comity 
of nations…Nigeria will not change until the Church goes back to the tenets of true 
biblical teachings on holiness and righteousness across the public and private sectors 
of our country (Ezekwesili, 2013:4; Prov. 14:34 NIV). 
Again, she too waited until she was out of office to make her critique of government. 
Accordingly, the value of her critique has been weakened because of these inconsistencies. 
However, she is nevertheless correct in her contention that individualism and the desire for 




attitude has denied Nigerians the humanness (Ubuntu32) that calls for being brothers and 
sisters to be each other’s keepers. Money and personal fame have replaced the dignity of 
humanity in Nigeria.33 Both State and Church may be guilty of the economic injustice that 
prevails in Nigeria, which has not only failed the poor but has also resulted in the life-
denying violence that has destroyed many lives and create thousands of internally displaced 
people. The situation in Nigeria is one where political leaders and lawmakers formulate laws 
that only favour themselves and their networks of close contacts (Salawu, 2010:345-350).  
 
Akinola confronted the Nigerian lawmakers concerning their unlawful decision on what they 
take as their monthly salaries: 
How much is an average university professor earning? How hard does he work in 
terms of teaching and research? Can their work be compared to that of politicians, 
who simply go there, make noise for two or three times a month, and earn the kind of 
money they are earning? Is it justifiable in any way? The money the politicians are 
earning cannot be justified in any way. But, because they make the law, they suit 
themselves. They abuse the privilege of the power that they have by putting 
themselves above other Nigerians. They should make laws that put Nigerians as the 
centre or focus of attention, not themselves…Their salary should be completely 
restructured to reflect the level of work they are doing vi-sa-vis the economy (The 
Guardian, June 09 2015, blog). 
Another report in The National Inquirer Blog (2013:1) deplored the deteriorating condition 
that:  
By estimation, according to international analysis, Nigeria is meant to be one of the 
most prosperous nations in the world owing to its staggering production of about 2.4 
million barrels of oil every day and with the price of oil pegged at $93.61 a barrel 
(before now). This means that the country earns a whopping $2.24 billion income a 
day, and this is just from crude oil sales. With its geo-political power and economic 
resources, it is doubted if any country would have the power and financial might to 
change the course of black/African civilization like Nigeria had the leaders not been 
corrupt. Nigerian citizens are the worst treated in the world with the recent research 
saying it’s the worst place for any baby to be born especially in this year 2013. Where 
are all the monies?  
Adekoya argues that:  
                                                 
32 Lovemore  Mbigi, The Spirit of African Leadership (2005: 69), Ubuntu is a Zulu concept that means 
‘personhood’, but the term seems to have equivalents in other African ethnic groups: In Shona it is Unhu and in 
both Tswana and Botho, Ubuntu means the essence of being human, and it is a positive perception of African 
personhood. It refers to the collective interdependence and solidarity of communities of affection. 
33 Nnoli (1978:108) laments the Nigerian economic situation “…during the pre-colonial times, family system 
with its emphasis on welfare and social responsibility rather than individualism and its ethic of an individual as 
his brother’s keeper is common to all Nigerian people…production was organized to satisfy definite biosocial 




63% of the Nigerian population lives in extreme poverty while a Nigerian senator 
takes home roughly 1.1 Sterling Pounds every year in salary plus benefits. The MPs 
must make do with nine hundred thousand Sterling Pounds. In comparison, David 
Cameron earns 142,500 Sterling Pounds Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. 
Nigerian lawmakers fly first class, lodge in priciest rooms at the fanciest hotels and 
live in Beverley Hill-style mansions, all at the public’s expense.34   
The entrenchment of economic injustice has been difficult to reverse because, according to 
Adekoya: 
In Nigeria’s fiercely hierarchical and materialistic society, it is easy for top politicians 
to discredit criticism of their lifestyle from those below them on the social ladder: by 
simply implying that it stems from envy. It hardly helps that there have been 
numerous cases of members of civil society who used to lambast politicians’ 
earnings—only to be co-opted by the establishment and promptly reverse their 
views.35  
Economic injustice in Nigeria appears to be fed by factors such as: ethnic, religious, and 
regional clashes, economic imbalances, pervasive poverty, inequality, unemployment, 
political conflicts, lad-based conflicts, perceived injustice in resource (petrol) control 
(UNDP/ECA, 2011: 24-25). Where power is misconstrued as a weapon of coercion, the 
socio-economic condition of the poor becomes worse. One could infer that divisive factors 
are responsible for Nigeria’s failure as a State from the current president, Mohammadu 
Buhari’s inaugural speech when he declared that: 
I intend to keep to my oath and serve as President to all Nigerians. I belong to 
everybody and I belong to nobody (The Vanguard, May 29 2015, p. 2).   
 
 
5.6.1. The Destructive Use of Power over Economic Issues  
The unhealthy use of power is a major facilitator of economic injustice in Nigeria. Power has 
come to be identified with the acquisition of wealth. According to Weber (1991:78), power is 
understood as: 
The ability to carry out one’s will despite resistance, where others only have to 
comply and conform has constituted an ideology where the State is regarded as 
constituting men dominating men; and supported by legitimate violence.  
                                                 
34 <http://www.theguardian.com/commentfree/2015/may/29/muhammadu-buhari-lavish-lifstyle-nigeria-elite/>, 
[Accessed June 1 2015]. 
35 <http://www.theguardian.com/commentfree/2015/may/29/muhammadu-buhari-lavish-lifstyle-nigeria-elite/>, 




This destructive idea of power sees power as based in institutions that are meant to dominate 
the citizenry. The use of power by Nigerian political and religious leaders is in serious need 
of a comprehensive transformation that relinquishes those features that disempower ordinary 
peoplepower. As Foucault (2003:342) can argue:  
Power should not be used as an instrument of coercion because power is not a 
monopoly of the few, but is diffused and embodied in discourse and knowledge. 
Foucault also challenges the notion that power is wielded by people or groups by way of 
“episodic” or “sovereign” acts of domination or coercion. Instead, it must be dispersed as 
“power is everywhere” and “comes from everywhere” because power is neither an agency 
nor a structure (1998:63). 
 
By his understanding of power, Foucault conforms to that of Tillich and Arendt who 
described power respectively as:  
Community expressing its intrinsic power in the positing of justice and people’s 
support lending power to the institutions of a country, a continuation of the consent 
that brought the laws into existence to begin with…All institutions are manifestations 
and materialization of power. They petrify and decay as soon as the living power of 
the people cease to be, and to uphold them” (1971:99; 1970:42).  
Arendt further argued that:  
When we say of somebody that he or she is ‘in power’, we actually refer to his or her 
being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name—without the 
empowering group, power vanishes—power is not equal to strength, not found in an 
individual characteristic or quality, it is bound to the social relationship and develops 
in communication and cooperation; therefore power is not related to violence. They 
are opposites! Violence occurs where power is in jeopardy but left to its own course it 
ends in power’s disappearance (1970:44).  
Within the context of Jos, Plateau State when power is wrongly construed, it leads to 
economic injustice and the destruction of community through endemic violence. Hence, 
when Church and State relations become dysfunctional, it creates an environment in which 
economic injustice and corruption thrive because both of them use power destructively. 
Economic injustice in the country has in part been blamed on the role of Church and State 
relations where some influential preachers have formed alliances with corrupt political and 
economic systems to exploit the vulnerable poor who are seeking solutions to their life’s 
problems. The context of injustice is usually fed by poor governance and corruption that 
misleads the citizenry with promises of an economic utopia (Oluwatofunmi, 2013:357-358). 




the political and economic elites for their share of unethical wealth. Consequently, an 
inherent state of contradiction exists between the religious leaders and the political leaders of 
the regional and national States of Nigeria because the religious institutions and their leaders 
that are that are supposed to be nurturing a nation that is built on high political and ethical 
standards allow themselves to be manipulated for the narrowly greedy agenda of the minority 
elite within the Church and State (2013:359). In the process, some Church leaders have gone 
as far as to press their members to vote for their political allies who reward them with gifts 
such as houses or vehicles that are presented to them as bribes during “thanksgiving services 
to express  ‘appreciation to God’” (2013:360).  
 
The older Churches that are linked to the European missionary heritage were developed with 
systems of governance that would hold their clergy and members accountable through 
recognized systems of discipline. As traditional denominations declined and independent 
Churches emerged with Charismatic/Pentecostal leaders known as Bishops, Apostles and 
Prophets, offering health and wealth, discipline and accountability among their clergy seem 
to lack institutional accountability to discipline those leaders that misrepresented the ministry 
of the Church with their behaviour.  Even among some of the clergy from the older Western 
mission-founded Churches in Nigeria, they are also losing control over their local pastors 
because some give their allegiances to the ruling political elites in order to benefit from the 
scarce economic resources for their local agenda. This high level of social and economic 
inequality within the nation has resulted in many of these Churches being unable to pay their 
pastors adequately, during harsh economic times. According to Oluwatofunmi, partisan 
politics and avarice has overtaken everyone (2013:360). Ezekwesili, has lamented the 
economic situation of Nigeria, blaming religious leaders, and especially Church leaders, for 
the unjust and oppressive state of the economy in Nigeria:  
Double standards and practice of instant gratification within the Christian community 
is responsible for inhibiting the fight against corruption in Nigeria. The need to curb 
the incessant spate of double standards and instant gratification within the Church is 
very germane, if the fight against corruption will be won in Nigeria. God is looking 
for sincere men and not just position-seeking individuals who will lead the change 
against corrupt practice that has continued to paint the country dark among the comity 
of nations… Nigeria will not change until the Church goes back to the tenets of true 
biblical teachings on holiness and righteousness across the public and private sectors 
of our country (2013:4). 
 It could be argued that from the pre-colonial period when slavery by the Arabs tended to 




hardly changed since Karl Kumm, the founder of the COCIN highlighted the prevalence of 
corruption within the colonial structures of the society (Kumm cited in Boer, 1984:170; The 
Light Bearer, 1907:12). This situation seems to perpetuate itself in the post-colonial period as 
is demonstrated below. 
 
5.7. Comparing the Post-Colonial and Colonial Political Oppressions 
Comparing the colonial and post-colonial political experiences, the experience of 
Independence for many Nigerians may be described as the exchange of one form of political 
oppression for another. The attitude of many Churches, linked to the Western missionary 
movement, was very supportive of the British Government approving the political 
Independence of Nigeria. However, the different ecclesial leaders failed to offer an in-depth 
critique of the lingering anti-nation building ‘divide and rule’ colonial policies that were 
bequeathed to the young independent nation. Ekineh (1997:70-80) states that, during the 
Independence ceremony, the retired Reverend Franklin Opuwari of the St. Augustine 
Anglican Church in Lagos ended his sermon as follows: 
Nature put us Africans far away from the civilization of Greece, Egypt, Rome, and 
the Christian Church…We and the rest of Africa South of Egypt did not benefit from 
the civilization which had flourished since more than two thousand years ago. Then 
fortunately, the British came; and within my own time, they have catapulted us from 
the age of darkness into this wonderful modern age-the age of peace, the arts, of 
science, and technology. I saw part of the beginning, and now, I thank God that he 
has allowed me to see the end…praise be the Lord (Opuwari cited in Ekineh, 
1997:80). 
This statement reveals a deep colonial enslavement of the mind that requires postcolonial 
emancipation. Opuwari has bought into the European discourse on Africa that separates 
Egypt from the rest of Africa by implying that its ancient civilization is the product of its 
relationship with Europe. The development of Egyptian civilization throughout its long 
history has never been without active socio-economic intercourse with the wider African 
Cultures. Nigerians achieved their independence through their just struggle against 
colonialism and it was not a gift granted by Great Britain. Therefore, the ministry and 
mission of the Church within the new independent nation context was expected to give 
critical solidarity in their prophetic role within the nation by promoting national unity and 
anti-corruption that are the fruits of divisive politics that thrive on corruption. If the colonial 
administration saw Nigeria as a burden that they surrendered then the newly independent 




challenges. On the other hand, one voice within the Church described it as an ‘age of peace’ 
(Ekineh, 1997:82). This perspective seems to gloss over the hard realities that the newly 
independent nation faced and it therefore could be argued that sections of the Church were 
part of the crisis right from the beginning. However, in a sermon that was preached soon after 
Independence at a Church where the worshippers focused on the restoration of peace in the 
Niger Delta region, the preacher stated that: 
During the colonial era, the country was not free, but we all know that the people 
were free; they could say their minds on any matter. Now the country is free, but the 
people are not free. I cannot preach to you and express my feelings about the Military 
Government and its brutality. In this country, only sycophants are happy…but God of 
Abraham will deliver us (cited in Ekineh, 1997:80).   
The preacher offered a stinging critique of the political order in his comparison of the 
colonial era and that of the independent nation under the governance of military government. 
He identified the loss of freedom under the military government as the greater threat to the 
nation’s well-being. These divergent views of what was happening within the nation reveal 
divisions within the Church and among Church leaders. While some Church leaders saw 
peace, others saw an acute denial of freedom of expression. Barth states that a confused and 
divided Church would not be morally effective in giving positive guidance to the State (Barth 
cited in Hunsinger, 2006:362). The systematic theft of the nation’s resources by corrupt 
colonial and independent governments ensured that the nation remained underdeveloped and 
the poor denied of resources that were intended for their development (Ekineh, 1997:80-81). 
The prophetic voice of the Church has been missing from the general political development 
of the nation because the religious leaders themselves were competing for political and 
economic power, benefits and privileges. No systematic ecumenical policy of how the 
Church and other religious groups should engage with the State was developed in Nigeria 
(Ekineh, 1991:81). The Churches themselves were divided, the different denominational 
groupings sought to address State matters according to their own terms and interests that 
proved to be ineffective.  This lack of an ecumenical and interfaith common agenda on 
national issues has had a negative effect on the peaceful co-existence of the citizens in the 
country. I quote at length the gravity of the problems that the nation faced in remaining and 
developing as a united nation, which was aptly described by the president, Nnamdi Azikiwe, 
in a national broadcast that took place in 1964: 
Fellow country men and women, we have taken a dangerous road which if not 
stopped at once, will make the crisis in the Congo look like a child-play…whether 
our beloved Nigeria will continue to remain united as one country or will disintegrate 




desist from inciting our communities to liquidate themselves, and whether our 
politicians would cooperate so that the law abiding elements in this part of Africa will 
experience free and fair elections…should our political leaders, after bearing all the 
above factors in mind, prefer to crucify the unity of this country on the Golgotha of 
their inordinate ambitions for naked power, then hundreds and thousands of Nigerian 
patriots, who sacrificed dearly for its unity and its freedom, must take note and pass 
this information to posterity. In which case, it would be an irony of history that the 
liquidation of our national unity occurred after we had become free from political 
bondage that lasted almost a century (cited in Ekineh, 1997:94-95).  
The threat to Nigeria’s identity as a unitary State that was present in that early post-
Independence period is still a very present threat to the contemporary Nigeria where it’s 
sovereign Constitution is constantly abused by regional States (Ekineh, 1997:97).  The threat 
is also heightened by the role that influential religious ideology plays in regional State 
politics. One could therefore question whether some of those that fought for independence 
did perhaps compromise their allegiance to upholding Nigerian unity by promoting their 
allegiance to their competing religious ideology. If the colonial administration failed by 
privileging some regions above others, then it could be argued that the leaders of independent 
Nigeria are also failing by allowing some Nigerian States to opt for a State religion that acts 
against the social cohesion of the nation. Nigeria has therefore become more divided during 
the post-Independence era than the colonial era because what seems to hold the country 
together is very tenuous and nothing but territorial boundaries.  
 
For the sake of emphasis, Nigeria could equally be labelled as a “failed State” characterized 
by what Blanco (2012:70-77) described as:  
Fragility and lack of capacity of the State structures or the bad governance of them as 
source of both insecurity and under-development. The State fails when it no longer 
perform basic functions required for it to pass as a State. These functions range from 
the provision of welfare and security to the border patrol and the rule of law 
enforcement.  
Further characteristics of failed States as enumerated by Nshirimana (2014: 21) include:  
Rise of criminal and political violence, loss of control over borders, rising ethnic, 
religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities, civil war, use of terror against own 
citizens, weak institutions, deteriorated or insufficient infrastructure, collapse of 
health system, leaders destroying economic and political fabric of the country 
[through corruption], exploitation of the poor.  
Most of the characteristics mentioned above seem to be responsible for the life-denying 
violence in Nigeria in general, and the city of Jos in particular. To overcome this State failure 




in Krasner and Pascual, 2005:153-163) identified as ten features of Statehood that have to be 
accomplished in order to overcome fragility and guarantee State stability. These are: 
 
i. A legitimate monopoly on the means of violence; 
ii. Administrative control; 
iii. Sound management of public finances; 
iv. Investment in human capital; 
v. The creation of citizenship rights and duties; 
vi. Provision of infrastructure; 
vii. Market formation; 
viii. Management of the assets of the State; 
ix. Effective public borrowing; 
x. Maintenance of rule and law. 
  
Policies which tend to exclude others from common participation can only perpetuate State 
fragility. This is because experience shows that attempts at State-building which ignore or 
oppose hybridity will encounter considerable difficulty in generating effective and legitimate 
outcomes. The strengthening of central State institutions is unquestionably important, but if 
this becomes the main focus it threatens to further alienate local societies by rendering them 
impotent in shaping their development and thereby weakening their sense of local 
responsibility for overcoming problems and developing the local ownership of solutions 
(Ghani, et al., 2006a and 2006b). The marginalization of minorities by any State begins the 
process of its failure. Likewise, the inability of the State to treat all sectors of its citizens 
within its jurisdiction as equals also contributes to the weakening of the State. 
 
 
5.8. Competition for Superiority between Christianity and Islam Weakened the State 
Based upon the above observations, the intolerant behaviour of some of the extreme 
followers of both Christianity and Islam in Nigeria has contributed to the instability of the 
Nigerian State. Their claims of exclusivism and superiority over all other religious faiths and 
the desire for national dominance constitute the fundamental cause for hostility between the 
two religions. They have served to foster disunity and hatred among Africans and their 




(Oluwatofinmi, 2013:346). As Christianity and Islam struggle for supremacy, particularly, in 
northern Nigeria today, one can only remember what some of the COCIN founding 
missionaries said concerning the fate of minorities in the northern region:  
If we do nothing now, the Churches [and the minorities] will feel grieve about our 
silence…it is our objects to make the minorities and the Church to be heard in the 
State, advocating for the things that are true, honest, just, pure, lovely, and of good 
report. The most important and reliable protection for minorities is their own strength 
of character and stability of purpose. As far as the Christian minorities in northern 
Nigeria are concerned, their progress will depend much more upon their fidelity to 
Christ than safe-guards in the Constitution (Farrant cited in Boer, 1984:92-94). 
The contradictory attitude of the SUM towards politics was self-evident. On one hand, it 
openly welcomed and supported British colonialism; and on the other, refused to become 
involved in nurturing the quality of representational politics that served the people (Boer, 
1884:179). This attitude may flow with their Protestant-Evangelical faith that saw the work of 
politics as being unholy activities. However, some prominent members of the SUM such as 
Bristow, Maxwell, and Farrant (1945:234; Gutip, 1998:4-6) refused to follow this narrow 
political understanding and engagement and openly called for the Church to become actively 
involved in the political reality of its members. It could be argued that the SUM feared 
political domination by the Muslims, where mission schools in the north served a strategic 
role in their agenda of using Western education as a lure to increase Christion influence. 
However, as Boer (1984:179) has argued, Christians in the north who received such 
education did not become politically conscious to respond to the political development 
constructively because they were misinformed to play politics only for the defence of 
Christian interests. 
 
The COCIN initially emerged from the SUM as EKAN,36 as a way of contextualizing the 
name of the Church. The COCIN’s position on Church-State relations that emerged out of its 
SUM-legacy adopted a contradictory policy that embraced partnership and separation (Datiri 
and Bewarang, 2013). This contradiction may signify a complete lack of a theologically-
informed and mature position on Church-State relations. The official documents of the 
Church have not revealed any approved position of the Church in relation to its relationship 
with the State. The leaders of the Church seem to present personal opinions on the subject 
rather than positions that emerged from in-depth reflections by the corporate body of the 
                                                 
36 EKAN is acronym from the Hausa language commonly spoken in northern Nigeria. The acronym stands for 
Ekklisiyar Kristi A Nigeria, meaning “Church of Christ In Nigeria” (COCIN). This name was changed again in 
2013 to “Church of Christ In Nations” (COCIN) because of its spread beyond Nigeria to other African countries 




Church. This is unfortunate because it leaves much to be desired on how the Church relates 
with the State and politics in the absence of a well thought out theological position. This 
leads me to the development of the Church’s relations with the State. 
 
 
5.9. The Development of COCIN-State Relations in Nigeria 
 
5.9.1 The Colonial Period 
The colonial/missionary factors discussed above did little or nothing to foster constructive 
COCIN-State relations in Nigeria. It should be noted that ‘State’ in this context refers to the 
colonial administration that was in power in Nigeria from 1900-1960) and not the later 
Plateau State. Apart from the allegation of a dualistic philosophy heritage that nurtured a type 
of Evangelical theology (Boer, 1983:180-181), that avoided social participation and 
discouraged their converts from political participation (Boer, 1983:182-183), one of the 
COCIN’s historical documents (The Light Bearer, 1908:5-7) has identified that other 
colonial/missionary factors may have been responsible for the Church-State model of 
relations that existed between COCIN and the Plateau State. These factors include the 
tendency of the State to have favoured one religious group (Muslims) over others 
(Christianity and African Traditional Religionists) Indeed, through its policy of indirect rule, 
and the Great Prohibition which prevented Christian missionaries from evangelizing and 
socializing with the Muslims and non-Muslim communities under them (Muslims) this may 
be correct (The Light Bearer, 1908:34; Gutip, 1998:4-6; Gaiya, 2004:358; Barnes, 2004:66).  
 
Another factor was the nature of the political instruction given by the SUM missionary 
leaders to its converts, asking them to get involved in politics in order to defend Christian 
interests (The Light Bearer, 1908:32; Boer, 1984:186-187). This had negative religio-political 
consequences for a pluralist context like Nigeria with two dominant religious groups. The 
COCIN religious leaders act in defence of their community’s interest while the Muslim 
leaders act in the interests of their religious community. The selfish competition by the 
leadership of these two religious groups has to a great extent contributed to the social 





Turaki (1982:45) and Kukah (1993:3) argue that these factors that influenced the 
development of COCIN-State relations developed when the Church leaders recognised that 
the leaders in the northern State did not apply justice equally between the Church and the 
Muslim organizations. The State chose to marginalize Christianity and the influence of the 
Church in society. On the other hand, the State promoted Islam by subjugating non-Muslims 
under the leadership of Muslim Emirs (Boer, 1983:186). It could as well be argued that these 
factors shaped the COCIN’s attitude towards State during the colonial period, but it also sets 
the stage for COCIN-State relations in the post-Independence period. During the colonial 
period, the SUM structure gave birth to the COCIN nurtured on an ideology of dependency. 
Thus, even after independence, the COCIN continued to rely on the SUM for the support and 
sustenance of its social services until the SUM finally left the country. The COCIN had not 
developed into a self-financing institution and therefore switched their dependency to the 
State for financial aid so as to sustain its schools and healthcare facilities. 
 
The Sudan United Mission (SUM) made frantic efforts to establish schools and healthcare 
facilities for the COCIN and the Plateau State to promote education and health for the people 
of Plateau State. These educational institutions raised most of the political elite not only for 
Plateau State, but for the entire Middle Belt Region of Nigeria. This could be said to be well 
intended by the missionaries. However, the COCIN did not only inherit schools and health 
facilities alone, but the embittered relationship between the colonial government and 
missionaries over the policy of indirect rule in the north was also inherited. But the COCIN 
did not take the embittered relationship far because it needed the cooperation and financial 
aid from the government to sustain these schools and health facilities. One could also argue 
that the COCIN’s decision to fall back to the State for support ought to be blamed on the 




5.9.2. The Post-Colonial Period 
After Nigeria became independent the separation model for the Church-State relations that 
operated during the colonial period was replaced by a Church-State partnership model (The 
Light Bearer, 1970:36; Datiri, 2013). This model was aimed at lessening the financial 




Church more engaged in participating in the political development of the State (The Light 
Bearer, 1970: 38; Goshit, et al., 2013:153). One of the past presidents of the COCIN stated 
that: 
In the past, the Church was lukewarm in political affairs like elections and 
electioneering campaigns in Nigeria. However, the ever-growing destruction of lives 
and property at any electioneering campaign has made the Church to be focused and 
interested in what the State and its statutes are doing, so as not to get more Churches 
burnt and more members dying or such unnecessary clashes. The Church and its 
leadership cannot involve [itself] in partisan politics, but it cannot shy away from 
politics and what happens in the political arena or the corridor of government since 
they affect the Church either for good or bad (Yamsat, 2011:v).  
This perspective seems to give other reasons for the shift from a separation model to a 
partnership model in the post-colonial period. Apart from the desire for financial support 
from the State, the COCIN wanted to use its position as the numerically strongest Church in 
the State to achieve political and economic dividends such as providing support for the many 
secondary schools that the COCIN inherited from the SUM (Datiri, 2013, Bewarang, 2013:4-
6). Its strategy to obtain State support for its projects was strengthened by the presence of 
many of the political elites of the State being members of the COCIN (Bewarang, 2013:4-7). 
For example, three democratically elected governors and one military State governor have 
been members of the COCIN since its inception in 1967 (Goshit, et al., 2013: 139-145). The 
situation between the COCIN and the Plateau State could be compared to two branches of the 
same vine because the State operations are also dominated by members of the COCIN.  
 
 
5.10.  Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I have presented the colonial SUM missionary model of Church-State 
relations and how it shaped COCIN-State relations in the post-Independence era of Nigeria. 
The divide and rule policies of the colonial powers laid the foundations for instability in 
nation-building, thereby sowing the seeds of division between the Christian-majority 
southern regional States and the Muslim-majority northern regional States. The consequences 
of this harmful policy continue into the post-Independence era and are still pose a major 
threat to the political unity of the country. The policy also weakened the African traditional 
leadership model of governance that resulted in a negative impact on the peaceful co-





Both Christianity and Islam also contributed to the destruction of traditional African culture 
by demanding allegiance to the dominant culture and worldview that their missionaries 
brought with them. The abuse of African hospitality meant that Christianity and Islam 
became strategic participants in creating the environment for African to become more open 
and accepting of colonialism. The missionaries of both religions also served as agents of the 
colonial system of governance. In addition, both the missionaries and colonial agents engaged 
in their project for the economic objective of mobilising commodities for the British 
economy that resulted in the further impoverishment of the local people. This economic 
model created an environment in which inequality thrived through oppressive economic, 
political and religious structures. Power that becomes the monopoly of the few endangers 
community life and creates an environment for violence among its citizens to thrive. 
 
The missionary praxis of the SUM that influenced its members to developed a negative 
perspective towards political engagement also ill-equipped the Church to develop positive 
missio-political ethics for the nation. Instead, an unhealthy competitive relationship evolved 
between the two dominant religions and their influence over State policies. The SUM legacy 
on political participation equipped the COCIN in the independence era to embrace 
dysfunctional Church-State relations that one could describe as uncritical partnership37 with 
the State. 
                                                 
37 Uncritical in the sense that the Church is unable to maintain a critical solidarity and distance from the State; 
instead, its leaders are always eulogizing the State even when the masses of the people are groaning and 





THE SEARCH FOR PEACE-BUILDING IN THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN COCIN AND THE PLATEAU STATE 
 
6.1. Introduction  
In the previous chapter I argued that the factors that shaped Church-State relations between 
the SUM and the Plateau State during the colonial and missionary period included policies 
which inhibited the process of peace-building and also set a precedence for the Church-State 
model the emerged during the post-Independence era. This chapter focuses on the search for 
peace-building in Church-State relations between the COCIN and the Plateau State between 
2001 and 2010. The critique, through the missio-political lens, argues that the Church’s 
missional engagement with the State should facilitate peace building especially within a 
pluralist society. If the missio-political engagement is defective then it becomes a 
contributing factor to nurturing violence, especially among religiously plural communities. 
Central to the mission of God are ethical values such as, a just-peace, justice, love, 
compassion, fairness, equity, accommodation of diversity, socio-political and economic 
inclusion, tolerance, fair sharing of resources, and respect of human rights.  
 
I begin this chapter by considering the Plateau State’s policy on religion in the light of what 
the law declares about the kind of relationship that should exist between the State and the 
various religions. This will be contrasted with the COCIN’s policy and practice of relating to 
the State after the departure of the SUM. The dominant position of the COCIN in the State as 
the largest Christian group has called into question its position of influence to shape its 
relationship with the State, and its influence on peace-building in Jos. This will necessitate 
following the money trail of the COCIN’s current sources of financial income that are needed 
to service its different social institutions and to find out the extent to which it depends on the 
Plateau State for its financial support. The core question to be answered will be: 
 
 “To what extent the relationship between the COCIN and the Plateau 




The surge in violent conflicts within Jos, Plateau State from 2001-2010 is the essential 
backdrop to interrogate the Church and State peace-building measures. This critique will 
begin with an examination of the policies of both the Plateau State and the COCIN 
concerning Church-State relations in general, and how these have shaped their relationship in 
particular. I will also take account their missio-political identities and vocations and whether 
the relationship has fostered peace or promoted violence among the citizens in Jos.  
 
 
6.2. The Plateau State’s Policy on Religion  
The Plateau State derives its policy on religion from the Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria as the sovereign State. According to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (1999 section 10 as amended), “the Government of the Federation or of State shall 
not adopt any religion as State Religion.”  This suggests that: 
every person in Nigeria shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, including freedom to change his or her religion or belief, and freedom (either 
alone or in community with others, and in public or private) to manifest and 
propagate his [and her] religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance (1999 §38). 
Based on the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Plateau State’s policy on 
religious matters, as published in the Plateau State Gazette (hereafter PLSG), allows for the 
religious freedom for all residents (PLSG, 1967). Theoretically, under this law there is no 
need for any religious group or institution to deserve any special or preferential treatment 
from the State. The State is supposed to adopt a neutral position in relation to all religions. 
Because it is a constituent State, subject to the Nigerian sovereign State, Plateau State (PLS) 
ought to maintain a policy of religious freedom for all its citizens (PLSG, 1976:13-15) as 
enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). According to the 
PLSG, the State does not legally promote or oppose any given religion or religious institution 
within its jurisdiction (PLSG, 1976:13-16). In addition, the Plateau Indigenous and 
Development Association Network (PIDAN) (2012:78), posits that:  
Since its inception in 1976, Plateau State was created on sound historical socio-
cultural values as envisioned by the founding Fathers with the aim of providing a 
levelled-play-ground for all residents.38  
                                                 
38 The Plateau Indigenous Development Association Network, (Jos: Jos University Press 2012:78-79 shows that 




Accordingly, the Plateau State’s policy on religion is neutral and is consistent with the 
Nigerian Constitution. What remains to be uncovered is whether or not this policy is 
translated in practice. The PIDAN (2012:79) reveals that the State is religiously neutral in so 
far as every resident in the State is free to practice her or his religion without State 
interference. However, religious freedom does not only mean freedom of worship but also 
should reflect whether the diversity of religious groups are equal participants in the socio-
economic and political life of the State. The policy implies that the Plateau State is officially 
bound to the principle of the separation of Church and State and this should be reflected in its 
relations with other religious institutions, for example with the COCIN (PIDAN, 2012:99, 
PLSG, 1976:16-18). 
 
The policy on religion with the State implies that the Plateau State should not entertain any 
special relationship with any religious institutions because the State policy does not allow for 
any religion to be adopted as a State religion (PIDAN, 2012:99). Its position is one of strict 
neutrality to all religions that are present in its domain (Nigerian Constitution, 1999 Sect. 10 
(3), PLSG, 1976:78; Nwafor, 2002:40). Hence, the policy on religion does not permit the 
State to entertain a close relationship with any religious organization in the State. Doing so 
would amount to a breach of the Constitution. Any tendency by the State to promote one 
religious group above another in a pluralist context would imply disrespect for justice and 
equality of all religions, and ultimately for peace, thereby calling the State’s political identity 
and mandate into serious question. This policy is constructive and life-giving given the 
diverse and pluralist context of Nigeria and Plateau State. The development of any healthy 
Church and State relationship necessitates all religious and irreligious residents are treated 
justly and fairly regardless of their creed. It also calls on the State to exercise neutrality with 
respect to people of faith without favouritism or the preferential treatment to anyone. Where 
these tenants are not observed, it amounts to disrespect for the Constitution and the policy of 
the State regarding religions. 
 
That said, the narrative of Church and State relations in Jos suggests that the situation leaves 
much to be desired. It has been reported by Ostien that two governors of the State, Joshua 
                                                                                                                                                        
stability where every Nigerian, irrespective of creed or ethnic inclination, would reside and conduct his or her 
affairs without hindrance. This noble vision was sustained so that the State earned a unique position as the 
undisputable “Home of Peace and Tourism” in Nigeria, an affectionate sobriquet based also on the people’s 
warm hospitality and receptivity. Quite apart from emerging as a bastion of peace and stability, the Plateau State 




Dariye and Jonah Jang have served as active instigators of marginalization against the 
Hausa/Fulani minority religious groups in their pronouncements, that identified them as being 
“non-indigenes,” “settlers,” and “tenants” in the State  (2009:17-19). These minority groups 
are said to be treated as such because they are non-indigenes in the State. This is not only an 
issue being faced by Plateau State alone but has being identified as a national problem that 
calls for an amendment in the Constitution of the country as a whole (Danfulani, 2006:4-8). 
Ostien, quoting from the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria (2009:3-4), also blames most of the 
ethno-religious violence in the various States of Nigeria on the Constitutional controversy by 
arguing that: 
The underlying problem is the Constitutional alleged rights of indigenes, meaning 
roughly “earliest extant occupiers” to control particular locations, as opposed to the 
rights of “settlers” or “strangers” or more generally “non-indigenes”, defined as 
everybody who came later…Religious differences is secondary, although it adds fuel 
to the fire when things go wrong…The Particular locations indigenes and settlers 
fight are the 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs) into which Nigeria is now 
divided…At the end, the fighting is about access to resources controlled by the 
federal, State, and local governments, through which 80% of Nigeria’s revenue flows. 
Administration of all these resources is by a system of “indigene certificates” issued 
by local governments, which is restricted to indigenes of a given local government. 
Ostien (2009:4) attributes this to the complete failure of the Nigerian State to provide safety 
and support networks for its citizens based on ethnicity. The Constitutional controversy may 
explain why the dominant Christian community in Jos argued that:  
Until the problem is given a Constitutional solution, the hospitality of the people of 
the State should not be abused by settlers who make outrageous and bogus claims for 
rights and privileges which do not exist anywhere else in the Federation (Danfulani, 
2006:7).  
The quarrel is that there is need for change in the Nigerian Constitution because its silence on 
some of the challenges being faced in the States has contributed to the development of 
divisive policies that the governors make by taking sides against some sectors of their 
residents in their States. When their political Statements are mixed with sectarian support of 
their own religious groups then the social environment becomes primed for violence. When 
political exclusion reigns against members of particular religious groups to the extent that 
Christian youth could demonstrate against the appointment of Muslims for political positions 
in the State on the grounds of alleged unethical records, then peace building is compromised 
by the State (Danfulani, 2006; Ambe-Uva, 2010:14-20). The negative perception that seems 
to exist against the Muslims in the State seems to be connected with the strategy of “keeping 




dominated States in the far north and their ill-treatment of Christians (Danfulani, 2006:45-
46). Stating the objective and accommodative function of the State, Hunsinger argues:  
A secular authority ceases to be legitimate when it violates the freedom it ought to 
safe-guard and destroys justice and peace. In cases where government becomes liars, 
murderers, and incendiaries and wishing to usurp the place of God to fetter the 
conscience, to suppress the Church and become itself the Church of the Anti-Christ, 
active resistance is the best response (Hunsinger, 2006:364).  
Similarly, Ruwa (2001:20-27) posits that:  
The basic responsibility of government anywhere is the maintenance of social order, 
while the Church is to ensure that human rights, peace, and public morality are 
upheld.  
The State belongs to all of it residents and its fundamental duty is to promote and protect the 
interest of all its citizens in a pluralist society. In view of this, the Plateau State should be 
seen practicing what Kuyper (2006:309) proposes for governments in pluralist societies 
which should practise impartiality in its support and operation of institutions. By this 
standard, the government should treat the religious institutions in the society impartially. 
Hence, if the government decides to fund any school, it should impartially fund all State-
registered schools regardless of their religious heritage as long as they have met all of the 
other required legal standards. The State should look beyond religion because its calling 
transcends religious boundaries. In keeping with Barth’s thought, Mbigi argues that African 
leaders should lead the way based on the principle of “appropriate and inclusive African 
Ubuntu” with the emphasis on human dignity and respect:  
Cultivation of stakeholder inclusion and accountability, principle of stakeholder 
interdependence/accountability, principle of consultation/inclusion of minority 
opinion, principle of collective team work and service to community, principle of 
common participation/community spirit, principle of value creation, sharing for 
brotherhood of humanity, and principle of compassionate governance, creating a fair 
society for all without discrimination (Mbigi, 2005:197).  
In view of the above, in a pluralist society such as the Plateau State, the best policy 
concerning religion is one of neutrality. If this principle is not translated into practise, the 
result will be a mockery of law which feeds violent conflict within the society. Zainah 
Anwar, a Muslim rights activist in Malaysia offered a depressing commentary on the crisis of 
governance in his country that aptly speaks to the crisis in the Plateau State:  
I am beginning to feel as if this country and its rakyat (the local currency) are being 
crushed and pummelled by wrecking balls. The wrecking ball of race and religion, of 




entitlements, of unpunished crimes and abuses, of ideology over rational thinking, 
justice, and fair play.39 
6.3. The COCIN’s Policy on Church-State Relations  
Being an Evangelical Church by theological tradition, the COCIN appears to have no 
developed theology on Church-State relations. As discussed in chapter five above, the SUM 
opted for a reactionary approach by encouraging its new converts to keep away from party 
political engagement. Consequently, the new members were not equipped with the mature 
political tools because the SUM did not develop any pro-active models of Church-State 
relations (Boer, 1984:27-30). In the post-Independence era, the COCIN Church-State policy 
seems to have been affected by the legacy that was bequeathed by the SUM. This means that 
the COCIN has failed to fashion a mature policy and theological position concerning its 
relationship with the State.  
 
Over the years, the COCIN adopted two contradictory models for its relations with the State. 
The first model reflected a separation between Church and State (The Light Bearer, 1908:20-
24) that evolved into a model of Church partnership with the State (1970:34-35). The dates of 
the two contradictory models correspond to two widely differing periods of the Church’s 
engagement with the State, namely the colonial and post-colonial (independent) periods.  
 
In chapter four above, an outline was presented of the interactions of the SUM and the 
COCIN with the colonial State in which the separation model was used to guide the 
relationship of the Church with the State. The colonial administrators and the SUM 
deliberately did no groundwork for peace-building activities among the citizens in Plateau 
State because of the “Great Prohibition” (Barnes 2010:442). There was no cordial 
relationship between the two entities that could have encouraged such an initiative. However, 
this situation changed dramatically after Nigerian Independence when the colonial 
administration and the SUM gave way to an indigenous government and to the COCIN as the 
succeeding Church (Gutip, 1998:24; Goshit, et al., 2013:152). 
 
When independence came, the separation model for the Church-State relations was replaced 
by a partnership model (Datiri, 2013) that was aimed at lessening the financial constraints 
faced by the COCIN after the departure of SUM (Goshit, et al., 2013:153). The financial 
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problems faced by COCIN forced the leadership to move closer to the State, which would 
allow them to apply for financial support to sustain educational and health institutions. The 
financial predicament gave rise to a different symbiotic and critical relationship between the 
Church and State as argued by Goshit, et al., (2013:153; cf. Gutip, 1998:28-30). The COCIN 
and the Plateau State have maintained a relationship similar to what Tsele (Boesak, 
2005:169) describes in the South African context as a “cohabitation with government.” In 
other words, there is unhealthy relationship that does not centre on the missio-political 
vocation of the Church.  As pointed out earlier, it was the imperative of economic needs that 
drew the COCIN into a closer relationship with the State. Expediency rather than critical 
reflection on developing a life-affirming relationship was adopted. Accordingly, one should 
not expect the State to take on addition financial burdens that were once the responsibility of 
the COCIN for simple altruistic reasons. Therefore, the State must have envisaged that some 
benefits would be gained by its political interest and financial support. Pertinent questions 
must therefore be asked. These include: 
 
i. Why did the State take on some of the COCIN’s financial burden?  
 
ii. What are the current missio-political factors that sustain this type of relationship?  
 
iii. What benefits accrue to the State from the COCIN that nurture and perpetuate the 
relationship? What about other religious institutions?  
 
iv. What does the COCIN-State relationship imply for peace-building in Plateau State?  
 
Questions of this nature will guide us as we discuss what scholars have to say about the 
nature of the current relations between the COCIN and the Plateau State.  
 
The Church and State are not called into a common natural, nurturing, and non-critical 
partnership simply because though they serve the same society. Indeed, their mandates are 
distinct and their partnership ought to be critical rather than nurturing a symbiotic 
relationship for their own mutual benefit. This argument supports Kumalo’s argument 
(2014:23-25) that, although the Church and State are both called to promote the wellbeing of 




other words, the Church-State partnership can only work if each performs its specific role in 
their respective efforts to promote the wellbeing of the society.  
 
Even after the COCIN established a partnership with the State, it still demonstrated politico-
phobia either because of negative experience with its colonial “Great Prohibition” heritage 
(Barnes, 2007:595-598, Goshit, et al., 2013:160) or its Protestant-Evangelical apolitical 
position (Boer, 297:20). One of the past presidents of the COCIN regretted the politico-
phobia40 of Christians, when he seems to refer to the COCIN as follows: 
In the past, the Church was lukewarm in political affairs like elections and 
electioneering campaigns in Nigeria. However, the ever-growing destruction of lives 
and property at any electioneering campaign has made the Church to be focused and 
interested in what the State and its statutes are doing, so as not to get more Churches 
burnt and more members dying or such unnecessary clashes. The Church and its 
leadership cannot involve [itself] in partisan politics, but it cannot shy away from 
politics and what happens in the political arena or the corridor of government since 
they affect the Church either for good or bad (Yamsat, 2011:v).  
This Statement appears to suggest that had the political violence had not affected the COCIN 
negatively, it would have remained apolitical, maintaining its lukewarm attitude concerning 
the affairs of State—including, it would seem—matters of social justice and peace-building. 
This does not put the Church’s public functioning in a favourable light. Igboin (2012:8) 
emphasizes the political function of the Church in society as follows:  
The Church must confront the world around the Church and interpret the fundamental 
symbols of its faith in light of the contemporary context. This contemporary context 
is feeling the impact of an emerging post-modern mind accompanied by a global 
future consciousness - the consciousness of a potential avalanche of disasters about to 
thunder down upon us. We need the faith that can face the future. 
Igboin’s argument implies that an apolitical Church may not serve well the needs of society. 
On the basis of the above-mentioned speech by the former COCIN president, it would seem 
that the raft of political crises have placed the COCIN in an opportune space to develop an 
informed missional model of participation in politics in order to perform its missio-political 
mandate for the good of society.    
 
A critique of the vision and mission statements of the COCIN that was developed (2012:3) is 
necessary in order to determine whether it is consistent with the partnership model. An 
                                                 
40 I use politico-phobia to refer to COCIN’s fear of political involvement. This fear seems to have been instilled 
in the first converts by the SUM who did everything to discourage political involvement among their converts. 




organization exists for a particular mission, expressed in its mission and vision statements 
and evidenced by its relations with other organizations in the society. One other factor that is 
likely to influence the relations of the COCIN and the Plateau State is its strategic position as 
a major Christian denomination in the State (Datiri, 2013; Bewarang, 2013). Care must be 
taken by dominant religious groups within society because they have, as revealed from the 
evolution of Church-State relations, always aligned with oppressive structures to marginalize 
the minorities. One could, therefore, argue that when a religious group is privileged to be 
strategic within a given society, it either becomes a source of sorrow or blessing to society 
depending on how it handles its missio-political vocation. 
 
 
6.4. The Strategic Position of the COCIN in Plateau State 
In chapter four above, I referred to the intolerance of numerically-dominant religious 
groupings within a religiously-pluralistic society towards other religious minorities. During 
the era of Bishop Ambrose (cited in Muthuraj, 2008:354) he tried to make religious 
orthodoxy of Christianity the dominant religion of the empire in the fourth-century and this 
had negative consequences on the minority religions. The State was used to oppress minority 
religions by the elimination of State subsidies to the minority religious groups as well as the 
destruction of their temples (2005:354). A similar situation appears to apply to the COCIN’s 
strategic position in a pluralist Plateau State where the leaders of this Church tend to equate 
the COCIN with the State (COCIN President’s Speech at Synod, 2013:4-6). For example, in 
his opening speech at the dinner that was organized to encourage the political elite to give 
funds for the construction work on its Karl Kumm University in Jos, and attended by 
prominent members of the federal and State governments—many of them products of the 
COCIN’s educational institutions—the COCIN President addressed the then President of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe Jonathan who was a guest of honour 
in the following manner: 
As you know Mr. President, the seat of COCIN is in Plateau State, and its patriotic 
people are predominantly COCIN members, thus making Plateau State synonymous 
with COCIN…COCIN has not only been at the doorstep of the presidential villa but 
right inside the villa. The name “COCIN” and what it stands for will not be strange to 
the Nigerian president and several State governors in Nigeria…I want to thank the 
governor of Plateau State, Jonah David Jang, for his support and partnership with 
COCIN in our endeavours, especially the Karl Kumm University project. We 
continue to enjoy the favour of our members in the national and State assemblies, our 




Church and its leadership on issues of security of the Church and its property 
(COCIN President’s Speech at Synod, 2013:2-6).  
The COCIN President’s speech as well as the audience in attendance gives an insight into the 
nature of the relationship between the COCIN and the State that will be further revealed in 
some detail in the course of this chapter. If the leader of the Church within a pluralist society 
could make such a claim that the Church was synonymous with the State, then it clearly 
demonstrates the nature of relationship between the Church and the State that is either 
symbiotic or competitive. His reference to the COCIN as synonymous with the Plateau State 
underscores his perception of the intimate nature of the extant relationship between the two 
institutions. The statement could also imply that the COCIN is in competition with the 
Plateau State government, or that the COCIN ‘owns’ the Plateau State. It could also mean 
that Plateau State ‘owns’ the COCIN, as the preferred religion of the State. The situation does 
hint at some sort of rivalry between the COCIN and the Plateau State as regards the use of 
power to govern the State. Even though the literature does not overtly state this, it seems to 
imply that the Church leader puts his religious institution on a par with the State and therefore 
indicates the competition for administrative power that underlies their relationship (Raiser, 
2013:50-59). Pilgrim (1999:187) argues this point further, when he writes: 
The Church and State live in uneasy tension. On the one hand, they can be mutually 
supportive of one another as long as the State fulfils its beneficent role as 
administrator of the common welfare. On the other hand, the Church is obligated to 
discern the temptations to idolatry from the State and its lack of concern for the good 
of the human communities it serves. The Church rejects all idolatrous claims of the 
State as demonic. 
The implication of Pilgrim’s argument is that the Church and State are critical partners, 
engaged in critical solidarity but keeping a distinctive distance of non-interference into each 
other’s affairs (Boesak, 2005:168-9). There is, however, no such thing as a permanent 
agreement or relationship between them. Amiable relations will always depend on the 
direction that the State takes in dealing with issues of justice and the well-being of people 
within the society. This accentuates the need for the Church to express critical solidarity to 
promote the wellbeing of the community and to avoid a relationship that is too close and thus 
does not allow for objective scrutiny. From the earliest history of the development of Church 
and State relations, there seems to be little constructive value for the general welfare resulting 
from any closeness between them. Wherever an intimate relationship existed between them, 
this always led to compromise of their mandates resulting in endangered peace and peace-




We must run away from incestuous co-habitation with government, for not to do so 
will be suicidal to our mission as the Church. To be in alliance with the persecuted 
political movement is one thing, but to become its ally in government is another…Are 
we useful tools…in the hands of political organizations, remembered only when 
needed, or do we have our own agenda? (Tsele cited in Boesak, 2005:169).   
The above submission explains that there are some limits posed to the relationship between 
the Church and State. In one of COCIN’s unpublished pamphlets, it is stated that the Plateau 
State government structures (e.g., executive, legislature, and judiciary) are dominated by 
followers of the COCIN (reports from COCIN Regional Churches, 2013:12). The literature 
reveals that of the 3.1 million people in Plateau State, 85.5% are Christians (Danfulani and 
Fwatshak, 2002:234) of which 60-65% are COCIN members (COCIN Vice President, 2013). 
The COCIN vice president confirms that 85% of the executive arm of Plateau State 
government is made up of COCIN members; 80% of the legislature and 83% of the judiciary 
belonging to the COCIN; 75% of the permanent secretaries belong to the COCIN, while 
COCIN followers constitute 70% of local government chairpersons and 80% of the entire 
body of civil servants of the State. Instead of the Church strengthening and encouraging 
communal power among its citizens, it is itself drawn into competition for power (Raiser, 
2013:120-126). Moltmann’s view of the changed nature of the Church in general is 
confirmed by this competition for power between the COCIN and Plateau State:  
Our Churches have become bureaucratic, vertical in organization, overly clerical in 
identity, planned and directed from above, militating against any conditions necessary 
for the congregation to come of age (Moltmann, 1988:14-15).  
Moltmann’s position seems valid because it appears as if the Church is so fed up with being 
society’s conscience that it wants to take over the State’s power (Raiser, 2013). Such a 
Church it can be argued is unclear and confused about it missional identity, vocation and 
witness within the State if it seeks to take over the core responsibilities of the State. Instead, 
according to Boesak (2005:167-169), it is mandated to collaborate with, and to be a critical 
partner of the State.  
 
In the partnership between the COCIN and Plateau State, the Church leaders gave the 
impression that its status with the society gave it the right to decide how the Plateau State 
should be governed. One gets the impression of a scenario in which the State takes directives 
from the COCIN for the day-to-day running of its political affairs and its policy decisions. It 




because it offered political benefits of getting the Church’s support and influence (Ishaku, 
2009).  
 
The Church and State relationship that the COCIN and the Plateau State created produced an 
unhealthy and un-just political partnership that worked to the detriment of good governance 
because it unjustly diverted State resources to the COCIN without a proper transparent 
process of accountability that would allow other religious groups to equally apply for access 
to State resources.  
 
This study argues that while it is undeniable that all non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
within the society do have some relationship with the state because all of them are 
stakeholders in the promotion of the welfare of the society, it is not true that any form of 
relations tends to promote the welfare of the society. The thrust of this thesis is not denying 
relationship between Church or any other social institution with the State; rather it is a 
critique of the existing model of relationship because as the literature reveals, it has become 
dysfunctional and life-denying, which the researcher has termed “unjust relationship”.  
 
My argument, on the one hand, is that the existing relationship between the two entities is 
unjust because it has failed to include all the sectors of the society and to promote the politics 
of inclusion. A just relationship ought to treat all citizens as human beings who deserve to be 
treated as humans. Such a relationship ought to create room for all the citizens to participate 
in the socio-economic and political decisions that affect them. Such a relationship ought to 
see the Church utilizing its prophetic voice effectively to hold the State accountable to justice 
instead of equating itself with the State as its synonym. Such a relationship does not 
discriminate against some sectors of the society whether they are indigenous or settlers 
because he State is supposed to be father to all; while the Church’s mandate is universal 
without ethnic or cultural boundaries. 
On the other hand, Church-State relationship becomes unjust when the two, either by 
commission or omission, tend to co-habit in a manner that leaves other groups or minorities 
out in the rain. What does it imply for peaceful co-existence when one out of the many NGOs 
begins to equate itself with the State in a pluralistic context like Jos (COCIN President’s 
Speech, 2013: 4-6)? Does it not mean that the evil of the State also become the evil of that 
NGO? Does it not mean that the particular is in conflict with the state as well as the other 




synonym of the State? A Church that becomes a synonym of a State also becomes an enemy 
of the enemies of the State.  
Therefore, I argue that the existing relationship between the two entities is unjust because it 
resembles a Constantinian model where the Church and State collaborated and discriminated 
and exploited the minorities in the society under the pretext of purging the society of 
paganism (Boer, 1976: 109-116). This came out clearly in the literature when the Church 
remained silent when two consecutive governors of the State made discriminatory statements 
against some sectors of the society calling them “tenants” (Ostien, 2009: 14-16). The 
literature also reveals that the minority groups are sidelined and excluded from socio-
economic and political participation in the State (Modibo, 2012: 2-6). Any Church-State 
relations that falls short of critical solidarity and distance constitutes what this study calls 
“unjust relationship” because it also falls short of carrying every citizen along towards 
promoting a life-giving community or society. 
 
The paradox is that whereas the COCIN’s leaders were happy with receiving the resources of 
the State, they did not equally accept responsibility in sharing in the blame for the State’s 
failures in meeting the basic needs of the society. Therefore, if the leaders of the COCIN who 
represented the Church in negotiating the relationship with the government seem to view the 
Church as equal to the State in status and thereby fashioned a symbiotic relationship. The 
resulting model of Church and State relations was fashioned without wider ecumenical 
involvement and therefore opens the issue of using majoritarianism as an ideology to build 
relations within a pluralistic context, which, according to Muthuraj (2008:382), can lead to 
religious fanaticism and violence when it follows a Constantinian or Ambrosian model (Boer, 
1976:138-140; Muthuraj, 2008:352). It further indicates a kind of power that the COCIN 
sought with the Plateau State and indirectly with the federal government in Abuja, which can 
only be based upon preferential treatment at the expense of others. Consider the further 
assertions of the Church leader that:  
 COCIN has not only been at the doorsteps of the presidential villa but right inside the 
villa; the name COCIN and what it stands for will not be strange to the Nigerian 
President and several other Nigerian State governors (COCIN President Speech, 
2013:6).  
This comment by the COCIN President epitomises the depth of the incestuous State and 
Church relationship that evolved within the Plateau State. How can the Church be 




because it embodied an unjust system of allocating State benefits to a religious body at the 
experience of other groups within the society. Furthermore, the competitive nature of any 
State system for power also ensured that its political strategy would be one of seeking to 
control the Church for its own political objectives. This is exactly what Gifford argued 
against when he noted that Christianity cannot be equated with any system of government: 
Christianity cannot be equated with any system of government, including democracy, 
but must remain critical of all social order…Christianity can exist and flourish within 
any political or cultural system; paradoxically, the Church has to be on its guard 
especially, when it exists within cultures which seem most congenial, in these, 
Christianity is most in danger of losing its critical and prophetic 
character…Christianity should not be used to give any political legitimation, on the 
contrary, it is part of Christian witness within the political sphere to evaluate all 
political systems prophetically from the perspective of the reign of God (1995:48). 
In view of the above statement, one wonders whether it was the COCIN president or the 
Plateau State governor who was really in charge of Plateau State political matters and as such 
accountable to the President of the Republic of Nigeria? The scenario presented above 
indicates that either of them can represent the State in the presidency, given the fact that the 
COCIN president identified the COCIN’s status as being equal to that of the State (COCIN 
President’s Speech at Synod, 2013:2). Since the Church cannot be synonymous with the 
State, one may surmise that the relationship is a description of two diverging and 
contradicting powers. Hence, it would only be a matter of time before serious conflicts 
developed between the two competing powers that were unclear about their strategic identity 
and vocation within the society. This model of relationship reflects wider issues of 
dysfunctionality within the State that threatened peace building and bred various acts of 
violence and perceived injustice by religious and State institutional powers. In his speech, the 
COCIN president also expressed his appreciation for the government partnership with the 
Church in the execution of some of its projects:  
I want to thank the Governor of Plateau State, Da Jonah David Jang, for his support 
and partnership with COCIN in our endeavours, especially the Karl Kumm University 
project. We continue to enjoy the favour of our members in the National and State 
Houses of Assemblies, our Senior Citizens, retired Military and Civilians have been 
very helpful in advising the Church and its leadership on issues of security of the 
Church and its property (COCIN President’s Speech at Synod, 2013:3-4).   
In 2010, at the time of this speech, the COCIN was in need of financial support for the 
establishment of the Karl Kumm University in Jos. Its dependence on government assistance 
for this purpose is another factor that served to consolidate the intimate relationship with not 




were COCIN members. Accordingly, the COCIN president used the fundraising dinner to 
praise the Hon. Yakubu Dogara, from another State:  
I thank Honourable Yakubu Dogara, member representing Tafawa Balewa in Bauchi 
State in the National House of Representatives who has been supplying cement for 
the Karl Kumm University (COCIN President’s Speech at Synod, 2013:3).  
The COCIN’s ambition to establish a university is apparently based on the perception that the 
public universities are not of very high academic standard because they are under-resourced. 
The COCIN sought resources from the State to build its own institution while the educational 
institutions of the State remained under-resourced. However, the COCIN has never seen this 
inadequacy as an opportunity to challenge the State to make public higher education and 
education in general a priority. Instead of addressing the failures of the Nigerian educational 
system it opted to establish its own tertiary institution that will require a vast amount of 
resources. Considering the close relationship between the COCIN and the Plateau State, one 
might conclude that the Church is in close partnership with those who are responsible for the 
failure of public universities. The Church should have been aware that the resources sought 
for the Karl Kumm University project would be diverted from government funds that should 
have been used to raise the standard of public universities.  
  
The Church’s missional identity calls for speaking out against oppressive structures and not 
to retreat into pietism and empire-building where there is no place for the poor (Bosch, 
2011:90). According to the former President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania: 
The Church should accept that the development of people means rebellion…unless 
we participate actively in the rebellion against those structures and economic 
organizations which condemn men/women to poverty, humiliation, and degradation, 
then the Church will become irrelevant to man (Nyerere 1970, cited in Hastings, 
1976:89).  
If the Church is to be recognised in any society as the moral conscience of the society then 
part of its function is to oppose oppressive policies and structures. Such a rebellion does not 
take place in the context of disobedience to authority, but of disobedience to oppressive 
structures that deny citizens a life of dignity. The COCIN is not the only Church 
denomination in Plateau State nor is it the only religious institution.41 Plateau State is not 
meant to benefit only one particular religious institution or one religious group but it belongs 
to non-religious people as well. Given that a particular religious groups dominates the society 
does not justify the neglect of other religious group by the State; rather it ought to bring to 
                                                 




bear the principles of the kingdom of God to promote the wellbeing of the entire citizenry. 
Unless the State is equally involved in similar relationships with other religious and non-
religious institutions, its intimate partnership with the COCIN cannot but impact negatively 
on peace-building measures in the State because public resources are channelled into one 
direction to the detriment of others. Moltmann (1988:13-17) cautions the Church against 
tendencies to discriminate within society by arguing that “Christian proclamation should 
intervene in the real political world in a critical and liberating way, and should not be limited 
to the private concerns of the pious citizens” in which case Christian proclamation could lead 
to violence among its citizens. 
 
Perceptions of a symbiotic relationship between the COCIN and Plateau State are 
strengthened by  the public honouring of some State officials and politicians for making 
financial contributions to the Church (COCIN President’s Speech 2013:4-6). Such practises 
create conflict and bitterness because it leads to the suspicion that the Church, for political 
reasons, favours some members over others. In a pluralist society, any close relationship with 
the State elite by religious groups could generate unhealthy competition because the society 
also contains those who do not identify with any religious group. It could be argued that the 
strategic status of the COCIN seems to give it the privilege of co-habiting uncritically with 
the State. This is recognised in cases where the Church is seen benefiting from its close 
relationship with the State while the masses of the people languish in poverty unleashed by 
corruption in governance. Maluleke lamented the deep involvement of the Church in 
government in South Africa because it impeded the prophetic vocation of the Church: 
When the Church is too involved in government, its voice would not be heard in the 
social landscape of the country. Priests and Theologians have “jumped ship” and 
become politicians, Civil Servants and Business people. So that fact of the Church 
that was prophetic is now in bed with government. The leadership appointment of the 
Church has connections with politicians so that the Church has become a training 
ground for politicians to use and abuse (Maluleke, 2010:150). 
Maluleke is correct in his critique because where critical solidarity and distance characterize 
Church-State relations, the Church would not enjoy such co-habitation with the State. This 
argument does not mean that the Church should have nothing to do with government, but 







6.5. Special Recognition Accorded to State Officials by the COCIN 
During the dinner for top political leaders, organized by the COCIN to raise funds for its 
university, the COCIN executive committee, through its president, announced the decision of 
the Church to honour some politicians among those in attendance.42 He went on to say:  
We appreciate you for your support for the cause of peace and peaceful co-existence 
in northern Nigeria, even in the face of provocations from unpatriotic elements. We 
appreciate you for your manifest revolution and massive funding of the University. 
Finally, distinguished gentlemen, let me say that COCIN individually and collectively 
appreciates you, and look forward to a strong strategic partnership towards the 
development of a university where products are God-fearing, professionally sound 
and available for service to their mother-land…one of our key mandates has been the 
relationship mandate and by the grace of God we have improved on this (2013:11). 
Apart from official events whereby recognition is accorded to distinguished politicians, the 
speeches of the COCIN president reveal that there are also occasions when the president of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria invites him for undisclosed functions as he testifies: 
Since the last General Church Council (Synod), I have had the privilege of being in 
company of President Jonathan Good luck four times for one reason or the other. I 
thank him for recognizing COCIN and inviting me on occasions. The Nigerian 
presidency will not forget COCIN very easily. The security issues facing the Church 
generally and the North-Eastern States have been adequately presented to him and I 
believe that in no distant future there will be positive result for those States (COCIN 
President’s Speech at Synod, 2013:4).  
The manner in which the president presented the situation seems to almost put the Church 
leader in the position of “chief security officer of the State.” Ordinarily, a Church leader 
would speak to the State security officer or governor about insecurity in society because the 
State is responsible for the safety of its citizens. It could amount to a breach of protocol when 
a Church leader usurps that responsibility while the State governor sat right beside him at the 
dinner. This scenario underscores the underlying conflict between the Church and the State 
over the use of power with the society (Raiser, 2013:120).  
 
Another indication of the closeness of Church and State is recognised in the frequent 
invitation of the governor of the Plateau State to the synod of the COCIN, a scenario that 
                                                 
42 In his Presidential speech at Synod, (Jos, 2013:9) the COCIN president gave special recognition to some 
distinguished personalities among those present who had strongly identified with COCIN’s efforts to establish 
the Karl Kumm University. Each of these was important for the COCIN as they willingly offered themselves to 
the service of the university and they will, according to the president, by the grace of God, continue to stand by 
the Church as a model university is built that will be admired by all. Specifically on behalf of the executive 
council, he was pleased to inform them that, for a start, five structures of the university would be named in 
honour of five guests present at the dinner and later other persons would be similarly honoured. This was 
besides sponsored and endowed facilities that would automatically be named after the involved persons, so 




Pochi (2013:20) refers to as an act of courtesy extended to the State leader. However, Pochi 
(2013) goes on to note that the governor uses such opportunities to obtain political benefits 
from the Church at election time because he knows that, once he is endorsed by the 
leadership of the COCIN, his success of being returned to office is guaranteed. The Church 
seems unable to distinguish between showing respect for authority and compromising its 
prophetic identity. Its failure to engage in missional critique of oppressive structures but 
quick to embrace uncritical solidarity that benefits only the Church and those that are 
politically connected. The Church has never been called to engage in uncritical support of the 
State because doing so would lead to a loss of capacity for peace-building and eventually to 
violence becoming the order of the day (Maluleke 2010:152; Tobias, 2003:22). 
 
This model of partnership works against the common interest of the State because the 
partnership may involve diverting State resources to maintain such a partnership. One could 
also argue that this partnership seems to foster prophetic silence on the side of the Church.  
The COCIN and the Plateau State is sustained by the mutual exchange of resources and votes 
during election time which is a form of corruption. The Church-State partnership was so 
close that the outgoing president of the COCIN, in his bid to sustain the partnership, went and 
officially presented his successor to the Plateau State governor to ensure the continuation of 
the partnership (COCIN Video Coverage File, 2010). A Church that maintains critical 
solidarity and distance, and lives by the principles of the mission of God could not enjoy such 
intimacy with the State in the pluralist context of Nigeria.43 
 
A few weeks after the official introduction of the in-coming COCIN president to the governor 
of Plateau State, the governor made time to pay an official visit to the COCIN president in his 
office in Jos to congratulate him on his nomination and election and to seek the approval of 
the Church leadership for a thanksgiving, wedding anniversary, and birthday service for his 
family in a particular congregation in his home parish (COCIN’s video coverage file, 2013). 
The governor also used the occasion to ask the Church’s permission to perform the dedication 
ceremony of the uncompleted parish structures at Du, pledging to sponsor the completion of 
the Church buildings (COCIN’s Coverage File, 2013). 
 
                                                 




The governor has always sponsored the Christmas Carol services of the COCIN Headquarters 
Compound Church since he became governor of Plateau State in 2007 (COCIN News Letter 
2007). These engagements are further proof of the involvement of the governor of the State in 
COCIN’s activities and vice versa. What does the State governor have to do with 
commissioning religious structures? Such cohabiting relations between the COCIN and the 
Plateau State official would become a matter of deep concern for other Christian 
denominations and religions within the State that would classify such incestuous relationships 
as unjust and corrupting because of its potential to divert State resources for the development 
of one particular religious institution within the pluralist context of Plateau State.44    
 
It should not be forgotten that the intimate relationship between the COCIN and Plateau State 
was originally informed by economic factors when the COCIN became unable to sustain 
itself.45 The situation has evidently not improved because all the above interactions between 
the Church and the State point to economic issues surrounding the establishment of the Karl 
Kumm University by the Church. Even before plans for the university came up, the COCIN 
had depended on the State’s intervention for running its educational institutions (Goshit, et 
al., 2013:153).    
 
It could be argued that the SUM bequeathed to the COCIN a model of being Church that was 
non-self-financing. Its missional model was built on dependency. As its policy of financial 
dependence has apparently not solved the Church’s economic problems one wonders whether 
the COCIN’s sources of financial income actually do consist. The ongoing costs of running 
its various institutions have drained the Church to the extent that it led the COCIN into its 
special relationship with the State.  
 
 
6.6. The COCIN’s Sources of Financial Income 
The COCIN’s Constitution (2013:18 as amended) reveals that COCIN has four main sources 
of financial income. The vagueness of this Constitution states: “offerings, thanksgiving, gifts 
and grants, devices, bequests and legacies…and any other sources as may be approved by 
COCIN.” This spells danger for the Church because it gives no clarity in regard to what other 
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sources are approved or not approved by the Church. Vague policies usually create space for 
error in an organization like the Church where accountability is supposed to be a watch-word. 
Among the sources of income are: 
 
i. Weekly Sunday offerings, thanksgiving, and tithes by members. 
 
ii. Gifts, grants and donations. 
 
iii. Devices, bequests, and legacies. 
 
iv. Any other sources as may be approved by the Church (COCIN Constitution, 
2013:18). 
 
Although the launching of funds is not specifically mentioned as a source of income, in 
practice it seems to be the usual way of raising capital for the realization of projects in the 
Church. In fact, the establishing of funds appears to be one of the most common ways used 
by the COCIN to consolidate its partnership with the State and fund raising is a common 
occurrence in Churches as noted by Musa (2009:158). Although Musa is not specifically 
referring to the COCIN, his observation applies. Since the COCIN does not outline other 
sources that are approved or disapproved by the Church, it is difficult to know what they are. 
The question remains as to why those other sources are not named so that a reader of the 
Constitution can perhaps form an idea of the yardstick by which the suitability of a source of 
income can be judged.  
 
 
6.7. Partnership in the Areas of Education, Healthcare, and Social Services  
 
6.7.1. Education  
COCIN has pioneered the establishment of educational institutions in the Plateau State after 
the SUM in 1934 had begun to found such institutions in Gindiri (Goshit, et al., 2013:138-
150). The colonial government did little more than pay lip service to education (Yamsat, 




did not see the need for a Western model of education in the north of Nigeria. However, one 
positive outcome of the “Great Prohibition” policy for the Plateau State was education 
(Bakare, 2013:324). The prohibition of missionary work in Muslim areas enabled the SUM to 
focus on the Middle Belt, where it established educational and healthcare institutions (Goshit, 
et al., 2013:3-5). Accordingly, most of the ruling elites in the Plateau State are products of 
these institutions (now COCIN schools) as the COCIN president recently emphasized in his 
speech to Synod: 
COCIN is not only proud of the educational institutions it has established and 
nurtured, it is proud of the quality and numbers, and spread of its products or 
graduates found all over the world. Surely, the roll call of accomplished professionals 
and first class academicians from the Gindiri institutions has constituted the 
inspiration to commence the establishment of a University to accommodate our 
teaming secondary school leavers (COCIN President’s Speech at Synod, 2013:3).  
It is true that the COCIN’s educational institutions have contributed massively to the 
economic development of the Plateau State as they are all-embracing and holistic in their 
approach (Goshit, et al., 2013). This is besides the fact that they were among the first schools 
founded in that part of the country (The Light Bearer, 1970:24; Gutip, 1998; Goshit, et al., 
2013). These institutions have also absorbed the large pool of unemployed graduate young 
people that would otherwise be roaming the streets because of lack of employment 
opportunities by the State. The State acknowledges this by giving subvention to these 
institutions that ordinarily does not reach the institutions (Goshit, et al., 2013:153-154). 
Educational services constitute the principal area of the partnership between the COCIN and 
the Plateau State. Since most of the elites in the State have passed through the COCIN 
educational institutions, they usually return annually for a reunion service to express their 
appreciation of the COCIN investment in their development (Gindiri Mission Compound 
Golden Jubilee, 1984:34).  
 
At the same time, most of the ruling elites have their political constituency in areas where the 
COCIN institutions are present and this serves to further strengthen the Church-State 
partnership (Yamsat, 2009:2). The COCIN’s Department of Education is expansive, dealing 
with units and schools ranging from nursery schools to tertiary institutions. They are part of 
the body of mission schools that stand out as the best sought after educational institutions in 
Nigeria. It is paradoxical that, while mission schools have produced most of the elites, 
especially in Plateau State, these graduates have failed to advance transparency and 




political mandate to the society has focussed primarily on providing social services to the 
society. It could therefore be argued that it is the COCIN’s involvement in these services that 
facilitates an uncritical co-habitation between the COCIN and the Plateau State because of 
the fundamental need for financial resources to maintain and further develop the institutions 
that offer these important social services. A very important question then is whether it is 
possible for the Church to provide social services for the society and still hold the State 
accountable to social justice? The COCIN faces a missional dilemma to find a balance that 
allows it to engage in social services to the society without compromising its missional 
mandate through its partnership with the State.46  
 
This thesis argues that the economic model of mission development by the SUM created 
these service institutions that were bequeathed to the COCIN. However, the financial 
unsustainability of the institution was not adequately assessed in their development. The 
SUM grew its mission through these institutions without the understanding that resources 
would need to come from external sources so as to sustain the work. Thus, it may have been 
natural for the COCIN to turn to the Plateau State for its financial support. Its institutions 
gave the State some of the best educated persons to administer its system of government. It is 
paradoxical that in the formation of these graduates for service in the public sector there are 
so many questions being raised about corruption among State officials and the call of the 
public for transparency and accountability in the handling of State resources and the need for 
political and economic ethic and good governance. Kumalo’s testimony concerning John L. 
Dube applies here when he argues that: 
When talking about J.L Dube, what comes to mind is one who brought a constant 
dialogue between religion and politics (Christianity in this case to be specific). In 
South Africa, he represents the genre of mission educated African elites who used 
both their religion and education not for their own selfish ends but for their people. 
These are people who were not satisfied with a religion that promised pie in the sky, 
and who sought an education that enabled them to get better jobs for themselves and 
their families. Rather, he saw religion as a tool in his hands that he could use to 
untangle the chains of oppression, to fight the oppressor with his own weapon (bible) 
which he used to rebuke the oppressor for preaching brotherhood and sisterhood 
while practicing racism at the same time (2012:114).  
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Kumalo’s perspective argues that those who were privileged to have passed through 
missionary schools ought to reciprocate by promoting social justice. This is the only way to 
show that they have not failed the Church and its message of peace and justice. 
 
The Church’s quest to launch a fund in order to establish a university offers no guarantees 
that that university will produce graduates with higher moral and ethical standards to address 
the social ills plaguing the society. Therefore, partnership in the area of education may not be 
a bad thing in itself but when the products of these institutions (both secular and theological) 
fail to promote social justice and peace-building, the partnership fails to engender peace 
building within the pluralist context. 
 
 
6.7.2. Healthcare and Social Services 
Healthcare is another field where Church and State work together in partnership. The 
COCIN’s contributions in this area encourages diverse interactions to take place with the 
State including the seconding of personnel and the supply of industrial training, funding and 
medicines by the State to voluntary healthcare institutions (CCDP, 2013). The COCIN’s 
health institutions in the Plateau State include Vom Christian Hospital (VCH), established in 
1920 by the SUM (Gutip, 1998:24). Vom Christian Hospital is in active collaboration with 
the Jos University Teaching Hospital and the Plateau State Epidemiology, Consultant Family 
Physicians are some of the expert services rendered in the hospital (2013:183). Goshit, et al., 
(2013:184) regrets the current financial situation of the hospital: 
While it is difficult to prevent the movement of staff from one organization to the 
other in a dynamic society like Nigeria, the case of Vom Christian Hospital is a bit 
worrisome in the sense that many of the staff leave as a result of non-payment of 
salaries for as long as three months. Added to this is that the salaries are low when 
they are compared to that of their counterparts in government hospitals. It was 
reported that in 2012 about 120 Staff Nurses and Doctors left their employment for 
that of government. However, the cheering news is there are still long serving Staff, 
between 17-30 years and above who, for the sake of the gospel, are still in the service 
of the hospital. More so, the Church has a plan to merge with the Karl Kumm 
University Teaching Hospital. 
Consistent with its investment in many educational institutions, it appears from the above 
information as if the COCIN has over-expanded itself beyond its capacity to provide social 
services to the society. The Church had drawn close to the State at the time of its 




because and mission policy of Church governance had not achieved the goal of becoming 
financially independent. It appears therefore that the COCIN has been overreaching itself 
through its social services and this has affected the quality of the services that are on offer. If 
employees are overworked or underpaid, the staff will not stay and the hospital will become a 
bad example for the wider society (Goshit, et al., 2013:184). This will make the Church look 
like an unjust and oppressive structure within society.  
 
The following are the different healthcare institutions that the COCIN operates: 
 
i. COCIN Hospital and Rehabilitation Centre (CHRC) Mangu was established in 
1950 by the SUM and became a fully-fledged hospital in 1976 catering for those 
in the region suffering from leprosy and similar skin problems.  
 
ii. The COCIN Community Development Programme (CCDP) in Panyam began in 
1959 when the initial Faith and Farm was started by Peter Batchelor (Bachelor, 
2007:234; Goshit, et al., 2013:187-188). 
 
iii. The COCIN Rural Health Programme (CRHP) which is found in almost all the 
COCIN local Churches across the State was founded in 1966 to reach out to 
people at the grassroots level.  
 
iv. The COCIN AIDS Awareness and Care Programmes (CAACP) in Jos was 
initiated in the early 1990s to cater for those infected with HIV and AIDS in and 
outside of the Church (COCIN Centenary, 2004:12; Gutip, 1998:24; Goshit, et al., 
2013:171-172).  
 
Although the COCIN has its qualified doctors who serve in all these healthcare institutions, it 
also uses government’s medical personnel who offer their services on a temporary basis 
through the Christian Health Association of Nigeria (CHAN) which mediates between the 
Church and the State (CCDP Pamphlet, 2012:6). The community usually depends on the 
COCIN health and social services when government hospitals embark on strikes for better 
working conditions—which is a very common phenomenon in Nigeria. This State and 
Church partnership in healthcare is very constructive in that government uses the Church 




activities in the fields of education, health, and social services have therefore served to 
consolidate the closer relationship between the COCIN and the Plateau State, but whether this 
relationship is all constructive is another thing. The statistics of the COCIN’s healthcare and 
educational institutions is shown in the Figure 6.1 below: 
 
1 Nursery/Primary Schools 97 
2 Secondary Schools 30 
3 District Bible Schools 10 
4 Theological Seminaries 3 
5 A University in progress 1 
6 Agricultural Training Centre 1 
7 School for the Blind 1 
8 School for the Handicapped 1 
9 Community Development 
Programme Centre 
1 
10 Major Hospitals 3 
11 Primary Health Care Centres 25 
12 Micro-finance Bank 1 
 
Figure 6.1. The contribution of the COCIN in providing social services in Plateau State (Gutip, 1998:67). 
 
Because most of these educational and healthcare institutions are located within the Plateau 
State, they serve to consolidate the close Church-State relations between the two institutions 
because of the government’s grant-in-aid financial support system that is available to sustain 
the COCIN social services and the also because many of the political elite in the State benefit 
from the services of the different institutions. 
 
 
6.8. The COCIN Pastors and the State Elite 
When the politicians go on electioneering campaigns within the State seeking votes for their 
election to political office it often becomes a corrupting affair between them and local pastors 
who mortgage their votes and support for gifts to benefit their Church and community 




fundraising activities in these periods, even if they are not involved in any specific Church 
project because the general tendency is: “Give us our due now before you get lost in the 
offices” (2009:85). One could argue that, by analysis, when pastors target electioneering 
periods for accessing money from aspiring politicians, the politicians are usually willing to 
give them money as an investment, for by sponsoring Church projects they will garner 
positive dividends of voter support on election day. The consequences of this is that pastors 
severely weaken their moral and prophetic voice when these politicians abuse their office, 
and such compromised pastors become silent and fail to address the situation because of fear 
of being labelled a compromised subject. Another danger seems to be that the Church can be 
perceived by the public to be a corrupt force that leads politicians to abuse and steal public 
resources. 
 
Politicians are aware that pastors command the respect of their Church members and the 
wider community in which they are located and that they can influence the people they 
should vote for. As a result, many COCIN pastors seem to have become closely allied with 
politicians for the wrong reasons (Musa, 2009:86). Musa (2009:86) is of the opinion that 
most pastors show interest in politicians only when they are seeking financial assistance for 
individual Church projects such as Church buildings, vehicles for evangelization tours and 
pilgrimages to Jerusalem, but they find it difficult to pray for these politicians or call them to 
order when there is need to do so. The situation has opened opportunities for politicians who 
are not faithful to the teachings of the Church but who attend their functions to obtain 
political legitimacy in the eyes of the Church’s followers. This situation also adds to the woes 
of the COCIN-Plateau State relations because of the COCIN’s strategic and dominant 
position in the State. One could infer from this that politicians who want to win elections in 
the State cannot do so without patronizing the COCIN pastors and members. This unethical 
environment has put the Church in a more favoured and preferred position in the State, but 
has compromised its prophetic identity, vocation and witness for justice in the pluralist 
context of Jos.  
 
 
6.9. The COCIN Leaders adopt State Language in their Functions   
In order to advertise its influential status in the State, the President of the COCIN does not 




Letters” to address societal concerns that affect the delivery of justice and equity. Rather like 
the Governor of the State, the President of the COCIN also presents a “State of the Nation” 
address (COCIN President’s Speeches, 2008-2013). No clear reasons are given for the 
changes in the use of language by the Church leaders. One can only assume it is done to 
affirm the leading role of the Church in the State. The common use of language with the 
Plateau has demonstrated how deep the Church has sunk into uncritical solidarity with the 
State. The Church does not have a nation to address but it speaks with confidence when a 
State of the nation address is delivered by its president.  
 
 
6.10. The COCIN Leadership Structure Compared to that of the State 
The leadership and administrative organizational structure of the Church seems to pattern 
itself along the lines followed by the secular State. This could explain the orientation of 
patterning itself to operate like an official parastatal organization. Moltmann (1988:15-16) 
argues that “the Church can still be in relationship with the State if its structures and politics 
look like that of the State.” In view of this, it is likely that if a Church develops an intense 
relationship with the State, the risk is high that it will seek to mirror its institutional structures 
on those of the State. This perception has led me to examine the leadership structure of the 
COCIN.  
 
The COCIN has a very complex leadership structure and administrative protocol. The 
COCIN Constitution (2013:9-10) mentions the following seven levels of administrative 
structures:  
 
i. The congregational committee (cc),  
ii. The local Church council (lcc),  
iii. The regional Church council (rcc),  
iv. The provincial Church council (pcc),  
v. The executive council (ec),  
vi. The general Church council (gcc),  





In the headquarters of the Church are the offices of the president, the vice president and his 
protocol officer, the general secretary, and the deputy general secretary who form the 
management committee of the Church (COCIN Constitution, 2013:11-16). Other leaders at 
the headquarters are various directors of administration and human resource and 
development, education, health and social services, evangelism and Church growth, 
information and communication technology, finance, internal audit, and security (COCIN 
Policy and Conditions of Service, 2008:12-14; COCIN Constitution, 2013:11-17). All of the 
directors have their personal secretaries and portfolios with official stipends attached to them 
(COCIN General Conditions of service, 2008:16-18). The infrastructural facilities and 
leadership structures of a Church speaks a lot about the position of the Church in the society. 
They mirror a government ministry or department with similar patterns of bureaucracy. The 
Church even possesses an officer for security that seems to pattern a government 
ministry/department for national security! What is left to distinguish a Church from the State 
when it has similar administrative structures and policies as the State? All of these factors 
reinforce the perception that the COCIN functions like a quasi-state body in how it projects 
its identity, vocation and witness. Its organizational and physical structures resemble that of 
the State.47 Out of the eight COCIN directors, only two are women who are also not ordained 
ministers. The unequal presence of female leadership in a largely female majority 
membership Church speaks volumes on the subject of gender justice within the Church and 
its missional responsibility to address the subject within the wider society. The COCIN’s 
leadership structure seems to give priority in governance though its identification of where 
authority and responsibility rest within its administrative structures. Clear lines are drawn to 
give clarity to each area of work, just as is available within the civil service. The strength of 
this model also holds the possibility of its weakness. Within the government, such systems of 
administration are regularly accused of being impersonal and out of touch with people’s felt 
needs. The Church can ill afford to be similarly accused of being impersonal in responding to 
the needs of people. 
 
The COCIN is the only Church denomination within the State that runs its own micro-finance 
bank (Light Micro-finance Bank) which is open strictly to the COCIN members alone 
(COCIN Constitution, 2013:13-17 as amended). This investment in micro-financing by a 
religious body that is accessible only to its own members raises some important issues. What 
                                                 
47 See Plates 8 thru 14 in the Appendix for photographs of the COCIN Administrative Headquarters in Jos, 




would have motivated the State to approve a micro-financing Church run organization to 
serve only its own members within a pluralist environment? Is this not discriminatory and 
therefore a recipe for sowing seeds for future tensions within the society? The complex top-
heavy administrative and leadership structure also indicates a degree of over-
institutionalization of the Church. This model of governance will absorb a lot of financial 
resources to maintain itself and thereby prevent sufficient financial resources from being 
made available to fund the development and growth of the ministry and mission of local 
Churches. The strong centralized structure suggests that less emphasis is placed on resourcing 
the Church to grow and develop as an organic body of believers whose lives are a positive 
influence on society (Bosch, 1983:2-3). 
One could therefore conclude that the post-colonial Church-State model between the COCIN 
and the Plateau State has overinvested in mega structures to demonstrate the strength and 
power of the competing and complimentary institutions that in the opinion of this present 
researcher has done little to facilitate peace-building in the State. One recurring factor seems 
to be its adoption of a State model of governance that focuses on the maintenance of its status 
and power rather than the renewal of it missional engagement. The COCIN’s strategic and 
dominant position within the State might work towards weakening its critical missional 
engagement in the State because of this unhealthy co-habitation.  
 
This critique seems to suggest that the COCIN cannot have it both ways. It cannot continue to 
enjoy the benefits of access to State privileges and the resources of the State to subsidise its 
social services and at the same time exercise missional responsibilities in challenging the 
State in areas where it has failed the people. It is not an easy option for any Church to 
maintain critical solidarity and distance from the State. A Church that is favoured by the State 
will tend to be slow to promote social rights and justice because it runs the risk of losing State 
patronage. This is illustrated in the COCIN’s slowness in its missional response to the Plateau 
State’s strategy in marginalising minority groups where they are addressed as “settlers,” 
“non-indigenes” and “tenants” even though the Constitution of the State advocates the equal 
treatment for all of its citizens. In view of this, one does not need to look far to know that this 
model of relationship between the COCIN and the Plateau is defective and may be 
functioning as a conduit for encouraging violence in the State. Hence, this thesis argues that 
the reality of violence in Jos can be linked to an uncritical relationship between the 
COCIN/Plateau State that seems to facilitate inequality in the disbursement of State 




peace-building that is aimed at encouraging both the COCIN and the Plateau State to 
formulate and embrace life-giving policies. Accordingly, Imo (2011:253-254) expects these 
two important institutions to foster the good governance of society:  
Religious leaders on the one hand should teach their members who hold political 
power to ensure that they do not infringe on public order and the democratic rights of 
fellow citizens in the name of religion. Dialogue should be organized annually for 
representatives of religious affairs. On the other hand, the State should promote and 
protect those activities of religion and religious people that help to build the national 
cohesion and stability, and avoid any action that tends to contradict those values that 
constitute the basis of the legal and social structure of democracy. In effect, the State 
should not allow the violation of human dignity and human rights in the name of 
religion. When religious activities appear to conflict with human rights and the public 
interest and the public interest, the State ought, above all other things, to respect the 
democratically expressed will of its citizens. 
Church-State relations must therefore be aimed at promoting the wellbeing of all its citizens.  
 
 
6.11. Chapter Summary 
This chapter attempted to analyse the constructive contribution of the COCIN through its 
provision of education and healthcare facilities, which complemented the efforts of the State. 
In the 1970s, when the Federal Government took over most of the missionary schools, the 
governor of the Plateau State, being a COCIN member, prevented most of the schools from 
being taken over, which would have given the State an upper hand in owning mission 
schools. However, this action created an unjust relationship between the two institutions 
because it led to a situation where the COCIN dominated the State machinery through its 
educational institutions that produced graduates that occupied many of the State offices and 
therefore acted in ways to protect the Church’s interest.  
 
The Plateau State’s policy on religions claims to provide a free space for all religious 
practices and groups within the State in accordance with the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria. However, the practise of this policy seems to be contradictory. The 
many ways in which the Nigeria’s Constitution has been interpreted by State officials has 
contributed to some of the death-dealing ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria especially those 
issues linked to indigene/settler issues which tend to undermine a united understanding of a 
common citizenship. In situations where rules linked to socio-political and economic 




others as settlers then they serve as conduits to nurture ethnic tensions within the State. The 
Church’s mission is called to serve all people regardless of their ethnicity and cannot follow 
the State in discriminating against its residents because of their ethnicity. The Church cannot 
obey unjust laws that inhibit peaceful co-existence and deny the fundamental human rights of 
the citizens. Indigene/settler discriminatory policies therefore destroy peaceful co-existence 
within society. Akinola’s challenge to President (Muhammadu Buhari) at his inauguration 
stresses the need for him to work toward achieving a Nigeria that is life-giving to all sectors 
of its citizenry without any discrimination of ethnicity, religion, and political affiliation.48  
I want a better Nigeria; a Nigeria where Christopher, Benjamin, and Suzan can live 
anywhere they choose unmolested; a Nigeria where Ahmodu, Mohammed and Jubril 
can live anywhere unmolested. I want a Nigeria that will be to me the mark of 
progress. I want a Nigeria that when I want my passport or to renew it, I do not have 
to go to the Immigration’s office. I want a Nigeria in which I don’t have to know 
anybody before I get services. A Nigeria where the system works; a Nigeria where 
public officials are courteous and respectful of the citizens. Can he do it? I pray he 
does. But it will be by actions not by utterances; it will be through concrete policy 
and not by propaganda.49 
Unless the COCIN is able to reform itself and gain the necessary missional integrity to 
challenge the Nigerian government to review the controversial elements in the Constitution, 
that are being misused by the States then the Constitution will continue to be used to justify 
oppression of some of its citizens. Having constructive policies in place, and yet, being 
unable to translate them into practise runs the risk of making Nigeria a dysfunctional State 
where laws cannot be trusted to be dispensed fairly . 
  
The COCIN’s Church-State relations are influenced by two inherited and contradictory 
models of Church-State relations: Church-State-separation during the colonial period and 
Church-State-partnership during the post-Independence period. The COCIN occupies a 
strategic position of influence in the State that is not afforded to other religious groups. This 
privilege seems to work for the mutual benefit of both institutions. This unjust relationship 
undermines the promotion of building a just society at peace with itself. A more life-
affirming relationship which is informed by a more indigenous African knowledge systems of 
State formation within a religious plural environment is therefore needed to address the issue. 
Such a model is proposed in the chapter which follows.  
                                                 
48 See Chapter Five, above. 




 CHAPTER SEVEN  
TOWARDS A Suum-Ngi MODEL OF RELIGIONS-STATE RELATIONS 
IN THE CONTEXT OF PEACE-BUILDING IN NIGERIA 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Having examined the model of Church-State relations that exists between the COCIN and the 
Plateau State in the previous chapter, in this chapter I will propose a Suum-Ngi50 model of 
religions-State relations that could serve as an alternative and contextual model of building a 
more just relationship between the COCIN and the Plateau State that would be better able to 
facilitate effective peace-building among the residents in Jos.  
 
A Suum-ngi model emphasizes the common humanity of all people, which means that it is 
relevant for all kinds of ideologies in the society.51 It also serves to argue that when all 
religions cooperate in search of peace-building, it leads to what Galtung calls “positive 
peace” (1975:282-304), The Nigerian cry for peace calls for improved religions-State 
relations that is based on what will unite all sectors of the residents together. A Suum-Ngi 
model of religions-State relations seems to function as a context for such relations.  
 
The incessant violence that has overtaken the residents of Jos, Nigeria presupposes that the 
historical models which have emerged from the history of Western Christianity are not 
adequate to promote peace in Jos as some are dysfunctional and others were constructed for 
different contexts and respond to existential challenges of that time. The model of relations 
between religions (including the COCIN) and the Plateau State have, in fact, prevented 
peace-building among the residents of Jos and this has resulted in a decade of violence, 
                                                 
50 Suum-Ngi according to Audu Lusa (2010:2-4) is a Kadung ethnic group’s term which means the essence of 
being human. Suum means human being, but when the suffix ngi is added, it refers to essential humanity. It 
refers to common humanity, which is found in every human being regardless of sex, race, ethnicity, religion, 
culture, and social class. The common humanity emerges from humanity’s common origins, common, essence, 
and common destination as is found in the Kadung’s creation worldview. Suum-Ngi carries the feeling of 
community and solidarity. It serves as a sign-post for life-giving relationships across every social construct.   
51 Much of what is written in this chapter with regard to Suum-Ngi relies upon a recently-published essay I co-




leading to the loss of thousands of lives and the destruction of a large amount of property.52 
The dignity and quality of human life has been sacrificed on the altar of unhealthy relations 
between the Church and politics. Hence, the aim of this chapter is to introduce a Suum-Ngi 
approach that is more contextual and humane and which may effectively deconstruct the 
existing dysfunctional model that excludes, marginalizes and discriminates against minorities 
in the State.  
 
The aspects to be discussed in this chapter include the explanation of the Kadung creation 
worldview and how Suum-Ngi emerges from it. In addition, an explanation will be offered as 
to the responsibilities constructed for male and female by the worldview, and how it seems to 
create a space for gender inequality. In addition, the Suum-Ngi notion of peace will be 
discussed and its relevance for religion and State relations. This will be followed by a Suum-
Ngi model of religion-State relations being suggested for the COCIN and the Plateau State. 
The chapter will also postulate a Suum-Ngi theology of peace for the COCIN in Nigeria and 
its relevance in peace-building. A peace-building process will be examined that includes 
political and economic inclusion, good governance, development, and security of life and 
property. Finally, an integration of the Suum-Ngi notion of peace in the curricula of religious 




7.2. Definition  
Suum-Ngi is a compound word from the Kadung ethnic group in Nigeria. The prefix Suum 
refers to a human being generally regardless of sex, nationality, race, gender, class, or 
religious affiliation. When the affix ngi is added, it means humanity, the essence of being 
human. Suum-Ngi puts all human beings at the same level without any discrimination on the 
basis of social constructs (Lusa, 2010:13). It serves therefore in this chapter to advocate 
peaceful co-existence among people in religious plural and violence-prone contexts such as 
Nigeria and the Plateau State in particular. Suum-Ngi sets out to counter all those oppressive 
elements that encourage uncritical solidarity between religions and the Plateau State and 
those elements that undermine what it means to be human. Discrimination is life-denying as 
it disempowers, deprives, denies and dehumanizes, preventing human beings from reaching 
                                                 




their full capacity of human life and breeding violence among citizens (Kowtal in Chunakara, 
2013:71). 
Suum-Ngi is also proposed in this chapter in line with Bosch’ notion of the missio-Dei, which 
he describes as the mission of God in the world, aimed at promoting well-being and peaceful 
co-existence in society (Bosch, 1991:114). It seeks to uphold and promote the well-being of 
the human society through the recognition of the common humanity that binds them together. 
A Suum-Ngi model of religions-State relations serves to affirm that African wisdom and 
philosophy offers worldviews and mythologies that may constructively promote living in 
harmony, togetherness and peace. A Suum-Ngi model of religions-State relations emerges 
from a creation myth or the worldview of the Kadung minority ethnic group in Plateau State, 
Nigeria. The group is located in Pankshin Local Government Area of the State. 
Etymologically, ‘Kadung’ means a better place to settle (Lusa, 2010:12-14). Paradoxically, 
this demonstrates that the Plateau State communities have in their cultures what it takes to 
live in peace but they may not know or may not want to use them because they have been 
brainwashed by Western and Arab worldviews. This is why this study adopted the theology 
of inculturation as one of its lenses so as to call for making the Christian message relevant to 
the cultures of the people of the Plateau State, Nigeria.  
 
 Suum-Ngi locates all human individuals in a position of caring for each other. It aims to 
promote unity in diversity and the welfare of the community. It challenges all forms of 
discrimination and violence among human beings and it seeks to uphold the principles of the 
kingdom of God which are love, forgiveness, cooperation, equity, compassion and, because 
of their common heritage, the celebration of community. Suum-Ngi and other African 
wisdom tropes and philosophies may attest that peaceful living is inherent in the culture of 
Africans but because they have allowed in foreign social constructs many of which have been 
imported and forced upon them to determine how they treat each other, peaceful living has 
given way to life-denying violence.  
 
In his zeal to uphold African wisdom, Oladipo (2003:343) discourages African Christians 
from thinking that the West delivered Christ to them “bound hand and foot” and that there 
existed no values in Africa—such as its communal spirit—that could help to explain the 
Christian message. To align with Oladipo one might argue that, unless Africans free 
themselves from foreign ideologies and allow Jesus to be African, Christianity will not make 




contributes to life-denying policies as it makes even members of the same family take up 
arms against each other as a result of religious and political diversity.   
Oladipo (2003:343) regards the process of Africanizing the gospel as “delivering Christ from 
Christianity.” He implies that the kind of Christianity that is practiced by most Africans is 
foreign to Christ’s ways because it feeds violence instead of peace. However, it is 
commendable that many African theologians are beginning to revolutionize Christian 
theology by bringing it back to their contexts. Deuoyo (2013:53-54) illustrates life-giving 
African community as Mang-Djala among the Cameroonians as one of these African 
philosophies that are constructive for healthy Religions-State relations:  
Human beings are always struggling for a better life, whether in a spiritual or a 
material sense. From this perspective, achieving the common goal comes to be 
understood as living life in its entirety in the company of all those who, at any given 
time, are witnesses to the human story of their epoch, whether good or bad. They 
participate in the living experience amongst and together with others. 
Of course, human beings are struggling for a better life by living together because they are 
gregarious by nature. Why they struggle is because they tend to forget their common 
humanity, lose their dignity, and destroy themselves by allowing social constructs to divide 
them. To appreciate the rich meaning of Suum-Ngi it is important to reflect on the Kadung 
mythology of creation. 
 
 
7.3. A Kadung Creation Worldview 
The COCIN and the Plateau State, Christians and Muslims in the State, indigenes and 
settlers, and all the minority ethnic groups in Jos need to reflect and consider their common 
heritage as human beings for the sake of realizing a closer and more peaceful community. 
Community living in and of itself is an expression of what it means to be human. By adopting 
a Suum-Ngi model of Church-State relations, it builds on the above concepts by arguing that 
our human-ness53 does not come from community-living but our desire to live in community 
comes from being human; sharing a common origin, common human essence and moving 
forward to a common destination. Responsible and meaningful community living is 
dependent on essential humanity or human-ness, an inherent responsible and dignified quality 
inherited from our Creator for all human beings. This is why any relationship model that aims 
                                                 
53 I here use the term ‘human-ness’ to refer to the “essence’ from which human beings are made while 




to restore peaceful living must focus on humanity before community. We are human not 
because we live in community, but we live in community because we are human. Although 
other creatures such as locusts live and move together in groups, they may not possess the 
essential and inherent sense of responsibility toward each other that human beings exhibit by 
caring, protecting, forgiving, reconciling, and helping each other (Pokol and Kaunda 
2015:235). 
 
Human beings were created human before they began to live in community. It is not 
community-living that determines humanity. The argument is that people live in community 
because they are human beings and not necessarily that they are human beings because they 
live in community. One may not imagine human beings who find peace in living alone; even 
those who engage in violence against each other may still need each other when the violence 
ends. However, community is also inherent in humanity because it finds expression and 
meaning only through community. This understanding is important for Church-State relations 
because the citizenry ought to be treated fairly as essential human beings before any other. 
The fundamental truth is that whether religion or State, politics or ethnicity, these are 
constructed institutions that tend to interfere with the dignity of natural human beings. 
Church and State do not create human beings. They are just stewards of the Creator’s world, 
which puts them at the service of humanity to promote wellness and peace. 
 
The term ‘worldview’ has been defined as the complex of beliefs and attitudes of a group 
concerning their origins, organization, structures, nature, religion, and interaction in the 
universe with particular reference to human beings (Ikenga-Metuh, 1987:45-50). A 
worldview tries to answer questions about the origin and nature of humanity and its place in, 
and relationship with, the universe (Uchendu, 1965:74). Balcomb (2013:598), defines 
worldview as “the templates that govern the social construction of a symbolic universe or 
paradigms in which a certain kind of knowledge is allowed.” He goes on to note that “the 
worldviews of a culture often constitute the essential identity of that culture.” A worldview 
can also be understood as the expression of an ethnic group’s understanding of itself in 
relation to its Creator, how it facilitates its corporate and harmonious existence, and how to 
keep it alive from generation to generation. A Suum-Ngi worldview serves therefore as a lens 
through which the Kadung ethnic group views humanity as an organic whole that holds 
human beings together regardless of what happens to them or where they belong in social 




essence of being human, inherited essentially and equally by all right from creation, and 
being nurtured by all human beings, which prompts them to live in community. Suum-Ngi 
argues that treating humanity as a product of community negates the common essence of 
humanity because community is dynamic and relative. One community differs from another 
community; therefore, making community the basis of humanity will leave us with a relative 
humanity, which is not the case. Humanity is the basis of community; while community 
living is only an expression of being human, both can be the basis of each other because 
neither of them is complete without the other. 
 
 
7.4. Suum-Ngi Emerging from the Creation Worldview 
The term ‘worldview’ has been defined as “the complex of beliefs and attitudes of a group 
concerning their origin, organization, social structures, nature, religion, the world, and 
general interaction in the universe with particular reference to human beings (Ikenga-Metuh, 
1987:45-50; Pokol and Kaunda, 2015:238). Balcomb (2013:598) also defines worldview as: 
The templates that govern the social construction of a symbolic universe or paradigms 
in which a certain kind of knowledge is allowed…worldviews of a culture often 
constitute the essential identity of that culture. 
Accordingly, this may enable them to adopt survival abilities or such worldviews that may 
endanger life-giving relations which then serve to infringe on their basic human rights. 
 
The concept of Suum-Ngi comes from the creation worldview of the Kadung ethnic group in 
Plateau State, Nigeria. (Lusa, 2010:4). Suum means human being generally without any 
indication of male, female, indigene, settler, Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, or atheist. It 
means human being in general. Being male (Imorom) or female (Iyih) is something that 
comes after one is already created suum (human) (2010: 5-6). When the suffix ngi is added to 
suum, it becomes Suum-Ngi, which means the essence of being human (2010:7). It also 
implies that Suum-Ngi, the essence of being human, is what counts, not imorom (male) or iyih 
(female) because these are mere social constructs and manifestations of the same suum 
(human being). 
 
The Kadung ethnic group believe that human beings and all other creatures originated from 




moving forward toward a common destination (Lusa, 2010:12). This further demonstrates the 
inherency of community through which common ground can be fund and defined. While 
woman and man originated from the tuber of the Yam plant, other creatures originated from 
its vine and leaves (2010:16). They believe that the yam grew so large that part of its tuber 
got exposed to the sun. The exposed part of the tuber eventually changed colour and taste and 
eventually metamorphosed into male and female human beings. That both of them emerged 
at the same time may imply that they inherently metamorphosed as a single community and 
not as an individual. This means that the community does not originate from the human being 
but is an undergirding principle of humanness. Consequently, human-ness does not exist with 
the community and the community does not exist without human-ness. Where there is 
conflict and injustice there is no human-ness; and where there is no human-ness there is no 
community.  
 
The exposed part of the yam plant produced a male human being, while the covered part 
produced a female human being (Lusa, 2010:18). The two parts of the same yam tuber that 
are regarded as the origins of man and woman are also regarded as origins of strength and 
weakness: the male is identified by physical strength because the exposed part that produced 
him suffered from the heat of the sun and became stronger; while the female is identified with 
weakness because the part that produced her was always covered and did not suffer 
(2010:34). These differences do not matter because the one-ness of the yam plant and its 
tuber is what constitutes every reason for harmony and peaceful living among the creatures. 
The male and female have responsibilities that reflect their physical qualities. These distinct 
responsibilities are meant to facilitate their mutual relationship (2010:23). 
 
 
7.5. The Responsibilities of Female and Male 
 Because he was deemed stronger, the male was responsible for using his strength to provide 
security and protection for the female. The female’s responsibilities as an insider are 
restricted to internal and domestic functions within the home; while the male plays external 
roles (Lusa, 2010:50). Eventually, this mutual relationship developed into marriage between 
them (2010:23). This worldview is reflected in the way the Kadung people build their houses: 
the husband’s room is always at the entrance of the house; while the wife’s room is always 




always at the front to protect his wife towards the wall (2010:16). That one is there to protect 
the other is not to be exploited because the Creator ordained complementarity for creatures to 
enjoy in their relationship (Adu, 2012:22).  
 
As man and woman continued their relationship, other creatures eventually originated from 
the vine and leaves of the same plant (Lusa, 2010:17). Accordingly, Lusa (2010:17) reveals 
that the relationship between human beings and the rest of creation is a symbiotic one 
because they originated from the same plant. There is, therefore, no hierarchy or precedence 
among human beings and other creatures because, like a chicken and an egg, it is difficult to 
tell which one comes first, and which one is better than the other, which also illustrates how 
humanness and community function (Adu, 2012:3-4). As the tuber depends on the leaves and 
the vine for its growth, so the vine and the leaves also depend on the tuber for survival. This 
network of relationship implies that there is essential harmony and mutuality in creation. 
Human beings and the environment share life together and rely on each other. For this ethnic 
group, peace is not peace until there is harmony between human beings and the physical 
environment (Lusa, 2010:24). There are particular forests in the land that are never tampered 
with because tampering with them is believed to lead to the outbreak of deadly diseases in the 
community (2010:34). Some diseases are also treated by bathing with water from the streams 
in such forests (Adu, 2012:34). This implies intimate human relations with the environment 
and with each other. This worldview comes close to what the Ecumenical Patriarch 
Bartholomew (cited in Chunakara, 2013:84) argues: 
To commit a crime against the natural world is a sin. For humans to cause species to 
become extinct and to destroy the biological diversity of God’s creation; for humans 
to degrade the integrity of the Earth by causing changes in its climate, by stripping the 
Earth of its natural forests, or destroying its wetlands; for humans to injure other 
humans with disease; for humans to contaminate the Earth’s waters, its land, its air, 
and its life with poisonous substances: these are sins.  
The physical environment is bound up with human existence and survival because they 
complement each other, and whatever happens to the environment affects human life (Lusa, 
2010:24). A Suum-Ngi notion of peace, views peace as a situation where there is a proper and 
life-giving relationship between human beings and the physical environment. The fact that 
they originated from a common origin, sharing common essence, and are more forward to a 
common destination calls for a relationship of caring, protecting, and loving each other. The 
human family is expected to exhibit a more intimate relationship with each other because 





Critics may raise questions as whether this worldview favours men over women, and whether 
it justifies patriarchal superiority and societies. It ought to be remembered that variety is part 
of the beauty of creation; The Kadung’s Suum-Ngi would regard such questions as a tendency 
to deny the one-ness of the yam plant and its tuber. Unless it is proved that some parts of the 
plant were better off than others (which is not), hierarchy has no place in creation because 
whatever originated from the same source carries the same essential quality and dignity. 
Suum-Ngi does not see reasons for destructive hierarchy and relationships in creation. 
Religion does not change humanity; indigeneity does not add to our humanity; settler-ship 
does not reduce our humanity; ethnicity does not reduce our humanity; political affiliation 
does not reduce our humanity. In fact, Suum-Ngi implies that it is not religions that make us 
human, but we are religious because we are first human; and our essential humanity has no 
diversity because of our common origins, common essence, and common destination (Pokol 
and Kaunda, 2015: 234). Our stereotypes and discriminations are our own creation.  
 
Suum-Ngi emphasizes the ‘one-ness’ and ‘same-ness’ of the plant, regardless of its separate 
parts, as a basis for ‘one-ness’ and ‘same-ness’ among human beings and the creation 
(2015:239). This ought to facilitate the promotion of peaceful living across all diversities of 
people. The fact that the male, female, and other creatures originated from distinct parts only 
justifies variety and distinction in creation not differences (Lusa, 2010:19). Provided 
everyone plays their essential roles and respects the other’s role, peace reigns. Impotent and 
destructive hierarchy comes in only when people use their essential quality and responsibility 
selfishly and disregard others. The idea is that peace-building ought to start from treating 
each other on the basis of our common humanity as viewed by the Suum-Ngi worldview. If 
we recognize our essential one-ness and respect that one-ness, social constructs such as 
religion, politics, and indigene/settler will never lead us into taking arms against each other. 
 
Such a worldview and retrieval of culture tends to justify African patriarchal society and the 
exploitation of women. Care must therefore be taken otherwise instead of fostering peace-
building, it may work the other way round. What happens to husbands who are protected by 
their wives? What about single parent-females who have their own houses, who protect 
them? It is even an over-statement to say that males are stronger than women. Therefore, 




State relations and theology of peace, one ought to be careful about its implications on gender 
issues.  
 
Nevertheless, Suum-Ngi as a community building model it contributes to formulating a 
healthier model of religions-State relations because it emphasizes the essential one-ness of 
humanity based on a common humanity above what human beings have constructed for 
themselves. The world is characterized by life-denying conflicts and this is rooted in 
humanity’s deviation from and denial of a common Suum-Ngi (lit: humanity) (Adu, 2012:25). 
Suum-Ngi tends to call for the reconstruction of destructive social constructs by arguing for a 
return to the recognition of our common humanity. Below is a sketch of a diagram where 
Suum-Ngi as creation worldview emerges: 
 
 
  Figure 7.1. A tuber of a wild Yam: The Kadung’s worldview about the origin of human 
beings (Lusa, 2010: 20-24) 
 
7.6 The Suum-Ngi Notion of Peace in Religions-State Relations 
Suum-Ngi maintains that since all creation originated from the same origin, they share a 
common origin, common essence, and are moving towards a common destination (Lusa, 
2010:20). These common grounds give creation equal standing, equal identity, and equal 
dignity (Adu, 2012:2). The basic implication of this is that every human being possesses a 
common humanity, a common origin, common identity, common dignity and equity, based 




what they do, but what they are essentially. It also means that being a Christian, Muslim, 
Hindu, Buddhist, or African Traditionalists does not matter because none of these can make 
anyone more or less human. Our basis of living in peace should therefore be our common 
origins, common essence, and common destination. The poor and the rich are all human; 
white and black people are all human; the indigenes and the settlers are all human; whatever 
we have chosen to be, can be changed; but our essential humanity cannot be changed or 
replaced. Hurting the fellow human being, therefore, means denying them humanity and 
hurting one-self (Lusa, 2010:26). 
 
The concept of Suum-Ngi is similar to what Martin Luther King Jnr. calls the “single garment 
of destiny” (King Jr., cited in Chunakara, 2013:67). These profound natural and organic 
common grounds call for peaceful living. This notion of peace speaks volumes against social 
constructs that divide us. Human beings are so tied together that whatever happens to one 
happens to all. The statement by the first President of the Republic of Ghana (Kwame 
Nkrumah) demonstrates this truth about human one-ness:  
The forces making for our unity far outweigh those which divide us. There is no time 
to waste because we are running against time in Africa. We must unite now or perish 
since no single African State is large or powerful enough to stand on its own…The 
independence of Ghana is meaningless until it is liked with the total liberation and 
unification of Africa (Nkrumah’s poster, blog). 
Although Nkrumah made this statement in a political context, it is true that there is more that 
unites human beings than there is that divides them. Selfishness, greed, and hatred are not 
primarily against social values but against a commonly shared humanity. When people take 
their eyes from their common origins, common essence, and common destination, they begin 
to value social constructs above their common natural and common origins, essence, identity 
and dignity (Lusa, 2010:57). This deviation seems to be the source of all conflict and 
violence in society. Mother Teresa (cited in Wallis, 2014:129) once remarked that “if we 
have no peace, it is because we have forgotten that we belong to each other [and for each 
other].” Suum-Ngi serves as a reminder that despite what human beings have made of 
themselves and constructed for themselves, they still have a common ground that binds them 
together (Lusa, 2010:34). As a worldview that focuses on peaceful living, Suum-Ngi is 
always sung as a reconciliation poem in Kadung land: 
Suum-ngi shan gama, ip-boh gong-gong maghi piagha wor kap mora. I-yan bbaghaka 
magha ko yaba sogha rami dhalla dha kap mora, I-kop diag-diag magha mu kopsora 
na mu dara sogha rami shembella; Adimori yighi lishem ni’m; I sha dusa bbeh, adusa 




wo kena dha araghat; ko gha wo yah a mujana, kogha wo yah dhak, suum shiri yighi 
didam ni’m; anak-mori ghat; adimori ghat; arama dhalla mora ghat; tom mori ghat, 
dhaksara mori ghat. Awamaghi dhalla miwomi sha dhak ni; nungvya nikapsana 
shadhak. 
[Humanity is more than a joke; it is so deep that it can cover all of us; it is wide 
enough to provide space for each one of us; it is high enough to accommodate every 
one of us regardless of our different sizes. Our origin is like a chameleon; some of us 
are red, some as black, some are white, some are yellow, some are blue, some are 
green, some are mixed, but all from the same origin, and rushing to the same 
destination. As human race, we are like termites, coming from one mother and one 
father. We have the same space to occupy, common responsibilities to accomplish, 
and common challenges to face. What peaceful relationship cannot do for us, violent 
conflict and division cannot do for us either] (Lusa, 2010:60). 
Suum-Ngi puts human beings in the same boat and at the same level. One can change 
religion, political association, cultural identity, and social status, but no one can change their 
humanity. The argument here is that if our understanding of what constitutes a neighbour 
does not transcend our ethnic, religious, and political boundaries, we debase our common 
humanity and we create a situation that will lead to life-denying crises. M. K. Gandhi 
(1914:438-439) argues that:  
All creatures are of the same substance as all drops of water in the ocean are the same 
in substance. I believe that all of us, individual souls, living in this ocean of spirit are 
the same with one another with the closest bond among ourselves. A drop that 
separates soon dries up and any soul that believes itself separate from others is likely 
destroyed…In all situations of conflict, there is something in the opponent that can be 
appealed to—not only common humanity but… that of God in man...no one can be 
utterly and finally an enemy because no one is without that divine spark within 
them…people may consider themselves to be our enemies, but we should reject such 
a claim.  
Gandhi is right because no matter how much we tend to hate one another, we cannot take 
them away from their Creator. Religion appears to be the worst enemy against our common 
humanity in this century. In a recent sermon entitled, “See if you can find a man among you,” 
(Scottsville Presbyterian Church Sermon, 21 June 2015), Hewitt commented that all religions 
are guilty of terror. He went on to argue that:  
God is not the enemy of your enemies. He is not even the enemy of his enemies. 
When God hates all the same people that you hate, you can absolutely be certain that 
you have created him in your own image...All forms of dehumanization, demonizing 
those who differ from you, treating your neighbour as the other, and claiming that 
God is on your side alone…fanatical claims of absolute truth. Doubt-free, no question 
asked, an uncritical confidence that one understands such absolute truth 
absolutely…Blind obedience to totalitarian, charismatic, and authoritarian leaders or 




Hewitt’s perspectives constitute a paradox of the highest order when religion becomes the 
source robbing humanity of peace when it ought to be that which unites them. Wallis 
(2005:203) also expresses the unity of humanity which religion ought to promote: 
Love for the neighbour is recognition of the oneness of the human race, created by 
God “like members of a body”. It is the fraternal affection which proceeds from the 
regard that we have when God has joined us together and united us in one body, 
because he wants each of us to empty himself or herself for the neighbour, so that no 
one is addicted to his or her own person, but that we serve all in common. The 
“neighbour” extends indiscriminately to every person, because the human race is 
united by a sacred bond of fellowship…To make any person my neighbour, it is 
enough that he or she be a human being…out of this come two consequences : first, 
“any inequality contrary to this arrangement is nothing else than corruption of nature 
which proceeds from sin”. Second, out of this flows the radical demand for socio-
economic justice. 
If the understanding of neighbour does not transcend our ethnic, religious, and political 
boundaries, then it debases our common human-ness and a situation is created that may 
threaten life itself. 
 
 
7.7. The Suum-Ngi Model of Religions-State Relations 
Suum-Ngi serves as an alternative African model of Church-State relations because of its 
emphasis on the essential one-ness and unity of human beings. Suum-Ngi calls for accepting 
people without conditions and tolerating their shortcomings and sufferings under their 
unacceptability (Buttelli, 2015:142). It does not regard people from the viewpoint of social 
constructs but on the basis of who they are essentially (Lusa, 2010:24). It does not treat 
people based on whether they are indigenes or settlers; poor or rich, from the same political 
party or not, from the same religion or not, but common humanity is what counts (Adu, 
2012:26). It departs from other African philosophies and wisdom tropes because it goes back 
radically to locate the human bond of unity in creation.  
 
Suum-Ngi is a contextual worldview that is local to the COCIN and the Plateau State in 
Nigeria. It is not foreign, but is part of the culture of the people of Plateau State. Focusing on 
humanity and its essential dignity as normative ground for peaceful living, Suum-Ngi calls on 
the Church and State to treat citizens based on humanity’s common origins, common essence, 
and common destination that are inherent in every human being. Hence, wherever and in 




unchanged because of the commonality of origin, essence and destination are constant to all 
humanity (Lusa, 2010:58). For the Church and State to uphold the common humanity of 
citizens in their relationship, Nkurunziza (2003:299-301) argues that: 
There ought to be economic justice, social justice, political justice, gender justice, 
ethnic justice, and environmental justice because these factors are tied to what it 
means to be human. 
Human-ness and community are undergirded by difference and not sameness. Difference is 
the essence of community. A Suum-Ngi model of Church-State relations affirms that Muslims 
are human before they practise Islam; Christians are human before they practise Christianity; 
Hindus are human before they become Hindus; African traditional Religious practitioners are 
human before they practise their faith, the unreligious are human before they reject religion; 
the common ground to all of them is humanity, which the Church-State relationship ought to 
utilize in treating them equally. The three conditions: common origins, common essence, and 
common destiny are not deposited in human beings in varying proportions; each human being 
has these conditions equally. Hence, Suum-Ngi, for the sake of common humanity, calls for a 
peaceful relationship based on love, compassion, kindness, forgiveness, reconciliation, 
tolerance, accommodation of others, service, to one another, caring for one another, and 
dialogue of life (Lusa, 2010:44). Discrimination against others on the basis of religion and 
politics is a negation of the one-ness of humanity. Religion and politics do not make 
humanity; it is the other way round.  
 
A Suum-Ngi model of religions-State relations re-enforces the theology of incarnation which 
sees the Creator coming to identify with human beings and their common humanity (John 
1:1-11 NIV). The entire redemptive agenda of the Creator (missio-Dei) is linked to his 
incarnation, not only in the world, but in sharing in our common humanity (Phil. 2:5-9 NIV). 
The implication of the Creator’s incarnation is that humanity is no longer a human essence 
alone, but the Creator is also involved. This further implies that the Church stands in critical 
solidarity and distance (Boesak, 2005:169) with the State to see that all people are accepted 
and treated fairly based on common humanity as the Creator would accept them without 
discrimination (Acts 10: 34-35; Gal. 3:26-28; Eph. 2: 11-22 NIV). Why the Christian religion 
exists is because the Christian message of peace and unity of human beings has to be 
proclaimed. What is the content of the Christian message? God himself is its content. How do 




tabernacled with us (John 1:11 NIV). The unity of the human race undergirds a Suum-Ngi 
model of religions-State relations. 
 
 
7.8. Toward a Suum-Ngi Theology of Peace for the COCIN in Nigeria 
When the Church fails to grasp the message of peace that is just as the basis of its ministry in 
the world, the Church also misses the direction to implement its missio-political mandate. 
This also tends to affect its relations with the State. God’s vision is life-centred for all people 
to live in fullness of life with dignity, equality and respect, regardless of class, gender, 
religion, political affiliation, economic status, race, indigene, settler or ethnicity (WCC, 
2011:19).  
 
The framework of social reconstruction represents an appropriate afro-centric lens through 
which the residents of Jos may call into question all those dysfunctional elements that deny 
them fullness of life within their society. Any religious group/institution that makes racism, 
social inequality or chauvinism central to its missional identity and vocation can scarcely 
expect to be taken serious when it undertakes political advocacy within civil society for 
justice, freedom, and peace (Hunsinger, 2006:409). Social reconstruction theory therefore 
requires that both the COCIN and the Plateau State cultivate policies that are life-giving to its 
citizens. Gifford (1998:344-346) argues that the Church must carefully monitor how power is 
exercised within the State, how accountable the political leadership is, how transparent 
decision making is, whether its Constitution is observed, what subsidies are given to 
organizations and how equal opportunities are for internal advancement. These are important 
measures that the COCIN should embrace within its life and work to determine its missional 
effectiveness. 
 
While a Suum-Ngi model of Church-State relations is intended for the COCIN and the 
Plateau State, the model also applies to the entire Church in Nigeria because of the common 
peace challenges facing the nation. The Church has no hiding place anywhere other than 
engaging in the public space actively, participating in the mission of God by radically 
planning for a just-peace to prevail. Hendricks (2006:328-329) argues that: 
When Christians sow the seed of peace and love and justice, they will grow and 
provide shade for all. This is the only way that the kingdom of God can transform the 




The entire mission of the Church ought to be viewed as liberating and reconstructing because 
as Kaunda (2013:558) argues:  
God is on the mission in Africa in order to demonstrate God’s liberating and 
reconciling love and consequently humanize the social order by overcoming 
inhumanity that human beings brought on others. 
Whatever is not of peace is inhumanity to humanity. The ministry of the Church needs to 
transcend mere “powerful declarations” by her “powerful leaders,” while their members are 
trooping to refugee camps for safety. For example, Ojo (2008:121) declared that:  
We must not be content to chant hymns and say prayers while the crisis 
deepens…There must be a change of thinking and attitudes towards life and 
responsibility for the condition of our nation and society. The great need of Christians 
in Nigeria is to realize that they are responsible for the present crisis because of their 
indifference and inactivity when they have the mighty gospel to solve the crisis. 
This declaration sounds promising but the crises have kept overwhelming the Nigerians. The 
Church was able to understand that the crises were attached to issues of poverty, ignorance, 
illiteracy, corruption, and under-development, which is attributed to transgression as Ojo 
(2008:121-122) has further reiterated: 
However, more than the internal factors that weigh on our economy is the fact that 
our woes are due to our national transgression against God. For how long will these 
continue? It would continue, so long as the Church permits it to continue, so long as 
the Church remains insensitive, so long as the Church forgets she is light of the 
world…The Church in Nigeria is grossly delinquent on the prophetic ministry or 
warning and judging the nation. Rather than do this, some of us legitimize the actions 
of men who go and plunder the State treasury and run to us for help and prayer. 
The Church also claims that: 
We must realize that the present revival and move of the Holy Spirit all over Nigeria 
is not only for Nigeria, but God has chosen Nigeria as the base from which He is 
going to invade other West African countries with the gospel of liberation and 
deliverance…God intends that Nigeria should be the beacon of the gospel in Africa. 
The mantle of leadership in Africa…falls on the Church in Nigeria. It is for this 
reason we are little bit prosperous…For deliverance does not lie with shrewd 
politicians, renowned economists or learned educationists, but in the men and women, 
who would revert to the old but most potent strategy of evangelism (Ojo, 2008:122).  
Given all these claims by religious leaders, why has peace remained elusive in Nigeria? Are 
these pronouncements backed with actions? Why are these plans failing to achieve peace in 
Nigeria? What kind of sermons are these pastors delivering from their pulpits? What space do 
they create for dialogue with other faiths in their pluralist contexts? Are they equipped for 
peace-building? Oye (2007:4) has argued that “the source of a river is better than the river 




institutions need to be equipped properly with peace-oriented disciplines if religious leaders 
are to be more active in promoting life-giving Church-State relations. 
 
In this chapter, I therefore advocate for the mainstreaming theology of peace (based on Suum-
Ngi) in the curricula of all religious training institutions in the nation in general, and in the 
Gindiri54 Theological Seminary (owned by the COCIN) and the Qur’anic schools in Plateau 
State. 
It is not enough to have the richest pastors and loudest religious leaders in the country who 
claim to lead the African Continent to set the Church’s missional agenda. The Nigerian 
masses may be tired of “powerful declarations” and promises of heaven on earth, which do 
not reflect on social justice and peace in the nation. Indeed, such religious leader want to sit 
comfortably under their own fig trees (Boesak, 2005:167-169) and live peacefully in their 
own houses instead of refugee camps (Okediji, 2005:48-53). Religion exists for humanity, 
and not for itself. It does not prophesy into its own waist-coat-pocket (Reeve, 1984:45-46). It 
is not of the world, and must be seen to be doing what it is meant to do. 
 
Peace-building issues are worth giving up all other projects for until peace prevails. Other 
things can wait (Pokol and Kaunda, 2015:235). Unless religions-State relations are viewed 
through the lens of the one-ness of humanity, social constructs will continue to challenge the 
human society forever. A Suum-Ngi model of Church-State relations challenges all social 
constructs that seem to determine how human beings regard each other. Since social 
constructs place us differently from one to another, they work against the promotion of life-
giving community living in our societies (Lusa, 2010:44).  
 
In view of this, religions and the Plateau State ought to relate according to the principles of 
Suum-Ngi in such a way that all the residents in the State, regardless of religion, race, 
indigene, settler, political party affiliation, ethnic and cultural background, are all treated 
primarily as human beings, sharing a common origin, common essence, and are passing to a 
common destination (Adu, 2012:23). It ought to be said that a Suum-Ngi model calls for the 
promotion of the well-being of the residents and the preferential treatment for the poor and 
the weak in the society. It calls for compassion, justice, forgiveness, equality, love, mercy, 
                                                 
54 Gindiri is a suburb within Plateau Region of Nigeria, where the early missionaries settled in the early 1930s. 
Within this suburb is also a cluster of secondary schools belonging to the Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN). 
This old missionary compound has produced most of the elite for the State because of its long history and 




and common participation in the community for the benefit of all residents without 
discrimination because human beings are all the same.  
 
However, the question is whether the religions of the twenty-first-century still have any moral 
fortitude to hold the State accountable for its patent lack of social justice and equity given the 
kind of power hunger and religious fundamentalism that rocks the world today. Impotent by 
social constructs such as religion, ethnicity, sectionalism, politics and even racism have 
worked against what common humanity does for the society. If our foreparents were regarded 
as “pagans,” or “traditionalists” could live in relative peace with one another through the 
principles of Suum-Ngi, the current sacrifice of peace on the altar of Christianity and Islam 
calls into question whether these “foreign religions” and their ideologies (Boer, 1984:27-18) 
have engaged constructively with our African culture or not. Unless we see religion as 
promoting life instead of sacrificing life to promote religion, we shall all perish as fools (King 
Jr. in Chunakara, 2013:67). 
 
 
7.9. Suum-Ngi and the Peace-Building Process in Jos, Nigeria  
Mother Teresa (cited in Wallis, 2013, 2014: 129) argues that “if we have no peace, it is 
because we have forgotten that we belong to each other.” Lord Strang (cited by Gawerc, 
2006:435) notes that “in a world where war is everybody’s tragedy and everybody’s 
nightmare, diplomacy is everybody’s business.” These quotations imply that the causes of 
violent conflicts in our societies are rooted in our inability to recognize our common 
humanity and failure to work together. Issues of political exclusion, under-development, bad 
governance, economic exclusion, and religious discrimination are rooted in our want to 
discriminate against others we think are different from us (Mwadkwon, 2001:45). The term 
‘peace’ has been defined in various ways by specialists in the field. Gawerc (2011:438) notes 
that:  
Peace as a term is contested. Colloquially, by government and the academia itself, 
peace is often defined negatively as the absence of war and physical violence. This is 
problematic, not least of which is that peace is often defined differently by different 
groups in a conflict.  
The obvious problem with the definition of peace as the absence of war and physical violence 





In order to define peace in a broader and more positive way, Galtung (1975:282-304) 
differentiates between negative and positive peace by positing that:  
Whereas negative peace is the absence of direct violence (people being killed), 
positive peace also includes absence of structural violence (people dying as a result of 
poverty) and cultural violence (factors that blind people to injustice or allow them to 
rationalize it).  
Hence, while “the negative peace of order and the cessation of direct violence” may not be 
compatible with justice, “the positive peace of reconciliation and psycho/social healing” for 
the most part presupposes it” (Gawerc, 2011:439). How can positive peace be realized in 
society? What does it take to achieve the absence of direct violence and war inter-personally 
and in the structures of society? Could positive peace be achieved within a short time? What 
are the processes involved in working for positive peace? Such peace as a positive must 
involve a long-term planning; hence, we turn to peace-building. All these are important 




Peace-building becomes a priority only where humanity is valued above their differences. It 
becomes optional when human life is under-valued and violence becomes a means of 
political achievement by the powerful. To achieve what Galtung (1995:265) calls “positive 
peace” requires peace-building measures that address the factors that facilitate direct violence 
as well as structural violence. Galtung (1995:223-265) also sets out a tripartite typology 
making a distinction among peace-keeping, peace-making, and peace-building. He explains 
that “peace-making is a negotiation process that takes place between decision-makers 
directed towards reaching an official settlement or resolution to specific conflicts. Peace-
keeping involves third-party interventions to keep apart warring factions or groups and 
thereby maintain the absence of direct violence or reduce it. Peace-building involves a wide 
range of activities focused on the social, psychological, and economic environment at the 
grassroots level. From this, the aim of peace-building is to create a structure of peace that is 
based on justice, equity, and cooperation, thereby addressing the underlying causes of violent 
conflict so that it becomes less likely in the future (Gawerc, 2011:439). This means that most 
of what the Nigerian government is doing to restore peace in the country only amounts to 






Positive peace is based on justice and equity and is an important aspect of peace-building. 
This is because justice may even demand that there is conflict so that positive peace may be 
restored. In view of this, Gawerc (2011:439) argues that it may not even be proper to stop 
direct or structural conflict if it is at the expense of justice. Furthermore, the best way to 
guarantee the durability of any agreement is to be pro-active and allow for higher 
participation by the conflict groups. This means that conflict itself can work in a constructive 
or destructive way depending on whether it leads to social justice or not (Lederach, 1997:1-
30). 
Peace-building ought to be pro-active and patiently pursued because it is tied to justice for all. 
It is not reactive to violence but is something that ought to be planned for in the budget by the 
State and religious groups. Peace-building focuses on the transformation of unjust social 
relationships and addresses the root cause of conflicts (Lederach, 1997:1-30). Peace-building 
envisions a world that is free of exclusion, discrimination, violence, intolerance or 
dehumanizing poverty, where the goods of the earth are equally shared by all and creation is 
cherished for future generation. It is a place where people—especially the poorest, 
marginalized, and oppressed—find hope and are empowered to come to the fullness of their 
humanity as part of the global community (Neufeldt, et al., 2002:4).  
 
The difference that peace-building brings is the emphasis on relationships. This it does 
through two central themes: peace-building is both relationship-centred and a participatory 
process. Rather than just looking at specific ways of improving food production or build new 
houses, peace-building focuses on relationships with partners and programme recipients as an 
integral part of establishing lasting peace in violence-prone areas (Lederach, 1997, 2001). 
Peace-building is more than just providing poor people with resources or relief materials, it 
includes healing relationships that have been broken (Lederach, 1997:2001). 
 
The Plateau State, through its instrument of governance, has the responsibility of putting in 
place long term measures that address structural issues that concern the basic needs of its 
citizens. It has been argued that one of the greatest shortcomings of the contemporary peace 
processes is that it fails to address the bitterness (including the memories and images), and 
the sources that generate it (Gawerc, 2011:437). In view of this, it has also been argued that 
“as civilians are so deeply involved in the structures of war, they also need to participate in 




violent conflict contexts like Jos where populations in conflict need to take part in every 
effort that is meant to prevent and end the violence.  
 
Peace-making and peace-keeping will contribute less in such situations because they do not 
address the root causes of violence. Peace-building recognizes that without intensive 
grassroots activities and a strong foundation built for civil society, negotiations at the official 
level of employing the military to keep peace will not bring just-peace and justice 
(Rasmussen, 1999:37-45). The literature makes it clear that solutions must be adopted by 
local actors and it cannot be forced from above or imposed by the outside (Lederach, 
1999:23-26). This reminds me that the deployment of the military as a Special Task Force by 
the Nigerian government to maintain peace is out of place because violence cannot be solved 
through violence. This strategy may only create negative and temporary peace because there 
is no provision for addressing the root causes of the violence. 
 
Peace-building is required because positive and lasting peace must address the underlying 
causes by involving the top, the middle, and the grassroots in finding lasting solutions to 
violence (Gawerc, 2011:441). Peace cannot be imposed from the outside, for the actors in 
violent conflicts need more than orders to lay down their arms. Instead, they need structures 
that restore their trust and acceptance of one another. Accordingly, Kelman suggests that:  
For a positive peace in an area [like Jos] that has a long history of war, there needs to 
be amongst the communities, mutual acceptance, cooperative interaction, a feeling of 
security, space for human dignity, the institutionalization of a mechanism for problem 
solving, and finally, broad reconciliation (Kelman, 1999 cited in Gawerc, 2011:442).  
Marshall and Gurr (2005:77-79) also suggest that “for the peace-building process to be 
sustainable for more than a short interlude, relief, recovery, reconciliation, and social and 
economic development must be integrated into the actual settlement.” In view of the 
importance of grassroots development as an important aspect of peace-building in the Plateau 
State, a Suum-Ngi model of religions-State relations demands that a number of factors need to 
be addressed by religions-State relations so as to restore peace in the violent context of Jos. 
 
Where a Suum-Ngi model of religions-State relations is observed as a model of relationship, 
political exclusion will give way to political inclusion. Political inclusion means that every 
person has access or a voice in the political running of their lives, the decisions that affect 




residents in the political community regardless of their differences. This implies that people 
treat each other on the basis of the “Golden Rule.”55 Niebuhr (cited by Douglas 2006:412-
433) believes that the problem of human nature is self-interest expressed in humanity’s desire 
to control and rule over others. He argues that this desire leads to selfishness in every human 
being, which tends to impede peaceful community living. Niebuhr also maintains that human 
selfishness is also exhibited by human groups because it is deeply seated in human nature, 
where even education and religious instruction cannot erode the selfish nature in human 
beings (2006:433). This selfishness also translates into human pride and collective egoism 
which is the source of structural injustice militating against the collective interest in society. 
Consequently, conflicts among human beings are not merely conflicts driven by the need to 
survive. The will to possess power fundamentally places human beings in conflict with each 
other (2006:434). Niebuhr further explained the political nature of human beings by positing 
that: 
The conflicts between men [and women] are thus never simple conflicts between 
competing survival impulses. They are conflicts in which each man [and woman] or 
group seeks to guard its power and prestige against the peril of competing expressions 
of power and pride. Since the very possession of power and prestige always involves 
some encroachment upon the prestige and power of others, the law of love becomes 
necessary for community living to work (Niebuhr cited in Douglas, 2006:420). 
Although Niebuhr appears to have a negative perception of human nature, his realistic 
position holds true for human nature. When we know what human nature is—particularly as 
it applies to the desire to control or exercise power—we come to realize that denying other 
people political participation is tantamount to denying them their humanity. The desire for 
power is connected to self-identity, which is deeply seated in all individuals and groups, 
finding its fulfilment in socio-political and economic participation. Anthony (cited in 
Pellauer, 2006:328-348) has argued that to deny people their right to vote, (and by 
implication, accessing the means of survival and identity), is to reduce them to the level of a 
slave. Niebuhr’s position on human nature ought to enable us know that what we value as 
individuals is the same with what others are entitled to, which is the message of Suum-Ngi 
(Lusa, 2010: 4-6; Adu, 2012:7), Ubuntu, (Mbigi, 2005:69), MangDjala (Deuoyo, 2014), and 
Ujamaa (Oladipo, 2003) all of which are models of religions-State relations. Accordingly, as 
Martin Luther King Jr. could confirm: 
                                                 
55 The principles of the ‘Golden Rule’ as recorded in Matthew 7:12, and seems to underlie all religions, demands 
that people treat each other on the basis that they would want to be treated. This is rooted in the truth that 





Everyman [Sic] is somebody because they are children of God. When we truly 
believe in the sacredness of human personality, we won’t exploit people, we won’t 
trample over people with the iron feet of oppression, and we won’t kill anybody 
(King Jr., cited in Jackson 2006:454). 
King Jr., further wonders:  
If all persons are equal before the creator, how can they be treated as unequal before 
the State or the wider society? (King Jr., cited in Jackson 2006:454). 
Political exclusion is, therefore, an act of injustice, described as: 
Wilful blindness to the image of God in others…an immorality that treats men and 
women as means rather than ends, and thereby reduces them to things rather than 
persons (Jackson, 2006:454).  
Political exclusion also leads to economic exclusion because human beings need both in 
order to live fulfilled life. One could argue that greed for unhealthy power and ill-gotten 
wealth is at the centre of all life-denying policies and the exploitation of other human beings. 
Indeed, until greed gives way to the promotion of the common good, socio-political and 
economic exclusion will keep fuelling violence. 
 
Economic inclusion according to a Suum-Ngi model of religions-State relations speaks for 
economic justice in the community where everyone ought to have access to the means of 
survival and economic satisfaction. In contexts such as Nigeria, where political participation 
is linked to economic participation (Ostien, 2009:34-36), denying people political 
participation also means discriminating against them economically. As Nkurunziza 
(2003:299) has argued:  
Deep rooted conflicts can easily explode to deadly violence if the involved parties 
disagree on powerful factors: Identity and unequal distribution or sharing of the 
economic, social and political resources within a given society.  
Disputes over access to and ownership of territory, material, economic and natural resources 
are some of the dominant sources of conflicts in Nigeria (Igboin, 2012:16-17). Resource-
based conflicts are bound to increase as a result of the growth in population and 
environmental degradation and the potential crisis because of food security, loss of land 
fertility and increased land segmentation due to high population (Nkurunziza, 2003:299-300). 
What Nkurunziza postulates may not necessarily be as a result of a literal resource scarcity, 




others as human beings by discriminating against them as “settlers,”56 thereby creating 
artificial resource scarcity and poverty in society. 
 
Access to economic power in Nigeria is constitutionally designed in such a way that the 
Federal Government allocates money to its citizens through the State and local governments 
(Ostien, 2009:34). This means that those who are in charge of these structures have direct 
access to the resources, while those who are denied political participation automatically do 
not access the resources. According to Mwadkwon (2001:58-64) and AmbeUva (2010:44-
51), why they are denied political and economic participation is because they are deemed 
“settlers.” The question is whether these “settlers” are recognized as human beings or not. Do 
they contribute to the economic development of the State? Do they pay taxes? Do they 
participate in building the State? If they do these things, excluding them from enjoying the 
benefits of Statehood amounts to injustice and by extension, denial of their essential 
humanity. This argument applies to all States where citizens are excluded and discriminated 
against because they are deemed ‘settlers.’ Yet, who is not a settler? When will the “settlers” 
return to their original Nation States? By the time that everyone is repatriated to their original 
Nation States, what kind of world will we have? Only through good governance, based on the 
principles of Suum-Ngi, can these destructive and divisive policies be turned around for the 
better. 
 
Good governance according to the Suum-Ngi model of religions-State relations advocates for 
a system of governance where every sector of the society is given fair treatment based on the 
political space available to them. Good governance, according to Peter, et al., (1997:i-iv) 
argues that “good governance focuses on integrity; it is not corrupt, not unfair, transparent, 
and integrity feeds into efficiency and effectiveness of the entire process of governance.” The 
entire essence of Church-State relations is to achieve good governance, where the citizens are 
at the centre of administration or governance and not a target of governance. Akokpari 
(2004), quoting from Jeffries (1993:27) also describes good governance as “a system of 
administration that is democratic, efficient, and development-oriented.” However, the World 
Bank (1981, 1999) has argued that:  
                                                 
56 According to Mwadkwon, 2001:58-60), as opposed to the indigenous people, settlers are those whose parents 
or great-grant-parents migrated to a community. Settlers are politically and economically excluded because they 
are said to return to their places of origin if they want socio-political and economic inclusion. This is a gross 
abuse of common humanity because people have constructed a condition that is valued above the common 




Good governance as transcending democratic set-up, frequent elections, and respect 
for human rights to include judicious use of resources, promotion of the private 
spheres as well as developing and nurturing formal and informal relations between 
government on the one hand and civil society, non-State entities and the international 
community, on the other hand 
These arguments tend to imply that Church-State relations that fail to promote good 
governance stand in need of being reconstructed to make them functional. 
 
The absence of good governance seems to be at the root of the violent conflict in Nigeria in 
general, and Jos in particular (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002:423; Danfulani, 2006:12; 
AmbeUva, 2010:50-51). Good governance, according to Akpokpari (2004: 243), “is a system 
of administration that is democratic, efficient and development-oriented.” AmbeUva 
(2010:51) adds the thought that, “in the absence of good governance, the ruling elite recourse 
to ethnic, regional, and religious appeal, thereby inflaming primordial identities of the 
masses.” AmbeUva further stresses that only a leadership that is transparent, accountable, and 
rises above primordial identities will be able to enhance the peaceful co-existence of both 
settlers and indigenes in Jos (2010:51).  
 
According to Epelle (2011:110), true democratic principles remain elusive in Nigeria with 
Jos at the flash-point of conflict since democracy returned in 1999. Indeed, Jos has never 
experienced peace because of the government’s inability to provide a level-playing field for 
all its residents. When power is construed as an instrument of destructive coercion, 
governance becomes immoral and impotent. A diffusion of power is necessary to prevent 
oppression because it is axiomatic that a disproportion of power leads to injustice no matter 
how it is mitigated (Niebuhr cited in Douglas, 2006:424). The lack of good governance is 
responsible for the concentration of political and economic power in modern societies, which 
then facilitates a surge in injustice within the society, while a diffusion of power is needed to 
deconstruct this. Good governance: 
Promotes participatory democracy, maintains human dignity, promotes cohesiveness, 
promotes equitable distribution of resources, promotes the rights of citizens to vote, 
promotes power sharing, and accommodates different opinions. Other principles of 
good governance include promotion of peace and unity, educating citizens about their 
rights, and promotion of economic participation (Ruwa, 2003:30-36).  
Ruwa (2001:9) equally enumerates several other principles of good governance which one 
could equate with the principles of the kingdom of God, which the Church ought to 




Accountability, honesty, justice, trust, worthiness, diligence, integrity, responsible 
leadership, preferential treatment for the poor, and respect for human rights.  
One could argue that these principles ought to constitute what the Church ought to use as 
yardsticks for holding the State accountable to social justice. Whenever the Church plays 
itself into the hands of the State it amounts to engaging in uncritical relations with the State. 
The Christian faith becomes a lived reality only when it includes a commitment to struggle 
for a transforming liberation of women and men in society (Ruwa, 2001:19). Bad governance 
however: 
Denies separation of power, denies political and economic participation, promotes 
disunity among citizens, lacks transparency and accountability, promotes abuse of 
human rights, manipulates electoral processes, promotes entrenched corruption and 
culture of impunity, mismanages public resources, discriminates against minorities, 
promotes growing rate of insecurity, and unemployment among the youth (Ruwa 
2001:36). 
One could equally argue that once there is a denial of human dignity, it feeds bad governance. 
This is because human dignity ought to be the essence of governance and every form of 
leadership. Authority is necessary for the unity of the State or society because its role is to 
ensure the common good of the society. Church-State relations constitute the use of 
constructive authority for the provision of expected socio-economic and political expectations 
of the governed (Ruwa, 2001:27). It is because of the role of Church-State relations in 
promoting good governance, without which the use of power becomes destructive, that this 
study has critiqued the deathly silence of the COCIN over lack of good governance in Plateau 
State, Nigeria. Nkurunziza (2003:307) also argues that: 
While good governance reduces levels of violent conflicts in the country, community, 
and organization, poor governance is a breeding ground for confrontation and armed 
conflicts. Where leadership or governance discriminates, it sets the society in flames. 
Nkurunziza (2003:310) goes on to state:  
To prevent conflicts from escalating to the level of violence, both the Church and the 
State leadership should be enlightened in terms of vision, creativity, and flexibility so 
that the emerging issues differences can be addressed in a constructive and creative 
manner for the benefit of all.  
Good governance is therefore a pre-requisite for the creation of peace, respect for human 
rights, and social progress (Ruwa, 2001:8). Indeed, it takes non-sectarian parents to keep a 
peaceful family. Parents who regard some of their children as tenants are building a lasting 
platform for violence because where justice is denied, violence takes over. The situation in 




them ‘settlers’ creates a conflictive atmosphere and is a recipe for public violence. If leaders 
fail not only to protect those who are regarded as settlers, but actively participate in 
discriminating against them (Obasanjo cited in Ostien, 2009:17-18), one can only imagine the 
extent to which citizens would handle foreigners in such societies. Good governance 
embraces everyone including foreigners. Part of the violent conflicts in Jos, Nigeria, is 
confirmed to be orchestrated and fuelled by top political leaders including the governors of 
the State (Ostien, 2009:16-24). This situation is uncalled for because it only demonstrates the 
political immaturity of politicians in the art of governance. Accordingly, Samuels (2006:3) 
argues that: 
Despite the fact that transition to democracy have been shown to be highly 
destabilizing and conflict prone, and that democratization without careful 
understanding of the pressures on the society can create conflict in itself, 
democratization should still be considered the best governance structure for long term 
conflict cessation. 
This argument appears valid but when democracy is misconstrued as governance restricted to 
indigenes and against settlers, then democracy is on the way to losing its true meaning. 
Democracy is about the equality of human beings and their human rights. In the immediate 
post-conflict environment, the adoption of true democratic principles can assist in the 
resolution of the struggle for power by providing an internationally acceptable standard of 
who is entitle to govern. This standard is based on an open and fair competition for power, 
structured around the popular vote. Moreover, conflict-mediating structures and increased 
opportunities for participation should encourage the non-violent resolution of conflict 
(Samuels, 2011:3). Democracy depends on the functioning of fair and free electoral 
processes. However, in the Plateau State, where according to Ostien (2009:4-8), elections are 
always marred by manipulation, democracy becomes a smoke screen behind which the 
minorities are marginalized and exploited by the majority. A major challenge of governance 
in Nigeria lies in the ability of the State to formulate policies that will eradicate 
discrimination among its citizenry. This is because the violent conflicts that have engulfed the 
nation since independence are ethno-religious and political in nature (Egwu 2005 cited in 
Ostien, 2009:7).  
 
The Nigerian State stands in need of total reconstruction in all the areas mentioned above. 
What Mugambi advocates for social reconstruction would take Ghani, et al., (2005, 2006a, 
2006b), ten features of nationhood that have to be accomplished in order to overcome State 





i. Legitimate monopoly on the means of violence; 
ii. Administrative control; 
iii. Sound management of public finances; 
iv. Investment in human capital; 
v. Creation of citizenship rights and duties; 
vi. Provision of infrastructure; 
vii. Market formation; 
viii. Management of State assets; 
ix. Effective public borrowing; 
x. Maintenance of rule of law.  
 
However, to achieve these features, a separation of power is also needed in religion. For 
example, when religion plays its role properly, it tends to facilitate the above principles of 
Statehood. Experience shows however, that attempts at State-building which ignore or 
oppose hybridity will encounter considerable difficulty in generating effective and legitimate 
outcomes. Strengthening central State institutions is unquestionably important, but if this 
becomes the main or only focus it threatens to further alienate local societies by rendering 
them passive, thereby weakening both a sense of local responsibility for overcoming 
problems and the local ownership of solutions (Ghani, et al., 2005, 2006a, 2006b).   
 
Discrimination on the basis of place of origin is strange to the concept of missio-Dei, which 
emphasizes responsible and caring community living (Deuoyo, 2014:64-68). It is therefore 
unfair and inhuman to involve all citizens in the economic contribution of society and then 
exclude some of them from the economic decisions that affect them on the ground, simply 
because they are deemed settlers (Ostien, 2009:16-18). Rapacious and imperial systems of 
leadership that force people into debt and dispossession of their political, economic, and 
human rights need to give way to a natural community. Joubert and Alfred (2007:3) describe 
this process as being: 
Similar to an organism, and individual people and groups are its organs. The organs 
of a healthy organism have different tasks and functions…yet, they all belong to the 
same organism. When living in such an organism, people gradually stop living 
according to principles of comparison, competition, [and place of origin], and start 
living according to principles of supplementing and supporting each other…All co-




‘I’ and they can therefore access survival abilities that they would not have as 
individuals.  
Over two decades ago, Mugambi (1991:36) also stressed that: 
Reconstruction is the new priority for African nations in the 1990s. The Churches and 
their theologians will need to respond to this new priority in relevant fashion, to 
facilitate this process of reconstruction. The process will require considerable efforts 
of reconciliation and confidence-building. It will also require reorientation and 
retraining.  
It can thus be argued that reconstruction remains a priority for African nations in the twenty-
first century as not much progress appears to have been made since the early 1990s. This 
theory is used to examine the COCIN’s strategy to connive and collaborate with the Plateau 
State that compromises its missional and prophetic witness. Any form of relationship 
between the Church and State that contributes to the exploitation of State resources that are 
meant to benefit everyone need to be reconstructed. Social reconstruction serves therefore as 
a lens to expose the true nature of the relationship between the ecclesial and the political 
institutions in the Plateau State and its contribution to engendering violence among its 
citizenry. 
 
Mugambi’s missio-political perspectives on Church and State relations is also advocated by 
Hendricks (2006:325), who argues that both institutions are accountable to a higher authority 
that calls for people’s needs to be  treated as holy.57  For example, within Jos, issues 
concerning the wellbeing of minority groups, the denial of access for settlers to the resources 
of the State are usually facilitated by religio-political policies that promote political exclusion 
and participation. Roshni (2012:293-294) argues that the social role of Christians is to love 
their neighbours and to promote policies that allow migrants to one day become neighbours. 
He advocates that migrants have to be welcomed and protected by the Church because all 
human beings are citizens in God’s household where they have equal rights and duties. It 
could indeed be argued that the COCIN’s relationship with the Plateau State is constructed on 
practising the politics of exclusion which appears to be similar to what the Muslim majority 
in the northern part of the country does to Christian minorities (Danfulani, 2006:18-20). Both 
religious institutions have put the narrow interests of their constituencies above that of the 
wellbeing of the society as a whole. By so-doing, they have compromised the future stability 
                                                 
57 According to Gwamna (2008:45), the root meaning of the word “holy” in the original Greek language means 
that which is set apart for godly use; anything separated, consecrated and held in respect as having a connection 




of the nation State and run the risk of unleashing uncontrollable forces that employ violence 
to achieve their objectives. The COCIN should therefore move beyond its self-seeking 
missional agenda and embrace a missio-Dei centred agenda that embodies a high standard of 
human rights towards all social groups because it is called to the ministry of reconciliation 
and forgiveness which is the only condition that justifies the Church being salt and light to 
the world (cf. Matt. 5:13). To break this violence breeding a religio-political system of 
‘divide and rule,’ a different way of thinking is needed in Jos that can nurture peace-building.  
 
Ostien (2009:7) is of the view that getting rid of discrimination by the government in Nigeria 
is impossible because everybody does it and has it.  But getting rid of discrimination may be 
impossible only when Nigerians continue to value social constructs above their common 
humanity that ought to bind them together as one people. Good governance is required to 
change discriminatory mentalities which are life-denying. For example, one instance that 
seems to show the absolute absence of good governance in Jos is that of the Peace 
Conference after the 2004 violence, called to reconcile the warring factions and rebuild peace 
in Jos. In this conference—which needs to be quoted at length because of its revealing 
insights—only key stake-holders were invited to discuss the way forward for peaceful co-
existence among the residents of Jos. The resolutions arrived at during the conference as cited 
by Ostien and Danfulani were: 
1. The Conference discussed the problem of Jos and re-affirmed the conclusion of the 
1994 Fiberesima Commission, which identified the true indigenes of Jos as Afizere, 
Anaguta and Berom. 
2. Delegates also advised that all peoples should learn to be proud of where they come 
from and to associate themselves with their places of origin.  
3. The Conference felt that with proper understanding of one another, integration and 
assimilation will ultimately come without intimidation and antagonism. 
4. The 1999 Constitution recognizes that every citizen has the right to contest for any 
elective position…but appointive positions anchored on representation should be 
done within the ambits of the Federal Character principle based on indigene-ship. 
5. Local Governments should only issue Indigene Certificates to indigenes of the 
respective Local Governments in Plateau State, as defined by the Conference. 
6. Other Nigerians who may be non-indigenes in a place should be issued with 
Residence Certificates backed by law. 
7. The Federal Government should include a definition of indigene in the 
Constitution…such a definition should be mindful of the minority rights as well as 
consistent with the Federal Character. 
8. Non-indigenes should desist from making frivolous demands on issues that are not 
their heritage, but the exclusive preserve of the indigenes, notably traditional ruler 
ship and traditional rites of indigenous communities. 
9. To allow for effective integration, assimilation and development, indigenes are not to 






Given the resolutions aimed to restore peace outlined above, one hardly sees where justice 
issues were raised.  
 
The fact that people at the grassroots were not present to voice out the real cause(s) of the 
violence makes the conference less than peace-building. All the resolutions seem to continue 
to blame the victim(s) because the settlers still had no place in the socio-political and 
economic space of the State. Sale Bayero, a Fulani herdsman, is reported to have lamented 
the level of discrimination meted against them by the Plateau State Government during the 
violence:  
Any society that refuses to be just and fair shall become a jungle where only jungles 
justice shall operate like the case of Plateau State today…So if you turn your State 
into a jungle State, this is what you get…we regret the unjust attitude of the State and 
the media for being silent when hundreds of Fulanis and their kinsmen were 
massacred. When our people were being killed, we cannot remembers seeing 
Governor Jang, the Gbong Gwom58 Jos, the Commissioner of Information, the 
members of the House of Assembly of the areas, neither did anyone say a word on 
our behalf…We observe with great dismay the outright taking of sides by the 
government (Osagie, The Guardian May 10 2010). 
This is an indication of the absence of good governance because if this allegation is 
confirmed, it means that only the indigenes deserve justice while those regarded as settlers 
can be killed. The lack of good governance also promotes under-development, especially at 
the grassroots where the so-called ‘settlers’ constitute the majority. According to Samuels 
(2011:9), good governance: 
Is able to build sustainable democratic institutions in peace-building. The design of 
the Constitution seeks both to create new democratic institutions to assure their 
protection in the longer term. Unless they are carefully designed and implemented, 
democratic institutions can ferment conflict in sharply divided societies like Nigeria. 
A poor governance framework will undermine the sustainability of peace. It can 
exacerbate the fault lines, divisions, and tensions in society; entrench conflict-
generating electoral or governance models, or provide basis for contesting the 
government.  
Democracy itself may not work if respect for human rights and human dignity is not upheld.  
 
Development according to Oye (2007:4) is defined as a military term: 
 When the enemy surrounds a community in an attack, the community is said to be 
‘enveloped’, but when the community or some third party is able to create an opening 
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for the citizens of the community to escape the attack, the community is said to have 
been ‘de-enveloped’ from that which kept them under siege.  
From this, one could conclude that development is a broad term that includes liberation, 
deliverance, redemption, and freeing people from all that denies them freedom and life. 
People at the grassroots are ‘enveloped’ by poverty, ignorance, injustice, oppression, and 
diseases of different kinds. These under-development factors keep them from realising their 
full potential as human beings. Accordingly, they turn to blame each other for their plight—
leading to making themselves cheap recruits for violent conflicts (Nkurunziza, 2003). 
Poverty enslaves because it renders people vulnerable and gullible to anything that occupies 
their minds and hands. Under-development and poverty at the grassroots is responsible for 
violent conflicts that have engulfed Plateau State over the years (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 
2002:432). Klein and Klein (2002:27) note that: 
Violent conflicts find fertile grounds in the exhaustion of renewable natural resources, 
stagnation of development, divergent ethnicity, and crises of power in the States. 
Hungry people may be angry people because basic human needs cannot be negotiated. M. K. 
Gandhi is quoted by Reeve (1984:102) as saying that “to a hungry man or woman, God 
himself is reluctant to appear except in form of food.” On the other hand, religions are 
responsible for ensuring that human rights, peace, and public morality are upheld. The 
Church has to speak when government fails to promote the common good of its citizens. The 
Church has to speak out against political dictatorship and all threats to civil and religious 
freedom and co-existence of its citizens. However, it takes a model of religions-State 
relations that stands where God stands and sees human beings as one to do this objectively 
(Boesak, 2005:169). The role of religions in the affairs of the society can best be implied 
from Antonio’s submission that: 
If a religion does not begin by undermining the bases of an unjust system, then it 
cannot claim any connection with the biblical concept of religion. For as the prophets 
and Jesus made it clear, the bible sees religion as a concrete practice of justice. 
Authentic acceptance of God means accepting a God who impels people to construct 
a more humane and fraternal world and to eradicate every trace of oppression. If one 
worships God who does not do that, one is worshipping a false god or idol (Antonio, 
1980:2). 
As the people of God, built on the values of the kingdom of God and centred on justice, 
peace, dignity of the human person, righteousness, truth, love, the special treatment and care 
of the marginalized (Ruwa, 2001:5) should be central in religions-State relations. For 
religions to ignore poverty and oppression, violence, injustice, and economic backwardness 




meaningless (Nkrumah, 1988:44). It could as well be argued that wherever people are 
reduced to abject poverty, everything goes in terms of what they will do in search of survival.  
 
The grassroots need to be developed just as the cities because there is no difference between 
the humanity of those at the grassroots and those in the cities. If a government becomes so 
divisive that it marginalizes the settlers and denies them common participation in the life of 
the society, despite their contribution to the State, this speaks volumes about whether the 
settlers may have basic necessities such as potable water, electricity, good roads and grazing 
land for their livestock. 
 
This is virtually the reason why local farmers and the Fulani cattle breeders are always 
clashing and causing violence in Nigeria (Mwadkwon, 2001:23-43). The government needs 
to recognize people at the grassroots according to their occupations in a way that they pursue 
their vocations without trampling on each other’s freedoms. Government used to keep 
government land reserves where cattle breeders graze their cattle, but most of these former 
reserves have now been turned into private farm lands while government remains silent 
because of their indirect support of these illegal actions. The cattle breeders are thereby left at 
the mercy of the farmers.  
 
Part of the gross under-development at the grassroots includes unemployment of school 
leaving young people without much hope of finding a job. The machinery of governance is 
continuously dominated by the older folk, who keep rotating the offices even when they seem 
to have become too old and unproductive. The youth with all their fresh ideas and academic 
qualifications are roaming the streets. This pool of unemployed youth feeds selfish and 
aggrieved politicians with mercenaries for violence when they lose elections (Phiri, 
2000:796). The unfortunate condition is decried by Mohammed Hamisu, “If government fails 
to engage us with something to do, Boko Haram will engage us” (The Guardian, 23 May 
2014). Therefore, peace-building is focused on grassroots development. When those who are 
used to cause disaffection and serve as mercenaries during violence are properly engaged in 
meaningful occupations, they will have less attraction to violence. When they are properly 
educated and informed about social values that are community-based, they will love each 
other. Development is said to be the first line of defence for a collective security system that 
takes prevention seriously because it makes everyone secure; but corruption or poverty is the 




leadership can be measured by the degree to which leaders are able to direct social 
reconstruction without destabilizing the society which he or she leads (Mugambi, 1995:13). 
This calls for radical resistance to greed because greed has costly consequences for the 
wholesome development of human communities (Hewitt, 2013:112). 
 
Security in this context includes safety of life, property, and acceptance as human beings. 
When people are secure, they tend to think more deeply on those things that make sense to 
them and how to plan their lives. Insecurity destabilizes every initiative and creativity of 
people because they live under perpetual fear. Insecurity is an enemy of development because 
the two cannot co-exist together. The current situation in Nigeria has made its citizens live in 
separate settlements and operate separate markets (Muslims and Christians) (Danfulani and 
Fwatshak, 2002:423), a situation that does not auger well for development to flourish. 
Insecurity also leads to poverty and food insecurity. 
 
In post-conflict peace-building, it is widely acknowledged that the provision of security is the 
sine qua non of peace-building, and increasingly that the building or rebuilding of public 
institutions is key to sustainability. However, a successful political governance transition 
must form the core of any post-conflict peace-building mission (Samuels, 2011:1-2). In line 
with Samuels’s position, governance transition may also call for a constitutional review 
because when the constitution is controversial, it feeds discrimination and violence. The 
constitution may also encourage the preferential treatment of indigenes at the expense of 
settlers; but no successful society is successful without settlers, especially in the globalized 
world with millions of migrants on the move. Peace is what the world is crying for. Nothing 
seems to work because whenever people are insecure, everything else comes to a standstill. 
 
This chapter also argues for the Suum-Ngi model of religions-State relations to be rooted 
within the various religions and the Plateau State elite, as well as in religious training 
institutions, where religious leaders are “manufactured.” Indeed a Suum-Ngi notion of peace 
needs to be mainstreamed in their curricula. When religious leaders grasp the idea of a peace 
based upon a Suum-Ngi worldview, this will permeate all sectors of the society because it will 
influence the political elite who wield State power and in the religious communities. The 
irreligious may not benefit from this but how many of them are there in society? If the 
majority of religious and political leaders are conscientized about the need to regard people 






7. 11. Integrating Suum-Ngi in the Curricula of Religious Training Institutions  
The missio-political role of religion, especially, in pluralist Nigeria, is to infuse the individual 
members of society in which it operates with the ideals of the Golden Rule and to challenge 
the political elite with the same message for the sake of peaceful co-existence (Phiri, 
2000:782). Oye (2007:4) observes that “the source of a river is better than the river itself 
because it determines how the river goes.” In a similar way, religious training institutions are 
the source of religious leaders. In other words, what religious leaders say and teach in their 
congregations is determined by the content and methodologies they learn from their time in 
seminary. Training institutions have some level of responsibility to equip religious leaders for 
public peace-building. Consequently, mainstreaming a Suum-Ngi notion of peace in the 
curricula59 may lead to life-affirming Church-State relations. 
 
This applies to all religious groups who have formal training institutions because Suum-Ngi 
also nurtures the principles of the Golden Rule which seems to be common to all religions. 
For Christians and Muslims to fulfil this mandate successfully, their religious leaders ought to 
be well equipped with the tools for doing so. The contention is that religious groups must 
resist being made irrelevant by the political parties and elite that have mushroomed in 
religious  pluralist Nigeria, and instead, focus their resources on teaching and challenging 
members and leaders of these organizations to integrate the Golden Rule into their political 
practise (Phiri, 2000:783). If the training institutions where religious leaders are raised do not 
provide them with adequate skills for promoting love and peace, this will be impossible. Love 
is said to be “the transforming ground of our life together” (Bryant, 1996:40). Love, for 
Gandhi, was “a potent instrument for social and collective transformation” (1996:44). 
 
Where there is love, peace flows; religious groups have all the privileges and opportunities 
for promoting love and peace in Nigeria because they continue to spread rapidly in the 
country. This means that they can reach and influence more and more people at the grassroots 
                                                 
59The term ‘curricula’ is the plural of curriculum. Fafunwa (1974: 210-211) defines curriculum as “a set of 
learning experiences open to learners under the guidance of schools.” He goes further to expand it to include the 
content of all values that a society cherishes and passes it from generation to generation. In this context, 
seminaries have their curricula which are the total contents of learning experiences used in equipping pastors 
and other lay leaders of the Church. Such curricula are expected to be holistic, covering relevant disciplines that 




level (Phiri, 2000:796). The influence of love and peace at the grassroots is critical to 
promoting a just-peace because it is at this level that people are recruited for violence by 
political opportunists (2000:796). Churches and Mosques also have the political elite in their 
congregations as members. Accordingly, they ought to use such opportunities to 
communicate the values of peace and self-less love to those elites who are the ones that reject 
election results and cause violence by mobilizing grassroots people (2000:796). All these 
opportunities that the religious groups have to spread the message of peace will be futile if 
our common humanity is not given priority in our relationships. 
  
It is pertinent to connect a balanced curriculum with self-less love because my lived 
experience in the seminary has helped me to understand that even when religious institutions 
want to mainstream courses such as Christian-Muslims relations in their curricula, students 
tend to avoid them because of anger. Nevertheless, such courses need to constitute ‘core 
courses’ and made mandatory to check this problem. Religious bodies ought to transcend 
“familiar love”60 to concrete and sacrificial love that calls for loving the neighbour and the 
enemy (Matt. 5:43-48 NIV). Just-peace is implicit in Suum-Ngi as it calls for Church-State 
relations that treat people as human beings and not according to social constructs. The 
Church has the resources to promote a just-peace by reconstructing the curricula of its 
seminaries to equip pastors with the tools for promoting a just-peace. 
 
Because most religious leaders in Nigeria are products of seminaries and Qur’anic schools 
(Oye, 2007:4); what they do and how they do what they do depends on these training 
institutions and their curricula. Some of their sermons and teachings are full of anger, hatred, 
vengeance, and resentment:  
Enough is enough! We do not have a third cheek to turn! The Sermon on the Mount is 
not for this age! Mohammed was a murderer! Mohammed is an anti-Christ! While 
God sent His Son into the world at the moment when the Roman Empire was at the 
height of its glory, the Devil sent his prophet to an ignorant people with no heritage of 
either law or literature, to whom the Koran is easily a miracle! If you vote for a 
Muslim in the forthcoming elections, you have betrayed Jesus Christ and His Church 
(Miller cited in Barnes, 2004:65).  
The same thing goes for Islamic schools where scholars are trained. A theology of peace 
ought to be mainstreamed in Qur’anic Schools to equip Islamic preachers with the skills of 
                                                 
60 I used “familiar love” in this context to refer to “professed love” which is never translated into action. This is 
love that is cheap and non-sacrificial. Love that is sacrificial extends to even those who may be different from 




promoting a just-peace in the course of their preaching. Pronouncements such as the 
following are not pro-peace perspectives on life at all: 
Have nothing to do with the kafirs (infidels) because Allah has ordained that we 
eliminate them or asked them to pay the required tax if they want to stay with us, to 
ascribe a son to Allah is the worst idolatry, those who oppose Sharia Law are infidels 
(Nasir, 2004:34). 
What Nigerians need is to see religion as a means of promoting community living as 
Onabanjo (a Muslim) has argued:  
I come from a part of the country where, within the same family, you have got 
Muslims, Christians, Pagans, and it does not mean anything. My father was from the 
Anglican Church, my mother a Catholic; my children are going to the Catholic 
Church; that is their business. But I know that we all practice religion, and we live by 
the principles of the Golden Rule (cited in Kukah, 1993:123). 
The destructive comments from preachers of religion in the name of the Creator are sign-
posts of an imbalanced training curriculum in the various training institutions. To rectify this 
situation, mainstreaming African theology of peace in the curriculum of the seminaries and 
Qur’anic Schools is necessary.  
 
Integrating a Suum-Ngi theology of peace in the curricula of religious training institutions is 
aimed at equipping pastors and theologians with tools in order to be effective in engaging in 
the process of peace creation and conflict resolution. It is aimed at ensuring that theologians 
and future pastors who are trained are able to deal with the peace-challenges in their parishes 
and the wider society. If the Church is to fulfil its aim of being an agent of peace, unity, and 
reconciliation in a deeply divided Nigerian society, integrating peace theology in the 
curriculum of Gindiri Theological Seminary is inevitable and this is relevant and consistent 
with the new global challenges and needs of the global agenda. Mainstreaming a Suum-Ngi 
theology of peace in the curriculum also means radically overhauling the whole purpose, aim 
and content of theological education, including the methodologies and processes by which 
learning takes place. The impotent values and cultures of the local context need to be 
deconstructed and reconstructed by going beyond the mere addition or subtraction of peace-
related courses on the existing curriculum to supplanting the impotent ideologies. 
Djomhoue (2013:642) refers to the underlying impotent ideologies as a “hidden curriculum.” 
The “hidden curriculum” ought to be replaced with more life-giving and pro-peace mind-sets 
that accommodate all people according to the values of the kingdom of God (Matt. 9:50; 





Mainstreaming a Suum-Ngi peace theology in the curriculum involves the deliberate and 
collective reformulation of a public policy concept of transforming the entire theological 
enterprise by assessing the different implications for just-peace and peace-building in society 
(Djomhoue, 2013:643). It offers a pluralistic approach that values diversity in religious, 
political, and ethnic groups—a strategy of concrete steps towards policies and programmes 
that give birth to something new in political, economic, and religious spheres so that diverse 
groups benefit from just-peace (2013:644). Mainstreaming a Suum-Ngi theology of peace 
means hatching, causing, inducing, provoking, exciting, and stimulating new thinking leading 
to the reformulating and reformation of theological education based on a just peace informed 
by an African worldview, which is both relevant and life-affirming for a pluralist Nigeria 
(2013:644). 
 
The call to mainstream a Suum-Ngi theology of peace in the curricula of religious institutions 
is not only necessary but a prophetic stance. This argument is also justified by the social 
realities in Nigeria, which Awoniyi (2012:502-505) describes as:  
The Nigerian plurality calls for African theology of peace to promote inter-religious 
dialogue; the desire for better interaction between the religious groups; the promotion 
of just peace in the country; the promotion of unity of humanity; the rise of religious 
extremism; the politicization of religion by politicians for political ends, and the 
endemic religious exclusivism, particularity, and unhealthy competition between 
Muslims and Christians, need to be corrected through an African model of peace that 
focuses on the one-ness of humanity.  
Martin Luther King Jr. also describes the global woes that justify a search for peace: 
Through our scientific and technological genius, we have made of this world a 
neighbourhood and yet we have not had the ethical commitment to make of it a 
brotherhood or sisterhood. But somehow, and in some way we have got to do this. 
We must all learn to live together as brothers and sisters or we will all perish as fools. 
We are tied together in a single garment of destiny, caught in an inescapable network 
of mutuality. And whatsoever affects one directly affects all indirectly. For some 
strange reason I can never be what I ought to be until others are what they ought to 
be. And others can never be what they ought to be until I am what I ought to be. This 
is the way the universe is made; this is the way it is structured (King Jnr. cited in 
Chunakara, 2013:67-68).  
Nigerian’s need religions that are proactive in promoting peace instead of being only reactive 
when violence takes place. Being pro-active means that the Church radically reconstructs its 
ministry in such a way that it focuses on peace-building. This should be seen in every aspect 




excludes peace-building. It is hardly justifiable for a nation such as Nigeria, where almost 
everything portrays religious colouration, to be a victim of religious crises. God cannot be 
competed for because God cannot be owned by any religious group. 
 
For the Church, to exercise a critical distance to the State while fulfilling its responsibility 
towards its citizenry inevitably means speaking out against State policies that promote 
discrimination and exploitation. The promotion of social justice in society constitutes the 
inescapable missio-political mandate of the Church. Boesak’s theory of critical solidarity and 
distance is therefore relevant to the Nigerian and Jos context where oppressive policies that 
foster alienation and engender coercive violence are prevalent. For example, policies that 
give more religio-political recognition and status to indigenes than settlers function just like 
apartheid laws once did. Should the COCIN be found supporting such oppressive policies 
then it too would have seriously compromised its ministry and mission. 
 
Nwafor (2002:106-108) emphasises that the missio-political responsibility of the Church in 
Nigeria is to make citizens more confident, more courageous and conscious of their rights 
and duties in order to be socially responsible, creative and useful. These duties constitute the 
urgent challenge of the Church in Nigeria, a country where human rights have been abused 
by those who hold the reins of State power. Wole Soyinka (1996) the famous Nigerian 
playwright and poet has reinforced the views of ordinary Nigerians when he states that the 
Church in Nigeria should take a stand against the exploitation and impoverishment of the 
common citizen. 
 
For the Church and State to become positive agents of peace-building within Jos, in addition 
to an indispensable commitment to social reconstruction, they must also embrace a healthy 
conversational relationship of critical solidarity and distance. Likewise, in order for the 
Church to nurture its missio-political identity and witness, it should embrace a contextual 
theology of inculturation that can effectively appropriate a life giving praxis of the Christian 
message that meets the felt needs of all the people within Jos.  
 
The central message of inculturation that makes it a relevant lens for critiquing the 
relationship of Church/State relations in Jos is based on the notion that when the Christian 
message is not rooted in the cultural context of people, it tends to enslave rather than liberate 




people’s understanding of the liberating message of the Christianity as argued by Waliggo 
(cited in Hewitt, 2012:17).61 Inculturation offers itself as an important lens for critiquing how 
the COCIN uses religion within the socio-political and economic context in her relations with 
the State. If the Christian gospel is truly good news, it should foster peace-building and social 
change. The lack of proper inculturation of the Christian gospel within the context of the 
people can lead to religious fundamentalism that escalates intra- and inter-religious violence 
within society (Jain, 2004:399).  
 
When Church leaders fail to confront corrupt State officials, on the grounds that they may be 
their relatives or persons that make significant contributions to Church funds, then it implies 
that the church has been compromised by narrow political and economic motives. Indeed, 
when the Church fails to appropriate positive elements within a local culture because of a 
missionary legacy of prejudicial bias against cultural meaning systems that emerge from 
indigenous roots, then the Christian message of hope and salvation loses its capacity to go 
deep into the local culture. When the SUM or the COCIN welcome financial aid from the 
State to maintain its schools, the State came in to rescue the Church, but the Church did not 
realize that it was also handing over its prophetic voice with her schools to the government 
(Ahanotu, 1977:335-336; Igboin, 2012:4-5). As a result, the Church bought itself into an 
uncritical relationship with oppressive structures to the extent that its prophetic voice became 
severely compromised. 
 
It is true that when religion is placed above human life, it becomes a curse and destructive to 
that which it is supposed to protect. Integrating peace theology in theological education and 
ministerial formation is pertinent because it may curtail some of the religious excesses that 
have overtaken the country. When the Church in Nigeria reorganizes its training institutions 
by integrating peace theology in the curricula, its pastors and other leaders will be better 
equipped to create more space for a just-peace to take root in a pluralistic Nigeria.  
 
                                                 
61 Inculturation asserts the right of all people to enjoy and develop their own culture, the right to be different and 
live as authentic Christians, while remaining truly themselves at the same time. It makes Christianity at home in 
the culture of each people, thus, reflecting its universality. It becomes a prophetic and liberating movement, 
which rejects colonial Christianity and proclaims the liberty of all peoples to serve God within their own basic 
worldview, thus, eliminating the constant danger of dualism or dichotomy in their lives (Waligo cited in Hewitt, 
2012:17). When religious matters divide families to the extent of taking arms against one another and inflicting 
injuries or taking lives (particularly among Christians), it calls into question whether the liberating Gospel has 




The above argument is justified by the realities in Nigeria, which Awoniyi (2012:502-505) 
describes:  
The Nigerian plurality calls for Suum-Ngi to promote inter-religious dialogue; the 
desire for better interaction between the religious groups; the promotion of just-peace 
in the country; the promotion of unity of humanity against the rise of religious 
extremism; the politicization of religion by politicians for political ends, and the 
endemic religious exclusivism, particularity, and unhealthy competition between 
Muslims and Christians, need to be corrected through an African model of peace that 
focuses on the one-ness of humanity.   
Nigerians need religions-State relations that are not only reactive when violence takes place, 
but pro-active. This means that the Church needs to radically reconstruct its ministry in such 
a way that it focuses its attention and vision on peace-building. This should be seen in every 
aspect of its programmes and institutions. There should be nothing in religious affairs that 
excludes peace-building. It is hardly justifiable for a nation such as Nigeria, where almost 
everything portrays religious colouration, to be a victim of religious crises. Suum-ngi 
philosophy or world view comes close to Rastafarianism, which ought to be alluded to as a 
similar Afrocentric model: 
 
Rastafari and black hermeneutic model 
  
Suum-ngi model of religions-state relationship, as an Afrocentric model, comes very close to 
yet another Afrocentric model that ought to be alluded to: Rastafari and Black Hermeneutic 
model. In terms of history, Rastafarianism was a religious and cultural movement that 
originated among the Black Jamaicans. It has its roots in the philosophy of Marcus Garvey 
but generally, it emerged as Black Jamaicans’ reaction to Western colonialism and 
domination of the Blacks in the 1930s (Encarta Premium, 2009). However, since the early 
sixteenth century, the history of Jamaica has been associated successively with slavery, 
Christian Evangelism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, which gave rise to numerous 
revolutions, riots and various other forms of social unrest. Black Jamaicans have always lived 
in a constant state of resistance, a mentality that gave birth to, in the early thirties, a Jamaican 
religion (Rastafari). 
 
 Basic Teachings of Rastafarianism  
 
Marcus Masiah Garvey is believed to be the brain behind the origin and development of 
Rastafarianism because of his prophetic utterance concerning the Black King to be crowned 




deified as “the living God” or the “Black God of Africa or the Black race” (Encarta 
Premium, 2009). Among the earliest Evangelists of Rastafarianism were Joseph Hibbert, 
Archibald Dunkley, Ferdinand Rickketts, Vernal Davis, and Leonard Howell. All of them 
preached and upheld the dignity and return of the oppressed Black Jamaicans to Africa, the 
Promised Land. 
Rastafarianism takes its origins from Ethiopianism, and ancient ideological matrix, created 
from and around the name Ethiopia originating from Black worlds (Shepperson, 1968: 249). 
This was inspired by the “Ethiopian references in the bible which had a liberating promise 
and which, when contrasted with the indignities of the plantation bondage, showed the Black 
man [and woman] in a dignified and humane light (Shepperson, 1968: 249). To the 
Ethiopianists, “Ethiopia” had a broader meaning than the present East African country. 
Formally known as “Abyssinia, Ethiopia referred to Africa, the home of the Black race, 
where all the Blacks in diaspora and under captivity to the whites shall return (Shepperson, 
1968: 249, Stewart, 1988: 280).  
Ethiopianists ideology advocated the purity and greatness of Africans in reaction to white 
Christianity which conveyed the image of primitive, pagan, and hideous Africa (Stewart, 
1988: 283). African consciousness developed and gave rise to many Pan-African preachers 
who were of significant importance in the early twentieth century Jamaica. Therefore, either 
Pan-Africanism or Ethiopianism was a dream of returning to Africa, the original land of the 
Black race where peace and human dignity would reign among the oppressed Blacks.  
     
 
 
Similarity between Suum-ngi and Rastafari  
 
Apart from the fact that both ideologies are Afrocentric, they also look forward to a common 
origin: the Rastafarians look to Africa or Ethiopia while suum-ngi believes that all human 
beings are returning to their common origin; wild yams tuber (Pokol and Chammah, 2015: 7-
9). In the context of this study, both ideologies advocate a return from human crises to where 
life-giving community is found: Suum-ngi proposes a return to common humanity or 
humanness, while Ratsafari advocates a return to Africa as the Promised Land where the 
oppressed Blacks will be free. While suum-ngi regards yams tuber as creator, Rastafri regards 
Haile Salessie as God of the Blacks, the redeemer. Suum-ngi is postulated in this study as an 
alternative Afrocentric model of religions-state relations in search of peace-building within 




postulated Rastafarianism in search of liberation from white oppression and domination. 
Whether these two are ideologies or not, Mugambi has argued that in the context of 
liberation, the difference between ideology and theology becomes blurred (2003:62). So 
Garvey advocated “Look to Africa for the crowning of a Black King, he shall be the 
redeemer” and Suum-ngi advocate: “Look back to humanity, sharing common origin, 
common essence, and moving back to common origin”. Again, Rastafarians stress the 
supremacy of life because human nature is very important and should be preserved and 
respected and protected (Owen, 1973: 167-170, Jagessar, JPIC, and Rastafarians, 1991: 15-
17). They also uphold the sanctity of nature and the environment just as suum-ngi which ties 
human life to the environment (Pokol and Chammah, 2015: 9-11). 
 
Dissimilarities between Suum-ngi and Rastafari  
 
Despite their similarities, there are also dissimilarities between the models being discussed: 
First, while Suum-ngi calls for the entire human race, regardless of skin colour, to consider 
humanity as the common denominator that binds them all together and utilize is as basis for 
peace-building (Pokol and Chammah, 2015: 8-9), Rastafari calls only the Black race to return 
to Africa, which may not be a common denominator to the entire human race. However, as 
Roderick Hewitt argues (2012: xx), “Rastafarianism is a response to the white domination as 
well as a shaper of Afrocentric identity and a counter cultural critique through its integrative 
use of language, religion and music”. Hewitt further argues that Rastafarianism has emerged 
as an indigenous response that challenges ideas about life. Instead of European image of 
Christ, their message portrays the Emperor of Ethiopia, a Black man [or woman] as the true 
and living God who has returned to earth as the messiah (2012: xxi). Both ideologies have a 
lot for African Christianity to learn from. 
Second, while suum-ngi calls for equality of humanity and equal treatment, Rastafari 
advocates for a shift of position where the Blacks will now take the superior place occupied 
by the whites. In this case, one could argue that suum-ngi has an all-inclusive perspective 
while Rastafari focuses on a local place and section of the human race. However, both of 
them have a place in African Christianity and the need to recognize the dignity of humanity. 
Whether it is in Jamaica alone or the entire human race, injustice anywhere is injustice 






7.12. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I postulated and argued for the adoption of a Suum-Ngi model of religions-
State relations. I explained that a Suum-Ngi worldview emerged from the Kadung ethnic 
group of Nigeria as a creation worldview. This worldview stressed the common human-ness 
of all human beings as the basis of peace-building and living in peace across every form of 
diversity that human beings have constructed for themselves. Accordingly, this model may 
serve as a life-giving model because of its contextual nature and emphasis on that which is 
common in every human being. However, there are limitations with this understanding 
because of the implications on gender justice that must be handled with great care because it 
may encourage patriarchy.  
 
The historical models of Church-State relations arose in the history of Western Christianity 
and therefore seemed to have failed to foster peace-building in Plateau State, Nigeria, and 
therefore a more contextual model is needed. Religions and the Plateau State seem to have 
relations based on unjust models which have only served to facilitate discrimination against 
the minority groups and feeding violence among its citizens.  
 
The main argument for postulating the Suum-Ngi model is that it offers a more contextual 
model that is common and accessible to all the communities in the Plateau State. The model 
calls for consideration of our common humanity, common origins, common essence, and 
common destination as basis of treating each other justly.  
 
The chapter also argues that Suum-Ngi is related to the entire redemptive agenda of the 
Creator because it is linked to the incarnation of the Creator sharing in the common humanity 
of us all, which the Church ought to emulate and proclaim by word and action in its relations 
with the State. The unity of humanity ought to inform all models of Church-State relations 
because no single human being can survive the challenges of this world alone. Mugambi’s 
(1995:ix) argument becomes relevant for understanding the principles of our common 
humanity: 
 It is clear that in this spaceship-earth, we ought not to behave as if anyone of us 
could jump out and survive alone. In this space-ship-boat-earth cruising on a perilous 
ocean of space, none of us ought to puncture the bottom or try to jump out—we have 
all to sail together. The ‘us’ versus ‘them’ syndrome is self-destructive because there 
is only one side for all of us to join—either mutual reconstruction or mutual 




African situation. Africa needs winner versus winner configurations, in which all 
contestants participate for future reconstruction, having learnt from the error of their 
past involvements. 
Only if people remain conscious of their essential unity as human beings can violence begin 
to lose its grip and give way to a just peace and the establishment of a life-giving community. 
Conflicts may remain but destructive violence must come to an end so that all Nigerians can 
live in peace. 
 
Finally, for a Suum-Ngi model to be effective and more life-affirming, an integration of 
Suum-Ngi is needed in the curricula of the major religious institutions of training, where 
religious leaders are produced. This is aimed at equipping religious leaders with tools that are 
relevant for promoting a just and public peace in the Plateau State, and the nation in general. 
Suum-Ngi also serves as a context and reminder for good governance as expressed in the 
socio-political and economic participation of the residents. Grassroots development and 
security of life and property are also aspects of Suum-Ngi because when people are 
recognized as human beings, they deserve attention wherever they are. The model is also 
relevant to the entire Church in Nigeria because being a pluralist context, religious training 
institutions have a responsibility to produce pro-peace leaders to facilitate peace-building 
across the nation. 
 
The chapter also alluded to Rastafari and black hermeneutic model because of its similarity 
and Afrocentric nature. Both ideologies call for the recognition of human dignity and respect 





SUMMARY, RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION 
 
8.1. Introduction 
In this concluding chapter, I will summarize the research objectives as well the method and 
the outcome of the research. The appropriation of a Suum-Ngi model of religions-State 
relations will also be provided as well as contribution of the study to knowledge. Sign-posts 
for future research will also be suggested at the end.  
 
This study has focused on Church-State relations with particular emphasis on identifying and 
critiquing the relationship between the COCIN and the Plateau State, Nigeria, within the 
context of violent conflict in Jos. The research problem that guided the study sought to 
identify and critique the nature of relations that existed between the COCIN and the Plateau 
State with the aim of assessing the extent to which it fed the experience of violence in Jos. 
The hypothesis that was set to be proved in the process of the research stated that:  
 
The violence that engulfed Jos from 2001-2010 was fed, to some extent, by 
an unhealthy Church-State relations between the COCIN and the Plateau 
State, which inhibited effective counter measures and building of peace. 
 
The main objective of the study sought to examine whether, and in what ways, the nature of 
Church-State relations that existed between the COCIN and the Plateau State facilitated or 
inhibited the process of peacebuilding among the residents of Jos. To fulfil these objectives, 
the missio-political factors that shaped Church-State relations in Nigeria since colonial and 
post-colonial periods were systematically analysed. A critical evaluation of the colonial and 
post-colonial natures of Church-State relations between the two entities was also undertaken.  
A missio-political critique was utilized to interrogate the nature of relationship that exists 
between the COCIN and the Plateau State and to further examine how the COCIN and the 
Plateau State relate in implementing their mandates of God in Jos. The framework was 




theory of critical solidarity and distance by Boesak, and the theory of Church and culture that 
is embodied in the theology of inculturation advocated by Hewitt. All the theories intersected 
and offered a tri-polar lens within the missio-political framework of Plateau State, through 
which the COCIN and Plateau State relations are examined. They argued that the missional 
identity and vocation of the COCIN necessitates that they practice critical solidarity with the 
State but must also embrace a critical distance from any life-denying policies of the State 
which discriminate against minorities. The Plateau State ought to cultivate the art of good 
governance by ensuring that its personnel and systems of administration, resource allocation 
and distribution are carried out fairly and justly in the pluralist context of the city of Jos, 
because the State is called to serve all its citizens without discrimination on the basis of 
religion, political affiliation, race, class, or ethnicity, indigenes, and or settlers (Hendricks, 
2006:325; Ambe-Uva, 201051; Bayero, 2010:1).  
 
 
8.2 Recapitulation  
The study sought to answer the key research question that guided it:  
 
To what extent have the colonial and post-colonial Church-State relations 
between COCIN and the Plateau State served to foster peace-building 
among the residents of Jos, Plateau State?  
 
In the purist form of systematic literature review method that was utilised, the relevant textual 
data from the ATLA Religious Database, Archival materials from the Plateau State and 
COCIN’s archives, hand-searched published and unpublished sources were identified, 
reviewed, and analysed that involved a large body of literature on Church-State relations 
within the parameters set by the key research question. Particular emphasis was given to 
literature within Nigeria and the wider sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The review, evaluation, and analysis of the literature in general revealed interesting 
information concerning the different models of Church-State relations that had emerged from 
the development of Western Christianity. Out of the many models, ultimate focus was 
centred on the Greco-Roman model, Constantinian model, and the Reformation model, as 




and weaknesses were pointed out in order to identify those elements that may contribute 
peace and those that may not. Consistent with all of the models is that they are attractive to 
the political and religious elites in the society to usually oppress the poor, uninfluential, and 
the minority groups within society.  
 
These three models served to examine the development of Church-State relations in Nigeria 
with particular emphasis on the COCIN-Plateau State relations. In mapping the early 
development of the colonial and missionary relations that unfolded within Nigeria’s diverse 
cultural quilt, the instruments of divide and rule colonial policies and the policy of indirect 
rule in northern Nigeria, which tended to separate the northern States from the southern 
States based on exploiting differences linked to religion, politics, and ethnicity were 
identified. The colonial policies therefore sowed the seeds of division, which affected 
Church-State relations. Muslim and Christian communities also used their religious divisions 
as fertile grounds for competition for religio-political supremacy. Christian missionaries 
belonging to the SUM, the majority of which are focused in northern Nigeria and the Middle 
Belt (Barnes, 2007:593-598), were prevented by the colonial State evangelising in Muslim 
rule areas and this colonial restriction on missionary work among the Muslims influenced the 
SUM/COCIN Church-State-separation model of relations during the colonial era.  
 
The colonial era missionary theologies also played an important role in shaping Church-State 
relations. The SUM, being Protestant-Evangelical by theological tradition, did not teach its 
converts how to participate in politics but to withdraw into their own ‘safe’ space of 
engagement. It was not until the time of Nigerian Independence from its former British 
colonial masters that the policy changed in order to defend the interests of the Church. This 
was the continuation of a reactionary response that opted for an incestuous partnership that 
did not reflect the constructive principles of politics within a pluralist context such as Nigeria.  
 
The missional legacy of the SUM resulted in a financially-dependent COCIN that could not 
sustain its educational and healthcare institutions financially on its own without grant-in-aid 
support from the State. This led to the change of relations from Church-State-separation to 
Church-State-partnership. This model of partnership was built primarily on the need of State 
financial support and thereby disenabled the COCIN to maintain a critical solidarity and 




securing financial support from the State created a relationship of co-habitation between the 
two institutions that was unjust to other institutions in the State. 
 
Another important issue that emerged from the literature had to do with what could be 
classified as factors that suggest discriminatory behaviour and bad governance by State 
officials that also belong to the COCIN. Especially in a pluralist society, the government 
must be transparent in governance and be neutral and accommodative to all its citizens. When 
this is absent, then community members may resort to violent methods to obtain justice.  
 
The State elites failed to realize that community is a natural breeding ground for trust and 
solidarity, which can only be destroyed through violence (Joubert and Alfred, 2007:2-3). 
Joubert and Alfred further argue that: “If this humus is missing, the uprooted human beings 
become violent” (2007:3). The sense of community is lost when leaders who are supposed to 
promote solidarity become participants in divisive policies that result in violence. Joubert and 
Aldred (2007:3) further state that: 
A natural community is similar to an organism, and the individual people and groups 
are its organs. The organs of a healthy organism have different tasks and functions; 
the liver acts different from the kidney and the brain acts different from the heart, and 
yet they all belong to the same organism. When living in such an organism, people 
gradually stop living according to principles of comparison and competition, and start 
living according to principles of supplementing and supporting each other. The 
system could not work otherwise…As the organism emerges, a new mental-spiritual 
subject develops: the communitarian ‘I’. This ‘I’ is at a higher level order in the 
spiritual hierarchy of life than the individual ‘I’. The communitarian ‘I’ contains 
knowledge and the power of all individual ‘I’s’. All different organs that are solidly a 
part of the community are connected to the communitarian ‘I’ and its mental-spiritual 
powers, and they can therefore access survival abilities that they would not have as 
individuals. 
The violent conflicts that erupted in Jos from 2001-2010 were linked to religio-political 
(Christians and Muslims) and socio-economic factors. The COCIN failed to mediate peace 
through dialogue of life between the warring factions in the State. Instead, the literature 
seems to reveal an incestuous kind of relations between the COCIN leadership and the State. 
The Church-State failed to include all sectors of society in life-giving policies and decisions 
that concern their human dignity and rights. It amounts to denial of their human-ness as well 
as peace-building and co-existence in society. In view of this, the two institutions that were 
meant to protect and promote the well-being of society became part of the problem that 




relationship which facilitated acts of discrimination against its citizens and the 
marginalization of its minorities. 
 
The development of COCIN-State relations witnessed nothing fundamentally different from 
those models that emerged from those developed and practiced in early Western Christianity. 
When Church and State relations fail to focus on promoting social justice, it feeds violence. 
This became evident when the Plateau State and the COCIN practised policies that resulted in 
the marginalization of non-indigenes; justice is then denied and violence becomes an option. 
In view of this, this thesis has argued that an alternative model is urgently needed which can 
be more contextual and relevant for the COCIN and the Plateau State. Such a model should 
be deeply embedded in the cultural context of the people so as to foster a meaningful peace-
building process for all the residents of Jos, Plateau State. 
 
Accordingly, this study has postulated a Suum-Ngi model of Church-State relations for the 
COCIN and the Plateau State to serve as an alternative model that can be more life-giving 
and accommodating because it calls for the recognition of a common humanity as binding 
upon all people regardless of what they have constructed for themselves in the society. The 
Suum-Ngi model states that people are human beings before they chose to belong to any 
religion, political party, social class, or those who have rejected or abandoned religion. The 
Suum-Ngi model emphasizes that all human beings come from the same Creator, share a 
common origin and essence and move towards a common destination, where each person 
shares a common humanity with equal dignity, equal identity, equal rights and an equal 
standing before their Creator. The recognition of a common humanity seems to be the only 
way to stop detrimental social constructs from dividing and denying us a peaceful co-
existence. A Christian is no more human than a Muslim; a European settler is no less human 
than an indigene; an African Traditional religionist is no less human than any of these. I 
further stress that the Suum-Ngi model might also serve to remind the COCIN and Plateau 
State that religion and politics can be chosen and can be changed, but humanity and human-
ness cannot be changed. They are non-negotiables. One may leave one religion or political 
party and still find another, but one cannot lose the essence of what it means to be truly 
human through religious violence and find another life.  
 
The Suum-Ngi model that is postulated for the COCIN and the Plateau State serves to support 




What holds a political society together is the actual process of politics. Politics allows 
persons and groups that have differing aspirations to live together in relative peace 
and to cooperate in limited ways for the sake of specific benefits. Whenever politics 
seeks to be more than this, it inevitably becomes far less. This process is what makes 
a political society. Political societies are where there is distribution of power or 
sovereignty to a plural number of centres of initiative and are forced, thereafter, to 
create a social unity through that process of conflict, negotiation, and compromise 
which we call “politics.” [Only] non-political societies do not seek to distribute power 
to a plural number of centres of initiative, but tend to rely on a single centre of 
initiative (e.g. a strong president, a dominant political party [or religious group] or a 
technological elite) to wield power and to establish social order (Moltmann 1974:97). 
A political society is meant to be life-giving because it focuses on the diffusion of power and 
the promotion of the common good of all. When people’s dignity and rights are denied in a 
pluralist society such as Plateau State, Nigeria, where some sections of its citizenry were 
denied socio-political and economic participation on the basis that they were foreigners, it 
amounted to denial of their essential human-ness and violence becomes an option for the 
marginalized. 
 
The Suum-Ngi model also calls for peace-building measures which include the political and 
economic inclusion of all its residents to enable them to experience what it means to live fully 
as human beings. Political and economic justice calls for good governance, which will ensure 
that development of people is given its proper priority. Development in this context means 
the liberation of people from all life-denying challenges that make people resort to violence 
in the society. I made a case that development was the first line of defence because it makes 
people secure. Development also ensures the security of life and property of all residents. I 
also advocated for the integration of the Suum-Ngi model of peace in the curricula of 
religious training institutions and theological formation schools to equip religious leaders and 
preachers with the proper tools for peace-building among their members for improved co-
existence in pluralist contexts. Some of the things that facilitate religious radicalism and 
intolerance in a society may be taught or excluded from the curricula or religious training 
institutions, which leads to little or no inter-religious dialogue. This appears to inform the 
reason why religious leaders preach and teach hatred to the members. It could also be argued 
that the Suum-Ngi model of religions-State could also be integrated into Church Constitutions 
and Youth Programmes because the youth are usually the perpetrators or victims of violence. 
One can further argue that the model could as well be enshrined within the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria and the curricula of all tertiary education institutions in the 




That said, there is no claim that the Suum-Ngi model of religious-State relations will 
automatically or magically solve the problem of violence in Nigeria but it has the potential 
for doing so as a culturally-based resource for life-giving relations that transcend mere social 
constructs (Deuoyo, 2013:209).  This research offers the model as a contribution that may 
facilitate the process of peacebuilding among the warring factions in Jos, Nigeria. 
 
 
8. 3. What Should Church-State Relations Focus On? 
It is my suggestion that, apart from the need to appropriate the principles of Suum-Ngi in 
order to promote good governance in the Plateau State for the common good of all its 
residents in Jos, peacebuilding ought to move to the centre of Church-State relations. This is 
to facilitate a realization in the city of Jos according of the world envisioned by Archbishop 
Oscar Romero: 
A vision of a world [or Jos] which reflects the reign of God, and where justice, 
peace, truth, freedom and solidarity prevail. A world [or Jos] where the dignity of the 
human person, made in the image of God, is paramount. A world [or Jos] that does 
not know what exclusion, discrimination, violence, intolerance or dehumanizing 
poverty are, rather a place where the goods of the earth are shared by all and creation 
is cherished for future generations. It is a place where all people, especially the 
poorest, marginalized, and oppressed, find hope and are empowered to come to the 
fullness of their humanity as part of the global community (Romero cited in Neufeldt, 
et al., 2002:4). 
Wherever there is life, there is hope for a better future. As a Church, the COCIN may do well 
to rework the nature of its relations with oppressive structures because, as Romero once 
declared against El-Salvadorian oppressive structures:  
It is time to recover your consciences and to obey your consciences rather than the 
orders of sin. The Church, defender of the rights of God, of the law of God. Of human 
dignity, the dignity of the human person, cannot remain silent before such 
abomination. We want the government to take seriously that reforms are worth 
nothing when they come about with so much blood. In the name of God, and in the 
name of this suffering people whose laments rise to heaven each day more 
tumultuously, I beg you, I ask you, I order you in the name of God: Stop the 
repression!62  
Martin Luther King Jr.’s dream serves as a relevant sign-post that may guide COCIN-Plateau 
State relations for a better and peaceful future: 
                                                 





I have the audacity to believe that peoples everywhere can have three meals in a day 
for their bodies, education for their minds, and dignity and freedom for their spirits. I 
believe that what self-centred men [and women] have torn down, men [and women] 
other-centred can build up. I still believe that one day mankind [or humankind] will 
bow before the altars of God and be crowned triumphant over war and bloodshed, and 
non-violent redemptive goodwill will proclaim the rule of the land (King, Jnr., cited 
in Chunakara, 2013:68). 
Finally, one can argue that the religio-political and socioeconomic problems that independent 
Nigeria faces cannot be totally blamed on colonial legacies. The dysfunctionalities within the 
nation are also created by the insatiable greed that the model of governance and economic 
system brings with it, controlled as it is by privileged elites. The rise of Boko Haram and the 
perennial acts of violence that threatens to make the country a failed State are linked to 
factors created by acts of poor governance because of the endemic corruption by State 
officials. Fifty-five years of self-determination has been long enough for the independent 
government of Nigeria to improve on the colonial failures. Accordingly, the continuous 
accusation of colonialism for Nigeria’s continual failures is uncalled-for. 
 
Church-State relations ought to focus on building peace through engendering good 
governance. The paradox of more religions more violence ought to give way to life-giving 
community living. The rate at which religious violence seems to overtake the world today 
would make one believe what Mani (2012:162) argues about the proliferation of religions and 
violence: 
As religions become more important in the lives of hundreds of millions of people, 
the political power generated by this commitment will either lead to a more peaceful 
world or to a more violent world, depending on how that power is utilized. De-
radicalization programs, interfaith initiatives, or peace-making courses are well 
intentioned but grossly inadequate. Religious leaders need to acknowledge and 
reverse their inherently violent beliefs and practices, and assume responsibility ad 
peace-builders.  
Religious violence is not justified anywhere in the world because if religion is all about the 
will of the Creator, it will not do anything less than promote the wellbeing of all the citizens 
wherever they are. However, because religious people especially leaders, have hijacked 
religion for the selfish purposes of greed for power and avarice, religion is almost no longer 
good news to the common people. Mani (2012:163) further argues that religious authorities 
ought to prioritize justice over power. Mani therefore calls on them to integrate what they 
dominated and rejects and laments this situation: 
Today, the alliance of religious authorities with political and economic elites and 




for religions. Studies have shown that inequality between groups—horizontal 
inequality—is a major underlying cause for war. The desperate or outraged may 
revolt against corrupt elites…More often, elites deploy disproportionate force to 
avoid redistributing wealth and power as in apartheid South Africa or Syria. By 
ignoring or exonerating injustice in their cosy relationship with political and 
economic power, religious authorities are facilitating, abetting, and fuelling conflict 
when they should be mitigating conflict, fostering equity and justice, and building 
peace. Speaking out against injustice will be uncomfortable initially for religious 
establishments and leaders because they may fall from political favour but, at last, 
they will be upholding their founding values and contributing to just peace and sound 
governance. 
My desire is for the COCIN and the Plateau State to revert once again to become integrators 
that serves societal inclusion (Mani, 2012:163), by overcoming their dysfunctional past and 
creating equal space for all the citizenry of  Jos, regardless of their religious, political, or 
ethnic affiliations. Church-State relations ought to accord equal treatment to the marginalized 
groups treated as inferior within their own religious and political ideologies because common 
humanity has put all of us on the same level. Religion ought to be pro-life and resist any 
move towards death-dealing relationships with oppressive structures. Mani (2012:166) notes 
that: 
Today, as humanity gropes for meaning in a sea of violence, it is essential that 
religious institutions and leaders reclaim this missing link of religion and urge their 
followers to above all pursue self-examination. Lack of consciousness and suppressed 
unconscious urges underlie violent acts…Religious leaders ought to inspire their 
faithful to raise their consciousness and take responsibility for their conduct. This 
may strike them as a diminution of their religious authority, but is essential in both 
reducing violence and deepening faith.  
He goes further to argue that: 
Such conscious and engaged spirituality could provide foundations for peaceful 
governance; such revitalized religions would merit renewed attention within 
international relations as agents of positive change. 
It ought to be argued that for religion to return to its traditional and constructive role of 
promoting social justice and peace, religious leaders must cultivate a fresh consciousness and 
check their sinful nature of co-habitation with oppressive powers.  
 
St. Teresa of Avila decried a similar situation during the sixteenth century that speaks 
relevantly to religious institutions today:  
Why this great war between the countries—the countries—inside us? What are all 
these insane borders we protect? What are all these different names for the same 
Church of love we kneel in together? For it is true, together we live, and only that 
shrine where all are welcome will God sing loud enough to be heard  (St. Teresa of 




In the twelfth century CE, Basra Rabia also argued for religious harmony, which religious 
groups of this century can learn from:  
In my heart, there is a temple, a shrine, a mosque, a Church, where I kneel. Prayer 
should bring [religion] us to an altar where no name and no walls exist”. With these 
arguments from past women of faith, one wonders whether religions are needed in 
this century when more lives and property are destroyed than saved. Therefore, 
religion, if unexamined and blindly followed, can cause untold division and violence 
and justify tyrannical governance. But if examined and sought consciously, they can 
bring solace, wisdom, and grace to humankind and become pillars of peaceful 
governance (Rabia cited in Mani, 2012:166). 
Unless religious institutions follow the way that promotes the wellbeing of its citizens and 
their property, they may not be needed because they seem to have lost relevance. It is my 
prayer that the COCIN and the Plateau State, Nigeria, will listen to these voices for the 
benefit of their citizens in Jos, and the entire Nigerian State so that Church-State relations 
will recover from uncritical relations with the State and practise its missio-political vocation. 
It is hoped that more studies of this nature will be conducted in the future to promote good 
governance for the wellbeing of Nigeria’s citizens. The present study will offer some sign-
posts for such research in areas not yet covered as a means of the continuous search for 
peaceful co-existence in Nigeria. Before that is done, this study has contributed to knowledge 
in some ways as explained below. 
 
 
8.4. Contribution to New Knowledge 
This research study has made the following contributions to new knowledge with respect to 
the dynamic of Church and State Relations in Nigeria today. 
 
i. Through the adoption of the systematic literature review method, this study has 
unearthed some critical religio-political factors that informed unhealthy63Church-State 
relations in Nigeria’s past. This is attested by the literature on the religio-colonial 
collaboration and associated legacies that served to constitute grounds for an 
unhealthy socio-economic and political competition among the Nigerian population.  
 
                                                 
63 In this context, unhealthy Church-State relations between Church and State serves to foster the discrimination 
and marginalization of other religious groups. When the Church and State engage each other in a marriage of 
convenience for some symbiotic benefits, they tend to leave others out in the rain. This relationship becomes 




ii. An important factor that has had a negative impact on constructing life-giving 
Church-State relations in Nigeria is linked to the reactionary politics to Christian 
engagement in colonial politics that were promoted by the SUM missionaries among 
their converts that shun political engagement. However, during the era of 
Independence, there has been a change in policy that promoted a partnership that was 
incestuous and endorsed sectarian interests to the detriment of the wider pluralist 
society.  
 
iii. This research study has confirmed that Church-State relations, although meant as a 
constructive role in the society, can become a fertile ground for life-denying conflicts 
and the destruction of community. When these relations deviate from its primary 
mandate to the pursuit of selfish ends and power, it tends to become a curse and a 
source of sorrow to society. This is to say that when Church and State confuse their 
missio-political roles, whatever model of relations they adopt feeds violence among 
its citizenry. 
 
iv. This study confirmed that the failure of the State to promote and maintain law and 
order in society and that all religions and their claim to absolute truth and certainty 
engage in sectarian practises that lay the foundation that influence the use of violence 
to resolve issues linked to perceived acts of injustice (Hewitt, 2015; Fernandex, 
2004:xi-xii). The unhealthy competition between Christianity and Islam for political 
influence and numerical growth has contributed to life-denying acts of violence. The 
desire for power and control seems to be at the root of unhealthy Church-State 
relations because power itself seems to be misunderstood by both institutions. Power 
ought not to be construed as a monopoly of some structures for coercive ends, but 
power ought to constitute what Foucault regards as, “a major source of social 
discipline and conformity including whatever promotes social justice and peaceful 
living in the society.”64 Treating people as human beings focuses on the fact that 
humanity is common to all, regardless of what the people have constructed serves to 
promote peaceful living. This informs the reason why this study has postulated an 
Afrocentric model of Church-State relations for the COCIN and the Plateau State. 
This model is contextual and seems to be more life-giving than others that have 
                                                 




emerged in the history of Western Christianity. The Suum-Ngi model of Church-State 
calls for looking beyond social constructs because everyone was human before 
choosing to belong to social groups. 
 
v. Finally, the study contributes to knowledge by asserting that there may be no such 
thing as a single and normative model of Church-State relations that is relevant to all 
contexts in both time and space. Church and State are social constructs which are 
dynamic and diverse in contexts. Hence, the need for a more contextual and Afro-
centric model of Church-State relations which is linked to the common humanity of 
all peoples and unites them despite their artificial differences in Jos, Nigeria. Suum-
Ngi may be the only model that serves wherever people are able to recognize their 
common humanity as a basis for human relations above social constructs. This model 
serves as an alternative model, not only for the COCIN and Plateau State, Nigeria, but 
for the sub-Saharan African region where the community spirit can be stronger. The 
model possesses the potential for a more representative and inclusive Constitution 
building process that can result in the Constitution favouring free and fair treatment of 
each other through greater political equality, more social justice provisions, human 
rights protection, and stronger accountability mechanism (Gawerc, 2011:6). 
Consequently, this study strongly suggests that since every context is unique in time 
and space, constructive and potent models of Church-State relations depends on 
whether it works for the context or not. In other words, the given context ought to 
determine which model works.  
 
 
8.5. Identifying Signposts and Gaps for Future Research 
In the course of this study, I have made a rigorous and systematic review of the literature. 
Accordingly, I have identified several areas that offer themselves as fertile grounds and gaps 
for future research work: 
 
i. The current resurgence of religious radicalism in Nigeria will affect the missio-
political mandate of the Church and State relations constitute room for further 
research. Can institutional religions continue to be prophetic in the society given their 




just about competition for power but that the symbiotic relationship is quickly 
replacing the critical and prophetic relationship because of the impact of economic 
globalization on religion and its diversion to focus on the acquisition of materialism.  
 
ii. The type of space available for constructive Church-State relations in democratic 
regimes compared to military regimes. Abraham Lincoln defined democracy as 
“government of the people, by the people, and for the people” (cited in Haralambos, 
1980:135), which means that democratic regimes are people-centred with greater 
measure of freedom of expression than military regimes; what does the future hold for 
prophetic religions in democratic contexts where people themselves decide on who 
become their leaders? Institutional religious leaders seem to find themselves as gate-
keepers for politicians who come to them for votes. Religious leaders also engage 
closely with political elites who come to lobby for votes by sponsoring religious 
projects. Democratic regimes seem to provide more space for co-habitation between 
Church leaders and the political elites and less prophetic vocation from the Church. 
This may not be the same under military regimes since people’s votes do not 
determine who rules. The effectiveness or otherwise of Church-State relations may 
depend largely on the nature of the political regime on the ground. For example, 
violent conflicts were less in Jos Plateau State until the country returned to democracy 
in 1999. One could equally argue that Boko Haram would not have emerged during 
the period of the military regime in Nigeria; yet, this is not the case with the 
resumption of political democracy where everything seems to go. 
 
iii. Within the context of Plateau State, the potency of Church-State relations seems to be 
dependent on whether the political apparatus of the State is dominated by particular 
religious groups. It appears that whenever those who wield political power of the 
State in pluralist contexts are dominantly from the same religious group or Christian 
denomination, it tends to impair the prophetic voice of the given religious group or 
Christian denomination because of the familiarity of spirit and discrimination against 
the other. Could this not be a sign that one of the reasons why Church-State relations 
fail is when the State elites and religious leaders in that State belong to one and the 





iv. Democracy and African culture seem to offer little space for constructive Church-
State relations because it appears that Africans find it more difficult to let go of power 
or to criticise their kinswomen and men when they are in power. This is clearly 
demonstrated for example in the context of Zimbabwe, Angola, Uganda and Burundi, 
all of which practise a form of democracy that guarantees their State President 
absolute power and silences dissenting voices by rule of law (Haynes, 1996:108-109). 
The sad truth is that many religious institutions, including the Church seem not to be 
the best examples of a democratic society.  
v.  
vi. This present study raises the viability of creating and defending a State (a territorial 
political sphere) as a Christian State or Muslim State in a pluralist context such as 
Nigeria. This is because the theme of owning States by the two competing religious 
groups in Nigeria keeps coming up strongly in the literature. To what extent do 
Nigerians appreciate and are ready to maintain the pluralist nature of their country? 
Are they willing to continue as a pluralist nation? If not, how does it affect Church-
State relations and peace-building in the pluralist context? By the time that Nigeria 
becomes a Christian or an Islamic State, where will democracy be?  
 
 
8.6.  Some Concluding Remarks 
The extent to which Nigeria functions as an independent Nation-State requires further study. 
The literature appears to suggest that Nigerian Independence since 1960 has simply resulted 
in an exchange of one oppressive regime by another. This further raises the important 
question as to whether it is justifiable for Nigerians to continue to blame the past British-
colonial government for the failures of the Independent government or not? It is hoped that 
future researchers will be able to address the above gaps as these issues have direct bearing 
on the nature of Church-State relations in the country in general and the Plateau State in 
particular. 
 
Coinciding with most of the State elites being products of its schools and from the same 
Church (COCIN), the intimacy between them begins to reduce the Church’s ability to 
maintain critical solidarity and distance from the State. Some of the political elite who have 




marginalizing policies against minorities. This tendency started giving rise to a co-habitation 
between the Church and State which has seen them leaving other sectors of the society out in 
the cold. This was discovered to be at the root of violent conflicts in Jos from 2001 to 2010. 
As a consequence, the way forward for a more life-giving and constructive Church-State 
relations between the COCIN and the Plateau State seems to lie with scholars making 
systematic research into the subject such as this one, which may serve to deconstruct the life-
denying relations and remind the two institutions about their missio-political mandate to all 
sectors of society. Religion and State are good things because they have the mandate to 
promote the wellbeing of its citizenry; yet they have also been a source of much pain and 
sorrow to humanity because the participants have used them destructively. The rise of 
religious fundamentalism may be bold handwriting on the wall that the Nation-States may 
revert back to a theocracy in the next century. The twenty-first century is a victim of religio-
political related crises with a cloudy future for the nature of Church-State relations. There is a 
need to shift from Church-State relations to a Religions-State relations model underpinned by 
traditional wisdom and the philosophy of Suum-Ngi in which all religious and non-religious 
traditions have equal validation and legitimation by the State, and that all humanity can have 
equal participation in the affairs of the nation, enjoy equal access to its national resources and 
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Plate 1  
Mass burial of victims of the violent conflict in Jos, Nigeria 
 (Source: HRW, 2001) 
 
 
Plate 2  
Corpses of victims of violence in Jos, Nigeria 






Plate 3  
Christian women demonstrating in search of peaceful co-existence in Jos, Nigeria 
 (Source: HRW, 2008) 
 
 
Plate 4  
The outgoing COCIN President introducing his successor to the Plateau State Governor  




A combined team of Christian and Muslim women demonstrating for peace in Jos, Nigeria 
 (Source: HRW, 2008) 
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Plate 6    
Governor Jonah Jang visits the COCIN president in his office  




The first group of COCIN Theological Seminary Graduates, 2004  




The COCIN Secretariat Headquarters in Jos, Nigeria  
(Source: COCIN Video Coverage File 2010) 















Plate 9  
The COCIN Director of Human Resource and Development, Rev. Ishaku Afan  




The COCIN Director of Health and Social services, Dr Emmanuel Kuden  
(Source: COCIN Video Coverage File, 2010) 
 
                 
Plate 11 
The COCIN Director of Evangelism and Church Growth, Rev. Paul Mangkam  















The COCIN Director of Internal Audit, Mrs Rabeca Tingyong  
(Source: COCIN Video Coverage File, 2010) 
              
 
Plate 13 
The COCIN Director of Finance, Mr. Yakubu Dutse  
(Source: COCIN Video Coverage File, 2010) 
 
 
Plate 14  
The COCIN Director of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), Mrs. Gyarta Pofi  
(Source: COCIN Video Coverage File, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
